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Abstract  
This thesis is situated at the interface between asset pricing and market microstructure 
theory. Motivated by seminal work of David Easley and Maureen O’Hara (2004), who 
present a cohesive framework in which idiosyncratic information impact firms’ cost of 
equity, I contribute three interrelated research papers to this stream of research. My first 
paper “Idiosyncratic Information and Expected Rate of Returns: A Meta-Analytic Review 
of the Literature” provides a quantitative review of the literature examining the associa-
tion between firm-specific information and expected rate of returns. Findings therein mo-
tivate my other two empirical papers. 
 
My second paper “The Impact of Idiosyncratic Information on Expected Rate of Re-
turns: A Structural Equation Modelling Approach” relates to work which tests the empir-
ical validity of information-based return models and examines the question as to what 
extent a firm’s information environment affects its cost of equity (CoE). Using a structural 
equation modelling approach—which is novel—it is shown that companies with high 
(low) quality information environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) CoE than other-
wise identical firms; however, findings also show that the significance of this impact de-
creases with firm size, maturity and profitability as well as market competition.  
 
My third paper “Implied Cost of Capital and Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasting 
Models: Evidence from Newly Listed Firms” pertains to work on implied cost of capital 
(ICC)—which is part of a greater literature on expected rate of returns—and analyses the 
degree to which earnings forecasting models can be used to derive valid ICC estimates 
for newly listed firms. Results show that combining the earnings model of Hou et al. 
(2012, HVZ) with the earnings persistence (EP) model of Li and Mohanram (2014) into 
one forecasting solution generates less forecast bias, higher earnings response coefficients 
and more valid ICC estimates vis-à-vis the HVZ, EP and RI (residual income) models 
stand-alone. This suggests that for smaller and younger firms more complex forecasting 
solutions are required to ensure reliability of model-based ICC estimates. 
 
The concluding chapter synthesizes the main findings of this thesis, indicates potential 
avenues for future research and discusses implications for practice.  
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1 Preface  
The expected rate of return of a firm’s equity (also referred to as cost of equity) is one of 
the most crucial numbers in corporate finance. Albeit its appropriate determination is an 
ongoing debate, its influence on corporations is clear: lower costs of equity, lead to higher 
valuations (i.e., higher stock prices) which is tantamount to increased shareholder wealth. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that academics, practitioners and policy maker alike aim to 
present ever new evidence as to how corporations can decrease their cost of equity (CoE).  
 
Particularly active in this regard is a strand of research that combines insights from 
asset pricing theory (i.e., research on what return can be expected from an asset) and 
market microstructure theory (i.e., research on the drivers of price formation of an asset) 
to examine the impact of idiosyncratic information on firms’ CoE. In general, a firm’s 
information environment is broadly characterised by the following three attributes: (1)  
information quantity is the sheer amount of available public and private information about 
the future prospects of the firm; (2) information precision refers to the accuracy of avail-
able information about the future value of the company (e.g., within what margin of error 
can one infer future payoffs to shareholders from provided information) and (3) infor-
mation asymmetry defines the degree to which investors are differentially informed (i.e., 
the fraction of privately informed vs. publicly informed investors). The interplay between 
these three attributes characterises the overall quality of a firm’s information environ-
ment. Eventually, the extent to which these information attributes constitute an econom-
ically significant effect on the CoE is at the forefront of this line of inquiry.1 
 
David Easley and Maureen O’Hara (2004, hereafter: EO) pioneer this realm in that 
they are the first to present a cohesive framework in which the effect of information quan-
tity, precision and asymmetry on a firm’s CoE is conceptualised. Their model demon-
strates that CoE decreases with high-precision, low-asymmetry information environments 
and motivates a large body of theoretical and empirical work. Lambert, Leuz and Verrec-
chia (2012, hereafter: LLV) present an important extension of the EO model. They show 
                                                 
1  From the outset it is important to note that some studies use the term information quality and information 
precision interchangeably; however, this study regards information precision to be only one of three 
attributes that impact the overall quality of the information environment. Appropriate terminology 
throughout this thesis makes this distinction clear.    
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that if markets are perfectly competitive (i.e., highly liquid), information asymmetry has 
no impact on the CoE over and above its impact on information precision; however, if 
markets are imperfectly competitive, information asymmetry might constitute a separate 
CoE effect. This subtle extension of the EO model entails that the degree of market com-
petition represents a crucial conditioning variable in empirical settings. Taken together, 
both models make a strong stance as to why, how and when firm specific information 
should have a direct effect on CoE and, therefore, support the notion of information at-
tributes being priced in the markets—despite their idiosyncratic nature.  
 
That this notion is much debated (e.g., Hughes et al. (2007), Lambert et al. (2007)) is 
somewhat unsurprising, not least because any evidence supporting above models’ predic-
tions directly undermines neoclassic asset pricing theory which states that the only risk 
which impacts a firm’s CoE is its exposure to (systematic) market risk, and any risk which 
is peculiar to the firm tends to be diversifiable; however, “if something is diversifiable is 
an empirical question that cannot be resolved by assumption within a theoretical model” 
(Shevlin, 2013, p. 448). Therefore, empiricism might be the final arbiter of this ongoing 
debate and further empirical work is warranted.  
 
Any study examining the empirical veracity of the EO and LLV model must decide on 
how to proxy for both the cost of equity and the respective information attributes. Given 
on the one hand that the validity of the different expected return proxies is much debated, 
and on the other that proxies for information attributes are large in numbers as informed 
by both accounting and finance research, the empirical literature is voluminous and the 
conclusions reached vary widely depending on the proxies used by researchers. However, 
as highlighted in my first paper “Idiosyncratic Information and Expected Rate of Returns: 
A Meta-Analytic Review of the Literature” (Section 2) the following two observations 
are particularly startling.  
 
First, extant work almost exclusively performs autonomous tests of the direct links 
between a single information attribute and CoE, which hinders the assessment of the rel-
ative importance of information precision, asymmetry and quantity as determinates of 
firms’ expected returns (see paths b, c and f in Figure 1.1). Except for a recent study by 
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Bhattacharya et al. (2012)—who use path analysis to decompose the association between 
information precision and CoE into a direct and indirect path mediated by information 
asymmetry—such assessment is not provided in the literature. However, simultaneous 
analysis of the interplay between the attributes as well as an investigation of the direct, 
indirect and total effects of the attributes on firms’ CoE  is a necessary “first step” to 
disentangle the underlying complexity between idiosyncratic information and expected 
rate of returns (Beyer et al., 2010, p. 309). 
 
Second, an aspiring literature—in particular in accounting research—uses the concept 
of implied cost of capital (ICC) to derive empirical measures of cost of equity.2 A crucial 
input to the ICC methodology are reliable forecasts of future payoffs to shareholders, with 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts commonly used in this regard. However, analysts’ 
forecasts not only tend to be overly optimistic, which can result in severely upward biased 
ICC estimates, but are also mostly unavailable for young, small and financial distressed 
firms—the sort of firms which would be of “greatest interest to researchers examining 
issues related to information asymmetry, earnings quality, and disclosure where an ICC 
approach is used most often” (Li and Mohanram, 2014, p. 1153). To overcome these 
analyst associated deficiencies, Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012) and Li and Mohanram 
(2014) recommend the use of cross-sectional earnings forecasting models to predict fu-
ture payoffs; nevertheless, the extent to which their models are applicable for the smallest, 
youngest and least followed firms in equity markets has not yet been examined.   
 
My remaining two research papers address these limitations in extant work. The sec-
ond paper “The Impact of Idiosyncratic Information on Expected Rate of Returns: A 
Structural Equation Modelling Approach” (Section 3) theoretically derives from market-
microstructure research and relates to work which tests the empirical validity of infor-
mation-based return models. The research question of this paper is as to what extent a 
                                                 
2  The idea behind the ICC methodology is simple: use a specific valuation model, accept the current stock 
price as at least semi-strong efficient in the classical efficient market hypotheses sense (Fama, 1965, 
1970) and back-out the internal rate of return which equates the current stock price of the firm with its 
expected future payoffs to shareholders (e.g. dividends). The internal rate of return is referred to as 
implied cost of capital (ICC) and regarded as the market participants’ ex ante assessment of the firm’s 
CoE. 
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firm’s information environment affects its cost of equity (CoE). Using a structural equa-
tion modelling approach—which is novel—it is shown that companies with high (low) 
quality information environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) CoE than otherwise 
identical firms, with information precision and asymmetry being of equal CoE relevance, 
while information quantity effects being economically negligible. Figure 1.1 offers an 
illustration of the structural model examined as part of the paper’s main analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Structural Model of SEM 
Oval figures indicate latent constructs which are only indirectly measurable through their impact on observable indi-
cator variables (not shown in this figure). One-headed arrows between the constructs indicate regression relationships, 
and the end of each arrow denotes the dependent construct.  
 
My third research paper “Implied Cost of Capital and Cross-Sectional Earnings Fore-
casting Models: Evidence from Newly Listed Firms” (Section 4) theoretically derives 
from asset pricing research and empirically pertains to work on ICC which is part of a 
greater literature on expected rate of returns. The research question in this paper examines 
degree to which earnings forecasting models can be used to derive valid ICC estimates 
for newly listed firms. Results show that combining the earnings model of Hou et al. 
(2012, HVZ) with the earnings persistence (EP) model of Li and Mohanram (2014) into 
one forecasting solution generates less forecast bias, higher earnings response coefficients 
and more valid ICC estimates vis-à-vis the HVZ, EP and RI (residual income) models 
stand-alone. This suggests that for smaller and younger firms more complex forecasting 
solutions are required to ensure reliability of model-based ICC estimates. 
 
 In the concluding chapter (Section 5), I synthesize the main findings of this thesis, 
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2 Idiosyncratic Information and Expected Rate of 






This paper provides a quantitative review of the literature on the repercussions of idio-
syncratic information on firms’ expected rate of returns. In total, the results of 113 unique 
studies—which examine the cost of equity (CoE) effects of information Precision, Asym-
metry and Quantity—are reconsidered. Results suggest that the association between firm-
specific information and CoE is subject to moderate effects: first, a positive relationship 
between Precision and CoE is only significant in studies using non-accrual quality prox-
ies for Precision and risk factor-based (RFB)/valuation model-based (VMB) proxies for 
CoE; second, almost all VMB studies confirm the positive association between Asym-
metry and CoE, but there is notable variation in the conclusions reached when asset pric-
ing tests are conducted; third, the link between Quantity and CoE is moderated by disclo-
sure types and country-level factors in that firms’ in comparatively weakly regulated 
countries tend to enjoy up to four times greater CoE benefits from more expansive dis-
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2.1 Introduction  
Extensive literature in accounting and finance investigates the extent to which idiosyn-
cratic information affects price formation and return structures in capital markets. This 
strand of research commonly tests the proposition that firms with high (low) quality in-
formation environments should enjoy relatively low (high) expected rate of returns; more 
specifically, it is conjectured that firms can lower their expected returns if they disclose 
more value-relevant information to investors (Quantity), provide information of higher 
accuracy (Precision) and disseminate information more widely between investor groups 
(Asymmetry). While analytical work models these propositions elegantly (e.g., Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991), Easley and O'Hara (2004), Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia  
(2012)), the empirical validity of these models and their predictions is subject to debate 
(e.g., Core et al. (2008) Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009)).  
 
Given on the one hand that the proper measurement of firms’ expected rate of returns 
(alias cost of equity) is an ongoing debate in itself (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee (2005), 
Easton and Monahan (2016), Elton (1999)), and on the other hand that proxies for the 
information attributes are large in numbers as informed by both accounting and finance 
research, the empirical literature is voluminous and the conclusions reached vary widely 
depending on the proxies used by researchers. With that in mind, the main objective of 
this paper is to offer a systematic review of the extant literature to examine the reasons 
underlying the variation in results. More specifically, this review meta-analyses the links 
between Precision/Quantity and cost of equity (CoE), and provides a descriptive sum-
mary of extant findings on the association between Asymmetry and CoE.3 To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study which quantitatively summarises the empirical liter-
ature on idiosyncratic information and expected rate of returns, and, as such, complements 
narrative literature reviews on this topic (e.g., Artiach and Clarkson (2011), Beyer et al. 
(2010), Healy and Palepu (2001), Kothari et al. (2016)). 
 
                                                 
3  Given vast variation in research designs between studies examining the impact of Asymmetry on CoE 
(e.g., some studies use yearly, others monthly data; some focus on portfolio-level, other on firm-level) 
a meta-analysis is not feasible; hence, I focus on descriptive statistics only when examining this link.  
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Overall, findings suggest that the association between firm-specific information and 
CoE is subject to moderate effects as indicated by insignificant average effect sizes (Pre-
cision: -0.048 ± 0.095; Quantity: -0.066 ± 0.124) and a notable amount of studies (29%) 
which only find conditional results for the Asymmetry link.4 Variation in the empirical 
measurement of both CoE and information attributes partially explains these mixed re-
sults: first, CoE effects of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity are 3 to 6 times stronger in 
studies using risk factor-based (RFB)/valuation model-based (VMB) proxies than in stud-
ies conducing asset pricing tests or using realised returns as proxies for CoE; second, the 
controversy over the impact of Precision (Asymmetry) on firms’ CoE stems—by and 
large—from the debate on the market pricing of accrual quality (PIN): whenever other 
proxies are used, results confirm the conjectured associations with CoE; similarly, Quan-
tity results show that country-level factors and the type of information (financial vs. par-
tial-/non-financial) mitigate disclosure effects on firms’ CoE.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the conceptual frame-
work in this study and derives the research hypotheses. Section 2.3 provides a succinct 
narrative review of previous empirical studies. Section 2.4 outlines the methodology. Sec-
tion 2.5 reports results of the systematic literature review, and concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 2.6.  
2.2 Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses 
To facilitate the structure of this review, I present a conceptual framework based on which 
the studies in my sample are allocated (see Figure 2.1). The direct links between the in-
formation attributes and CoE are supported by analytical work. In a seminal paper, Easley 
and O'Hara (2004) demonstrate that a firm’s CoE decreases with the accuracy of available 
information about the future value of the firm; that is, investors demand to be rewarded 
for bearing uncertainty about a firm’s prospects which stems from imprecise information 
given to them, implying that firms which disclose higher quality information to investors 
can benefit from reduced CoE. Thus, I formulate Hypothesis 1:  
 
                                                 
4  Average effect size plus/minus two standard deviations of the mean (i.e., 95% confidence interval). 
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H1: The higher (lower) the information precision of a firm, the lower (higher) its CoE. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
This figure illustrates the direct links between the information attributes and CoE. For each attribute, the most com-
monly used empirical measures are indicated. VMB (RFB) Valuation model-based (Risk factor-based) cost of equity 
proxies.  
 
 Easley and O'Hara (2004) also show that as the fraction of uninformed investors as 
well as the number of private signals about the future value of the firm increases, its CoE 
decreases; that is, uninformed investors—who only have access to public information—
require compensation for “losing out” against privately informed investors—who have 
access to both public and private information—when making investment decisions. The 
higher this informational disparity between these two groups is, the larger the CoE pre-
mium induced by Asymmetry. This corroborates Hypothesis 2:   
 
H2: The higher (lower) the information asymmetry between investors, the higher (lower) 
the firm’s CoE.  
 
Finally, the estimation risk literature (e.g., Clarkson et al. (1996), Lewellen and 
Shanken (2002)) demonstrates that if the amount of information about a firm is low, in-
vestors have difficulties to accurately estimate the return and cash flow parameters of this 
particular firm (i.e., parameter uncertainty); this makes it a riskier investment vis-à-vis 
otherwise comparable firms, and, hence, induces higher CoE. These insights are summa-
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H3: The larger (smaller) the quantity of available information about a firm, the lower 
(higher) its CoE.  
 
The proceeding paragraphs provide a succinct narrative review of some notable studies 
that draw upon these hypotheses. This pinpoints prevailing debates in extant work, reveals 
commonly used proxies for Precision, Asymmetry, Quantity and CoE, and offers guidance 
towards the creation of meaningful sub-groups for later analyses. 
2.3 Previous Empirical Studies  
Firms’ cost of equity is the dependent variable in the studies reviewed below and its em-
pirical measurement varies widely between papers. While some researches rely on real-
ised returns to proxy for CoE (e.g., Doukas et al. (2006) Konchitchki et al. (2016)), others 
use traditional risk factor-based estimates (e.g., Barth et al. (2013), Cohen (2008)), and 
yet others apply valuation model-based measures (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Hou 
(2015)). Those studies which conduct asset pricing tests or use future realised returns as 
proxies of CoE are classified as realised return-based (REAL) in this study. The remain-
ing “non-REAL” papers are further divided into two categories: studies using risk factor-
based (RFB) estimates—such as rCAPM, rFF4 (Carhart (1997), Fama and French (1993, 
2015), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), Sharpe (1964))—and papers applying valuation 
model-based (VMB) proxies, i.e., implied cost of capital (ICC) estimates (see Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002), Claus and Thomas (2001), Easton (2004), Gebhardt et al. (2001), 
Gode and Mohanram (2003), Gordon and Gordon (1997), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) for commonly used ICC estimates).5  
 
Empirical measures are inherently flawed (Rao, 1973), and so are the CoE proxies 
mentioned above. For instance, Elton (1999) in his presidential address states: “The use 
                                                 
5  The intuition behind the ICC framework is straightforward: use a specific valuation model, accept the 
current stock price as at least semi-strong efficient in the classical efficient market hypotheses sense 
(Fama 1965, 1970)  and “back-out” the internal rate of return which equates current stock price of the 
firm with its expected future payoffs to shareholders, where future payoffs are commonly proxied by 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The internal rate of return is then considered the market participants’ ex 
ante assessment of the firm’s CoE. 
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of average realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that infor-
mation surprises tend to cancel out over the period of a study and realized returns are 
therefore an unbiased estimate of expected returns. However, I believe that there is ample 
evidence that this belief is misplaced” (p. 1199). In a similar vein, Fama and French 
(1997) argue that RFB proxies are “woefully imprecise estimates of the cost of equity” 
(p. 154), given that these estimates are based on noisy past realised returns; that is, the 
unexpected news component in realised returns tend to corrupt the reliability of factor 
loading and factor premia estimates in RFB models. Finally, Easton and Monahan (2005) 
examine a number of different ICC estimates and conclude that—due to the optimism in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts—“these proxies are unreliable” (p. 501).   
 
Despite these concerns, two major conclusions regarding the empirical validity of the 
different measures seem to be justified. First, proxying for CoE by realised returns is 
problematic in that discount rate and cash-flow news have a significant impact on firm-
level returns: realised returns are noisy estimates of CoE (e.g., Chen et al. (2013), Ogneva 
(2012), Vuolteenaho (2002)). Second, VMB proxies show somewhat greater construct 
validity than RFB proxies in terms of association with future realised returns, common 
risk-factors, and predictive power of returns (Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. 
(2011), Lee et al. (2010, 2015)). Taken together, this suggests that researchers’ choice of 
CoE measurement might distort findings and partially explain mixed results across stud-
ies when analysing the impact of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity on firms’ expected 
returns.  
2.3.1 Information Precision and Cost of Equity  
The literature analysing the hypothesis of lower information accuracy resulting in higher 
CoE (H1) is thoroughly researched (e.g., 38 papers are assigned to this link in my analy-
sis) and can be categorised in two major strands: accounting/earnings quality and security 
analyst forecast-based studies. 
 
The first stream is pioneered by Francis, La Fond, Olsson and Shipper (2004, 2005). 
The authors examine the association between the quality of accounting information and 
investors’ return expectations, and demonstrate that firms’ CoE decrease as their earnings 
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quality measures increase (e.g., accrual quality, value relevance); however, in an influen-
tial paper, Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) strongly question the validity of this early results. 
Despite continuous evidence for the proposition that earnings/accounting quality is in-
versely related to expected returns (e.g., Aboody et al. (2005), Barth et al. (2013), Hou 
(2015)), this link remains challenged in a number of papers (Cohen (2008), Khan (2008), 
(McInnis, 2010)).  
 
The second stream of research uses security analyst forecasts to proxy for information 
precision; it is argued that the less uncertainty exists about the prospects of a firm, the 
greater the consensus among security analysts, which is then reflected in more precise 
forecasts (Barry and Brown (1985), Barron and Stuerke (1998), Barron et al. (1998)). 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013, working paper in 2003) provide initial support that total an-
alyst forecast precision (AFP) is negatively associated with CoE.  Botosan et al. (2004) 
decompose total analyst forecast precision into its private and public information compo-
nents and show that public (private) AFP is negatively (positively) associated with CoE. 
Interestingly, Barron et al. (2012) show that for firms with limited public information, 
private analyst forecast precision is in fact negatively associated with CoE, which might 
be explained by the dual effect of private information precision. On the one hand, more 
precise private information increases information asymmetry which induces higher CoE 
(e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)), but on the other hand it might also decrease CoE 
when the quantity of public information is limited; that is, private information is still bet-
ter than no information at all (Easley and O'Hara (2004), Lambert et al. (2012)).   
  
In summary, accounting quality—and more specifically earnings quality—appears to 
be an important determinant of firms’ information precision; however, since the study of 
Core et al. (2008) its association with CoE is subject to controversy. What is more, CoE 
seems to be decreasing with total analyst forecast precision, but its relation is less clear 
regarding the private and public components of it. 
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2.3.2 Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity 
Numerous papers investigate the proposition that CoE increases with information asym-
metry (H2); that is, the greater the informational disadvantages between privately in-
formed and publicly uninformed investors, the higher firms’ CoE. Twenty-two (22) pa-
pers are included in my analysis, with Asymmetry proxies mainly deriving from market 
microstructure data (e.g., PIN scores; bid-ask spreads).6 Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara 
(2002) are the first to document a positive association between CoE and PIN scores. 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) question these findings and conclude that “there is not 
much evidence to support the interpretation that information risk, proxied by PIN, is a 
source of priced information risk (p. 241)”. However, the authors acknowledge that while 
their paper suggests “PIN is not priced risk, it is difficult to make more general statements 
about the pricing of information risk since information risk can […] be proxied by differ-
ent empirical variables.” In fact, using spread-based proxies, Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Levi and Zhang (2015)—among others—document a 
significantly positive association with expected returns.     
 
Taken together, market microstructure-based estimates are common proxies for Asym-
metry in empirical work. While there is an ongoing debate about the pricing of PIN (e.g., 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013), Duarte and Young (2009)), the inverse relationship between 
bid-ask-spreads and firms’ CoE seems to be widely accepted.     
2.3.3 Information Quantity and Cost of Equity 
A large literature examines the association between the quantity of available information 
about a firm and its CoE (see H3), with 56 papers being analysed in this study. One stream 
of research operates simple proxies—such as firm age or period of listing—as measures 
of information quantity and demonstrates that these proxies are negatively correlated with 
CoE (Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), Clarkson and Thompson (1990), Kumar et al. 
(2008), Zhang (2006)).  
 
                                                 
6  PIN scores measure the probability that the next trade order is from a privately informed investor; i.e., 
based on private information (Brown et al., 2004). Bid-ask spreads are a measure of the adverse selec-
tion problem market makers are exposed to and assumed to increase with information asymmetry 
(Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). 
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A second stream of research uses firms’ disclosure levels as a proxy for Quantity, with 
ample evidence supporting the predicted negative association with CoE (e.g., Baginski 
and Rakow (2012), Botosan (1997), Campbell et al. (2014), Cao et al. (2017), Healy et 
al. (1999), Francis et al. (2005b), Fu et al. (2012), Kothari et al. (2009), Ng and Rezaee 
(2015)).  However, a large variety of different research designs, disclosure types exam-
ined and disclosure metrics used by researchers’ makes it difficult to generalise results in 
narrative reviews; that is, some studies investigate mandatory disclosure (e.g., Campbell 
et al. (2014), Core et al. (2015)), while others concentrate on voluntary disclosure aspects 
(e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Francis et al. (2008)); some papers focus on financial 
disclosure (e.g., Baginski and Rakow (2012), Evans (2016)), while others examine non-
financial disclosure (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Ng and Rezaee (2012)); and, some au-
thors use self-constructed disclosure scores (e.g., Botosan (1997), Kothari et al. (2009)), 
while others rely on commercially available ones (e.g., Healy et al. (1999), Richardson 
and Welker (2001)), and yet others use simple dummy variables to distinguish between 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms (e.g., Ogneva et al. (2007), Cao et al. (2017)). 
 
Overall, the disclosure literature dominates “simple-proxy” studies in terms of volume 
and recognition whenever the link between Quantity and CoE is tested. However, it 
should be noted that commonly used proxies for disclosure levels—be they self-con-
structed or externally provided—tend to measure disclosure along both a quantity and 
quality dimension, which makes them noisy measures of Quantity.7 What is more, whilst 
there is strong evidence supporting an inverse relation between disclosure and firms’ CoE 
in general, more evidence—along the lines of Richardson and Welker (2001) and 
Mangena et al. (2016)—on the types of disclosure which are particularly CoE relevant 
seems beneficial. This study contributes such evidence.  
2.4 Methodology  
The main objective of this paper is to provide a meta-analytic review of the literature on 
idiosyncratic information and expected rate of returns. However, only for H1 and H3 
                                                 
7  For instance, Cheng et al. (2006, p. 179) state that “while prior empirical research has used the quantity 
of disclosure as a proxy for the quality of disclosure quality, in many cases disclosure quantity and 
quality are not separable information attributes.” 
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research designs between studies are homogenous enough to carry out such analyses; 
studies relating to H2 are often lacking necessary information (i.e., sample size is incon-
sistently reported) and data comparability (e.g., some studies use yearly, others monthly 
data; some focus on portfolio-level, other on firm-level) to conduct a meaningful meta-
analysis; thus, for H2 I only provide descriptive statistics (e.g., fraction of studies con-
firming/rejecting the hypothesis; proportion of what proxies are used).  
2.4.1 Data Collection  
In line with research hypotheses H1-H3, I search for different combinations of several 
keywords (see Table 2.1) in the following databases to identify relevant studies: ISI Web 
of Science; ScienceDirect; Emerald Management Ejournals; SSRN. A review of all top-
tier journals in accounting and finance as well as the reference list of all identified articles 
complements my search.8 Analytical papers (e.g., Bertomeu et al. (2011), Cheynel (2013), 
Christensen et al. (2010), Dutta and Nezlobin (2017), Hughes et al. (2007), Lambert et al. 
(2007), Strobl (2013)) and studies lacking statistical information required for the meta-
analysis of H1 and H3 (e.g., Aboody et al. (2005), Beneish et al. (2008), Chen et al. 
(2007), Clement et al. (2003), Hirshleifer et al. (2012)) are excluded during this process.  
 
The literature applies various different measures for Precision, Asymmetry, Quantity 
and CoE. Based on the most commonly used proxies, I create several sub-groups for each 
information attribute and CoE (see Figure 2.1). Each study in my sample is coded accord-
ingly: for instance, Francis et al. (2004) examine the impact of seven different earnings 
quality measures on two implied cost of capital proxies; hence, I categories this study as 
using “Accounting Quality” proxies for information precision and “VMB” proxies for 
CoE. A number of insightful papers are excluded from the analysis, since the novelty of 
the proxies used in these studies hinders their allocation to one of my sub-groups: for 
example, El Ghoul et al. (2013) put forward firms’ geographic distance from financial 
                                                 
8  Accounting Journals: Accounting Review; Accounting, Organizations and Society; Journal of Account-
ing and Economics; Journal of Accounting Research; Contemporary Accounting Research; Review of 
Accounting Studies; Finance Journals: Journal of Finance; Journal of Financial Economics; Review of 
Financial Studies; Journal of Corporate Finance; Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; Journal 
of Financial Intermediation; Journal of Money, Credit and Banking; Review of Finance.  
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centres as a measure of information asymmetry and show that CoE decreases with prox-
imity; Cao et al. (2015) find that company reputation is inversely related to CoE, and 
Muino and Trombetta (2009) document a significant impact of distorted graph disclosure 
on expected returns. Furthermore, the focus of this review lies on firm-level results, there-
fore, I exclude country-level studies from the sample (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Li 
(2015)). 
 
Table 2.1: Attributes and Keywords 
Attributes Keywords  
Information Precision ▪ information precision/accuracy/quality 
▪ financial reporting quality  
▪ accounting quality 
▪ earnings quality/management 
▪ earnings attributes 
▪ accrual quality 
▪ analyst forecast  
▪ security analyst  
▪ analyst forecast precision/accuracy/dispersion 
▪ earnings/analyst characteristic 
▪ earnings persistence/predictability/smoothness/value rele-
vance/timeliness/conservatism 
Information Asymmetry ▪ information asymmetry/dissemination/dispersion  
▪ informational dis/advantages  
▪ un/informed investor  
▪ public/private information  
▪ probability of informed trading/PIN 
▪ bid-ask spread  
▪ investor concentration/competition  
▪ market liquidity  
▪ firm-specific information 
▪ idiosyncratic information 
Information Quantity ▪ information quantity/amount 
▪ information/estimation risk 
▪ mandatory/voluntary disclosure  
▪ financial/non-financial disclosure  
▪ age/listing/operating history  
▪ media/press coverage  
▪ firm/company prominence 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 2.1: Attributes and Keywords (cont.) 
Attributes Keywords  
Cost of Equity  ▪ cost of equity 
▪ cost of capital 
▪ implied cost of capital 
▪ expected rate of return 
▪ required rate of return 
▪ discount rate 
▪ weighted cost of capital 
The table shows for each information attribute and cost of equity the respective keywords searched for in several 
databases and journals.    
 
2.4.2 Meta-Analysis Techniques 
2.4.2.1 Effect Size  
Meta-analysis techniques require the use of effect size which is the study’s Pearson r 
correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variable of interest 
(Hunter et al., 1982).9 If a study only reports regression results, t-statistics are converted 
into r coefficients as √𝑡2 𝑡2 + 𝑑𝑓⁄ , where df is degrees of freedom. If only p-values are 
provided, corresponding Z scores can be obtained from the normal table, which are then 
transferred into r coefficients by using  𝑍 √𝑁⁄ , where N is sample size (Rosenthal, 1991). 
 
Whenever a study uses multiple, but similar measures for a variable (say, different 
proxies for earnings quality), the study’s average effect size is recorded; thus, these stud-
ies only appear once in the analysis (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999); however, if a study tests 
different proxies for different samples (say, one RFB and one VMB CoE sample), the 
effect size for each sub-sample is recorded separately; thus, these studies appear twice in 
the analysis. For example, 35 studies for the link between Precision and CoE contribute 
48 observations to my analysis (Asymmetry: 22 studies and 28 observations; Quantity: 
56 studies and 62 observations). Also, where necessary, I multiply a study’s effect size 
by negative one to ensure consistent interpretation across proxies and to conform to the 
                                                 
9  I use Spearman correlations, if Pearson correlations are not reported.  
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intuition of the underlying hypotheses of this paper. This is necessary because interpreta-
tions of results vary depending on which proxies are used: some proxies are constructed 
such that lower values signal higher information quality, while others are constructed 
such that higher values also signal higher information quality. For instance, in most stud-
ies, lower earnings quality proxies indicate higher information precision—confirming H1 
if a positive, not negative, correlation with CoE is observed—while higher analyst-based 
measures signal higher Precision and confirm H1 if a negative correlation with CoE is 
observed. In such instances, I multiply effect sizes (of earnings quality) by negative one 
to reverse and re-align the interpretation of results with the intuition of the underlying 
hypotheses (H1).  
 
After the effect size for each study is calculated, the mean correlation (?̅?) for the pop-
ulation is estimated as shown in Eq. (2.1), where 𝑁𝑖 is the sample size and 𝑟𝑖 is the Pearson 
correlation coefficient for study i. 
 





The population variance (𝑆𝑝
2) is estimated as the difference between observed variance 
(𝑆𝑟
2) and the sampling error variance (𝑆𝑒
2) as shown in equations (2.2) to (2.4), where K 
is the total number of studies included in the analysis.  
 
𝑆𝑝
2 =  𝑆𝑟





∑ 𝑁𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
∑ 𝑁𝑖




(1 −  ?̅?2)2𝐾
∑ 𝑁𝑖
   (2.4) 
 
Eventually, the 95% confidence interval is calculated as follows: 
 
[?̅? − 𝑆𝑝𝑍0.975; ?̅? + 𝑆𝑝𝑍0.975 ] =  [?̅? −  𝑆𝑝(1.96); ?̅? + 𝑆𝑝(1.96)]  (2.5) 
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2.4.2.2 Homogeneity Tests  
To test for homogeneity in the data—that is, to examine if variation in results is due to 
sampling errors or moderating effects—two methods are followed. First, putting the sam-
pling error variance into perspective to observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) reveals the degree to 
which the residual variance is trivial; that is, if more than 75 percent of the variation in 
results can be attributed to sampling error (the suggested cut-off in the literature), then 
the relation under investigation is considered to be homogenous and unmoderated (Ah-
med and Courtis (1999), Khlif and Chalmers (2015), Pearlman et al. (1980)). Second, the 
chi-square test statistic shown in equation (2.6) is calculated, where high statistical sig-
nificance rejects the null of homogeneity, indicating that moderating effects might impact 
results across studies (K-1 is the degrees of freedom and N = ∑ 𝑁𝑖). While statistically 
powerful, it should be noted that chi-square statistics are directly proportional to sample 
size (Fan et al., 1999), which makes it difficult to accept homogeneity at conventional 






(1 −  ?̅?2)2
 (2.6) 
 
2.4.2.3 Sample Size  
Most of the studies analysed report results for a multi-period sample. This poses the ques-
tion of how to define sample size (i.e. 𝑁𝑖) in equations (2.1) to (2.6). Using the number 
of unique firms appears to be most appealing; however, this information is often missing. 
Conversely, the number of firm-years (firm-quarters or firm-months) is reported most 
consistently, but might bias meta-analytic results towards studies spanning longer sam-
pling periods, without necessary covering more firms. I address this point as follows: 
when transforming t-statistics (p-values) from regression results into r coefficients, I de-
termine the degrees of freedom (sample size) based on the number of observations in the 
regression (e.g., firm-years). When summarising among studies (e.g., computing mean 
effect size, population variance, chi-square statistic) the average number of firms (e.g., 
firm-years divided by number of years) is used as sample size. This maintains the internal 
integrity of each study—larger sample studies generate robuster results—while ensuring 
a “sampling-period-independent” impact on the meta-level. 
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2.5 Meta-Analytic Results  
Thirty-five (35) studies in my sample examine the link between Precision and CoE, 22 
the link with Asymmetry and 56 the link with Quantity. Given that some papers provide 
findings for multiple sub-categories (for instance, RFB and VMB proxies), subsequent 
analyses are based on 48 observations for Precision, 28 for Asymmetry and 62 for Quan-
tity. Hereafter I use “observations” and “studies/papers” interchangeably, but results al-
ways refer to the number of observations. The Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity studies 
included in my sample are shown in Table 2.2, Table 2.3, Table 2.4, respectively; Table 
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Artiach and Clarkson (2014) AJM US 196 3,138 1985-2000 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0593 Table 3, p. 305 
Barron et al. (2012) SSRN US 307 8,606a 1983-2010 VMB Analyst Confirm -0.2327 Table 2, p. 29 
Barth et al. (2013) JAE US 1,985 51,612 1974–2000 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1210 Table 1, p. 214 
Barth et al. (2013) JAE US 1,985 51,612 1974–2000 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0380 Table 1, p. 214 
Berger et al. (2012) SSRN US 1,665 41,615 1980-2004 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0475 Table 7, p. 33 
Berger et al. (2012) SSRN US 1,015 25,365 1980-2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0830 Table 5, p. 29 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1,054 12,648 1993-2005 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1770 In-text, p. 475 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1,054 12,648 1993-2005 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.2243 Table 2, p. 463 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 555 6,656 1993-2004 VMB Analyst Mixed -0.1470 Table 3, p. 1061 
Botosan et al. (2004) RAST US 312 2,804 1993-2001 VMB Analyst Mixed -0.0930 Table 2, p. 247 
Callen et al. (2013) CAR US 1,129 29,345 1981-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0354 Table 5 & 6, pp. 283-85 
Callen et al. (2013) CAR US 841 19,336 1984-2006 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0416 Table 7, p. 287 
Chan et al. (2009) MF UK 416 5,403 1987-1999 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0190 Table 3, p. 336 
Chan et al. (2009) MF UK 416 5,403 1987-1999 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0288 Table 9, p. 342 
Chan et al. (2016) NAJEF US 1,828 32,910 1996-2013 RFB Analyst Confirm -0.1203 Table 4, p.125 
Chen et al. (2008) JAAF US 2,122 53,048 1980-2004 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0420 Table 2, p. 480 
Chen et al. (2008) JAAF US 614 15,339 1980-2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0433 Table 4, p. 489 
Cohen (2003) SSRN US 1,111 16,664 1987-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0045 Table 6 & 8, pp. 44-6 
Cohen (2008) APJAE US 1,074 18,264 1987−2003 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0068 Table 3, p. 83 
Cohen (2008) APJAE US 1,074 18,264 1987−2003 RFB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0052 Table 4, p. 85 
Core et al. (2008) JAE US 2,909 93,093 1970-2001 REAL Acc.Qual. Reject 0.0003 Table 4 & 5, pp. 11-3 
Core et al. (2008) JAE US 814 21,979 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0386 Table 8, p. 18 
Diether et al. (2002) JF US 2,908 66,884 1980-2002 REAL Analyst Reject 0.0089 Table 9, p. 2136 
Diether et al. (2002) JFQA US 1,203 22,854 1983-2001 REAL Analyst Confirm -0.0585 Table 8, p. 597 
Eliwa et al. (2016) IRFA UK 587 4,112 2005–2011 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0714 Table 1, p. 131 
Table continued next page.  
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Francis et al. (2004) TAR US 790 21,334 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0481 Table 5, 6 & 9, pp. 990-1001 
Francis et al. (2005a) JAE US 1,722 55,092 1970-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0248 Table 2, p. 309 
Garcia Lara et al. (2011) RAST US 1,875 54,389 1975-2003 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0139 Table 4 & 6, pp. 261-4 
Gray et al. (2009) JBFA AU 170 1,362 1998-2005 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0676 Table 3, p. 63 
Gray et al. (2009) JBFA AU 170 1,362 1998-2005 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0730 Table 4 & 5, pp. 66-8 
Hou (2015) RAST US 1,418 41,134 1982-2010 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1275 Table 2, p. 1073 
Hwang and Lim (2012) APJFS US 645 9,672 1993-2007 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1640 Table 2, p. 471 
Kim and Qi (2010) TAR US 2,802 103,682 1970-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0040 Table 4, pp. 947-9 
Kim and Sohn (2013) JAPP US 1,211 30,276 1987-2011 VMB  Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0673 Table 2, p. 529 
Konchitchki et al. (2016) RAST US 2,567 100,095 1976-2014 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0118 Table 5, p. 21 
Larson and Resutek (2015) SSRN US 79 2,684 1978-2011 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0491 Table 6 & 8, p. 42-4 
Larson and Resutek (2015) SSRN US 49 1,728 1977-2011 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.1102 Table 9, p. 45 
Latiff and Taib (2011) ATBMR MY 141 141 2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1624 Table 4, p. 6 
Liu and Wysocki (2016) QJF US 1,454 68,348 1960-2006 RFB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.1200 Table 3, p. 15 
Liu and Wysocki (2016) QJF US 945 44,392 1960-2006 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0700 Table 3, p. 15 
Mashruwala and Mashruwala (2011) TAR US 2,561 92,187 1971-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0048 Table 6, p. 1368 
McInnis (2010) TAR US 1,777 56,870b 1975-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0025 Table 1, p. 321 
McInnis (2010) TAR US 438 14,008 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0444 Table 4, p. 328 
Ogneva (2012) TAR US 2,184 80,790 1970-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0048 Table 4, pp. 1433-4 
Othman (2012) AJBA MY 461 3,688 2000-2007 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0319 Table 3, p. 17 
Safdar and Yan (2016) CFRI CN 1,251 8,754 2006-2012 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0244 Table 2, p. 87 
Safdar and Yan (2016) CFRI CN 1,251 8,754 2006-2012 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0138 Table 3, 5, & 6, p. 89-92 
Sheng and Thevenot (2015) IJF US 128 3,583a 1984-2011 VMB Analyst Confirm -0.3300 Table 2, p. 521 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in Appendix 2.1. † AU: Australia; CN: China; MY: Malaysia; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States. § Number of 
firms is approximated as number of firm-years divided by number of sample years. ‡ When multiple samples are selected for one study, average sample size is reported.  ¥ REAL: realised-
return, RFB: risk factor-based, VMB: valuation model-based cost of equity proxy. £Acc.Qual: Accounting/Earnings Quality, Analyst: security analyst forecast based proxy. a Converted 
firm-quarters into firm-years. b Converted firm-months into firm-years. 
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Table 2.3: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Analysis 
Study Journal* Country† 
Sampling 
Period DV: CoE¥ IV: Asymmetry£ Proxy‡ Direct Link? 
Source of 
Information§ 
Akins et al. (2012) TAR US 1984-2009 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 3, p. 48 
Akins et al. (2012) TAR US 1984-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 4, p. 50 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) JFE US 1961-1980 REAL Micro. B/A Confirm Table 3, p. 236 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1988-2006 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1976-2006 REAL Non-Micro. Acc.Qual. Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1976-2006 REAL Non-Micro. Analyst Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Aslan et al. (2011) JEF US 1965-2009 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 8, p. 796 
Barron et al. (2012) SSRN US 1983-2010 VMB Non-Micro. Analyst Confirm Table 4, p. 32-4 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1993-2005 VMB Micro. B/A Confirm Table 2, p. 463 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1993-2005 VMB Micro. PIN Confirm Table 2, p. 463 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 1993-2004 VMB Micro. PIN Confirm Table 4, p. 1062 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 1993-2004 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 4, p. 1062 
Brennan et al. (2016) MS US 1983-2010 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 4 & 5, pp. 2469-70 
Choi et al. (2016) SSRN CN 1996-2007 REAL Non-Micro. Comp. Confirm Table 6, p. 36 
Duarte and Young (2009) JFE US 1984-2004 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 10, p. 136 
Duarte et al. (2008) JFE US 1985-2000 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 5, p. 37 
Easley et al. (2002) JF US 1984-1998 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 6, p. 2213 
Easley et al. (2010) JFQA US 1983-2001 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 6, p. 307 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) JFE US 1961-1990 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 2, p. 379 
He et al. (2013) IREF AU 2001-2008 VMB Micro. B/A Confirm Table 4 & 5, p. 617-8 
Hwang et al. (2013) JAE KR 2000-2004 VMB Micro. PIN Mixed Table 5, p. 158 
Hwang et al. (2013) JAE KR 1995-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 9, p. 162 
Kang (2010) JBF US 1984-2002 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 4, p. 2990 
Levi and Zhang (2015) MS US 1993-2003 REAL Micro. B/A Confirm Table 3, p. 361 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 2.3: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Analysis (cont.) 
Study Journal* Country† 
Sampling 
Period DV: CoE¥ IV: Asymmetry£ Proxy‡ Direct Link? 
Source of 
Information§ 
Luong et al. (2011) SSRN US 1984-2006 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 5, pp. 46-7 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) JAE US 1984-2002 VMB Micro. PIN Reject Table 7, p. 239 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) JAE US 1984-2002 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 1, p. 230 
Yan and Zhang (2014) JBF US 1983-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 8, p. 147 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in Appendix 2.1. † AU: Australia; CN: China; KR: South Korea; US: United States. ¥ REAL: realised-return, VMB: 
valuation model-based cost of equity proxy. £(Non-)Micro.: (Non-)Microstructure-based proxies. ‡ B/A: Bid/Ask-spreads; PIN: Probability of informed trading scores; Acc.Qual.: Account-
ing/Earnings Quality, Comp.: market competition, Analyst: security analyst forecast based proxy. § Information used to decide if a study confirms/rejects or finds mixed results regarding 
the direct link between Asymmetry and CoE.   
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Table 2.4: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis 






























Al Guindy (2016) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 1,232 8,626 2007-2013 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0870 Table 5, p. 30 
Al Guindy (2016) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 54 381 2007-2013 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Confirm -0.1008 Table 6, p. 31 
Al-Hadi et al. (2015) JMFM 6 Count. N LDE n/a 141 705 2007-2011 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0160 Table 2, p. 80 
Bachoo et al. (2013) AAR AUS N LDE 0.75 150 450 2003-2005 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0157 Table 3, p. 78 
Baginski and Rakow (2012) RAST US Y HDE 1.00 1,355 1,355 2004 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1164 Table 4, p. 299 
Blanco et al. (2015) JBFA US Y HDE 1.00 1,667 10,002 2001-2006 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.1281 Table 6, p. 391 
Blanco et al. (2015) JBFA US Y HDE 1.00 1,667 8,502b 2001-2006 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0314 Table 10, p. 398 
Botosan (1997) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 122 122 1990 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.1430 Table 7, p. 342 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) JAR US Y HDE 1.00 246 2,706 1986-1996 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed 0.0110 Table 4, p. 34 
Boujelbene and Affes (2013) JEFA FR N LDE 0.75 102 102 2009 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.2180 Table 4, p. 50 
Campbell et al. (2014) RAST US Y HDE 1.00 2,048 8,193 2005-2008 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0292 Table 8, p. 436 
Cao et al. (2017) RAST 31 Count. B n/a 0.84 6,309 37,856 2004-2009 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Confirm -0.1500 Table 2, p. 14 
Chen et al. (2003) SSRN 9 Count. N LDE 0.87 273 545 2000-2001 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1400 Table 6, p. 391 
Cheng et al. (2006) RQFA US Y HDE 1.00 348 348 2001-2002 VMB Disc. FF EXI Confirm -0.0500 Table 2, p. 193 
Chien and Lu (2015) IMDS US Y HDE 1.00 4,122 16,488 2009-2012 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0090 Table 4, p. 515 
Clarkson et al. (2013) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 98 195 2003, 2006 VMB Disc. NF SCI Reject 0.1096 Table 4. p. 423 
Core et al. (2015) EAR 35 Count. B n/a 0.86 3,347 50,201 1990-2004 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0083 Table 3, p. 14 
Core et al. (2015) EAR 35 Count. B n/a 0.86 3,347 50,201 1990-2004 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0030 Table 4, p. 18 
Déjean and Martinez (2009) AIE FR N LDE 0.75 112 112 2006 RFB Disc. NF SCI Reject 0.1450 Table 5, p. 73 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 795 11,925 1993-2007 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Mixed -0.0297 Table 4, p. 76 
Dhaliwal et al. (2014) JAPP 31 Count. B n/a 0.83 6,093 79,212 1995-2007 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0700 Table 3, p. 341 
Elzahar et al. (2015) IRFA UK N HDE 0.83 90 448 2006-2010 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1695 Table 7, p. 106 
Elzahar et al. (2015)  IRFA UK N HDE 0.83 90 448 2006-2010 VMB Disc. NF SCI Reject -0.0378 Table 7, p. 106 
Embong et al. (2012) ARA MY N LDE 0.92 135 406 2004-2006 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.1430 Table 2, p. 126 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 2.4: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (cont). 






























Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) JBFA SP N LDE 0.50 50 250 1998-2002 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.2000 Table 4, p. 1384 
Eugster (2014) SSRN CH N LDE 0.67 104 1,039 1999-2008 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.2260 Table 4, p. 40 
Evans (2016) CAR US Y HDE 1.00 187 935 2003-2007 VMB Disc. FF SCI Mixed 0.0440 Table 1, pp.1147-8 
Feng et al. (2009) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 335 4,024 1995-2006 VMB Disc. FF SCI Mixed -0.0343 Table 4, pp. 30-1 
Francis et al. (2005b) TAR 23 Count. N n/a 0.69 137 274 1991, 1993 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1450 Table 7, p. 1154 
Francis et al. (2008) JAR US Y HDE 1.00 677 677 2001 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.0381 Table 4, p. 79 
Fu et al. (2012) JAE US Y HDE 1.00 333 7,654 1951-1973 REAL Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0600 Table 3, p. 139 
Fu et al. (2012) JAE US Y HDE 1.00 333 7,654 1951-1973 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0500 Table 3, p. 139 
García-Sánchez and Noguera-
Gámez (2017) 
IBR 27 Count. B n/a 0.72 659 3,294 2009-2013 VMB Disc. PF Dummy Confirm -0.0620 Table 5, p. 965 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) JBFA UK N HDE 0.83 30 301 1993-2002 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.1340 Table 2c, p. 625 
Grüning (2011) BR DE N LDE 0.42 361 361 2006 REAL Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1580 Table 4, p. 58 
Hail (2002) EAR CH N LDE 0.67 73 73 1997 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.4780 Table 5, p. 761 
Healy et al. (1999) CAR US Y HDE 1.00 37 408 1980-1990 REAL Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1034 Table 6, p. 504 
Khlif et al. (2015) JAAR EG N LDE 0.50 73 292 2006-2009 RFB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2730 Table 4, p. 44 
Kim and Shi (2011) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 1,066 3,198 2003-2005 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Mixed 0.0148 Table 5, p. 360 
Kothari et al. (2009) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 223 1,338a 1996-2001 RFB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0313 Table 3, p. 1658 
Kristandl and Bontis (2007) JIC 4 Count. N LDE 0.46 95 95 2004 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed 0.0315 Table 6, p. 587 
La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) EMJ 8 Count. N n/a 0.60 62 309 2005-2009 VMB Disc. PF SCI Reject 0.0560 Table 10, p. 816 
Lopes and de Alencar (2010) IJA BR N LDE 0.25 55 276 1998, 2000/02/04/05 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2900 Table 3, p. 454 
Mangena et al. (2016) JAAF UK N HDE 0.83 125 125 2004 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.2500 Table 3, p. 12 
Mangena et al. (2016) JAAF UK N HDE 0.83 125 125 2004 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.3440 Table 3, p. 12 
Ng and Rezaee (2015) JCF Global B n/a n/a 598 13,745 1991-2013 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0300 Table 3, pp. 138-9 
Ogneva et al. (2007) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 2,021 2,021 2004 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Reject 0.0127 Table 2, pp.1268-9 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 2.4: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (cont.) 






























Orens et al. (2009) MD 4 Count. N LDE 0.55 223 223 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.1313 Table 4, pp.1547-8 
Orens et al. (2010) JBFA 7 Count. B n/a 0.84 668 668 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.2720 Table 5, p. 1076 
Orens et al. (2013) RAF 4 Count. N LDE 0.52 217 217 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.1150 Table 4, p. 139 
Paugam and Ramond (2015) JBFA FR N LDE 0.75 445 445 2009 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1112 Table 4, p. 606 
Plumlee et al. (2015) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 79 474 2000-2005 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0150 Table 3, p. 351 
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) MDE Global B n/a n/a 27 135 1995-1999 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.3410 Table 4, p. 438 
Reverte (2012) CSREM SP N LDE 0.50 19 114 2003-2008 VMB Disc. NF EXI Confirm -0.2388 Table 4, p. 263 
Richardson and Welker (2001) AOS CA N HDE 0.92 108 324 1990-1992 VMB Disc. FF EXI Confirm -0.0460 Table 2, p. 604 
Richardson and Welker (2001) AOS CA N HDE 0.92 108 324 1990-1992 VMB Disc. NF EXI Reject 0.0110 Table 2, p. 604 
Saini and Herrmann (2012) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 87 87 2005 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0770 Table 2, p. 42 
Tohang and Hutagaol-
Martowidjojo (2015) 
ASL ID N LDE 0.50 29 58 2010-2011 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2210 Table 2, p. 901 
Wu et al. (2014) EMFT TW N LDE 0.75 121 482 2007-2010 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0930 Table 3, p. 113 
Xiao-feng et al. (2006) MSE CH N LDE 0.67 102 102 2005 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.5200 Table 4, p. 1449 
Xu (2009) GJBR US Y HDE 1.00 212 212 1996 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.0300 Table 3, p. 21 
Zhao et al. (2009) RAF US Y HDE 1.00 255 255 2000 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.1529 Table 9, p. 274 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in the appendix. † AU: Australia; BR: Brazil; CH: Switzerland; CA: Canada: DE: Germany; EG: Egypt; FR: France; 
ID: Indonesia; MY: Malaysia; SP: Spain; TW: Taiwan; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States; Studies focusing on US firms only are denoted (Y), non-US studies (N) and studies using 
inseparably both US and non-US firms in their sample (B). $ Disc. Reg.: Disclosure regulation score from La Porta et al. (2006); in the case of multi-country studies scores are a weighted 
average by number of firm-years per country. § Number of firms is approximated as number of firm-years divided by number of sample years. ‡ When multiple samples are selected for one 
study, average sample size is reported.  ¥ REAL: realised-return, RFB: risk factor-based, VMB: valuation model-based cost of equity proxy. £ Disc.: Disclosure; Disclosure Types: Full-
financial (FF), part-financial (PF), non-financial (NF) disclosure; Disclosure Metrics: Self-constructed index (SCI), external third-party index (EXI), binary dummy variable (Dummy).    
a Converted firm-quarters into firm-years. b Converted firm-months into firm-years. 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity Studies 
  Precision   Asymmetry   Quantity   Total 
Sample                       
Observations 48 100%   28 100%   62 100%   138 100% 
Studies 35 73%   22 79%   56 90%   113 82% 
Direct Link                       
Accept 27 56%   16 57%   44 71%   87 63% 
Reject 8 17%   4 14%   6 10%   18 13% 
Mixed 13 27%   8 29%   12 19%   33 24% 
Published Work                       
Yes 42 88%   25 89%   50 81%   117 85% 
No 6 13%   3 11%   12 19%   21 15% 
Publ. Quality                       
Higher-Tier 29 60%   24 86%   37 60%   90 65% 
Lower-Tier 19 40%   4 14%   25 40%   48 35% 
Country                       
US 41 85%   24 86%   25 40%   90 65% 
Non-US 7 15%   4 14%   37 60%   48 35% 
CoE Proxy                       
REAL 16 33%   21 75%   6 10%   43 31% 
VMB 26 54%   7 25%   50 81%   83 60% 
RFB 6 13%   0 0%   6 10%   12 9% 
Precision Proxy                       
Acc. Quality 41 85%               41 30% 
Analyst 7 15%               7 5% 
Asymmetry Proxy                       
Micro.       24 86%         24 17% 
Non-Micro.       4 14%         4 3% 
Quantity Proxy                       
Disclosure             62 100%   62 45% 
 thereof: FF/PF/NF           11/29/22 18/47/35%   62 45% 
 thereof: SCI/EXI/Dummy           38/13/11 61/21/18%   62 45% 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity studies included in the litera-
ture review for several sample characteristics: (i) Sample: number of studies and observations included; (ii) Direct 
Link: number of observations (no. of obs.) accepting, rejecting, and finding mixed results for the link with CoE; (iii) 
Published Work: no. of obs. which are published and unpublished; (iv): Publication Quality: no. of obs. appearing in 
higher-tier journals (4 & 3 rated journals in ABS 2015 list) and lower-tier journals (ABS 2015 2 & 1 rated, unranked 
and unpublished work); (v) Country: no. of obs. focusing on US and non-US firms; (vi) CoE Proxy: no. of obs. using 
realised-return (REAL), risk factor-based (RFB) and valuation model-based (VMB) cost of equity proxies; (vii) Preci-
sion Proxy: no. of obs. applying accounting quality (Acc. Quality) and analyst-based (Analyst) proxies; (ix) Asymmetry 
Proxy: no. of obs. using microstructure (Micro.) and non- microstructure-based proxies; (x): Quantity Proxy: no. of 
obs. focusing on full-financial (FF), part-financial (PF), non-financial (NF) disclosure and using self-constructed in-
dices (SCI), external third-party indices (EXI) and binary dummy variables (Dummy) to measures quantity.  
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2.5.1 Information Precision and Cost of Equity 
Most of the forty-eight observations analysing the CoE effects of Precision relate to pub-
lished work (n=42; 88%) and appear in higher-tier journals (29; 60%).10 The sample is 
strongly tilted towards US firms, with only nine observations (19%) stemming from non-
US data. About one-third of observations use realised returns to measure for CoE (REAL: 
16; 33%) and the remaining two-thirds mainly apply VMB proxies (VMB: 26; 54%; RFB: 
6; 13%). Most observations (41; 85%) rely on accounting/earnings quality measures to 
proxy for information precision, with analyst-based proxies being the exception (see Ta-
ble 2.5).  
 
Focusing on the general conclusion of each paper, about half of all observations (n=27; 
56%) can be regarded as confirming the negative association between Precision and CoE, 
eight studies tend to reject it (17%), and the remaining papers provide mixed/conditional 
results for this link (13; 27%). For instance, Ogneva (2012) shows that only after control-
ling for cash flow shocks in realised returns, a negative association with Precision exists; 
Kim and Qi (2010) confirm H1 after excluding low-priced firms from their sample, and 
Mashruwala and Mashruwala (2011) document a negative relation only in January. This 
qualitative assessment is consistent with meta-analytic results (see Table 2.6). The mean 
effect size between Precision and CoE is -0.048 with a 95% confidence interval between 
-0.142 and 0.047, which illustrates that results for the association between information 
precision and CoE are mixed across studies. A highly significant χ² of 177.89 with 47 
degrees of freedom along with only 27 percent of observed variance explained by sam-
pling error (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) rejects the null of homogenous data and signposts the presence of 
moderating effects.  
2.5.1.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity    
Dividing my sample according to CoE measurement yields some interesting insights (Ta-
ble 2.6, Row II & III). The first sub-group includes those studies which use realised re-
                                                 
10  I refer to four and three rated journals (ABS 2015) as higher-tier outlets, and denote two and one rated 
journals as well as unraked and unpublished work as lower-tier. 
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turns (REAL) as a proxy for CoE; the second group (RFB/VMB) contains studies apply-
ing either risk factor-based or valuation model-based CoE estimates. Total average effect 
size for the REAL group is -0.014;11 the one for RFB/VMB is about seven times larger 
(r̅: -0.082) and almost significant at the 10% level (p-value: 0.111). The difference be-
tween the two effect sizes is highly significant (t-statistic: -165.1; untabulated two-sample 
T-test). Overall this is evidence that the measurement of CoE constitutes a moderating 
effect on results: while there seems to be no relation between Precision and firm’s realised 
returns, the association with RFB and VMB proxies is statistically and economically 
meaningful.12 
2.5.1.2 Measurement of Information Precision  
In a similar vein, the empirical measurement of Precision might explain the overall in-
significant correlation with CoE (r̅: -0.048 ± 0.095).13 However, irrespective of whether 
Precision is proxied by accounting quality (-0.044 ± 0.085) or analyst forecasts (-0.067 ± 
0.139), the associations with CoE remain insignificant (Table 2.6, Row IV). Moreover, 
results suggest that data heterogeneity stems from RFB/VMB studies, since variation 
across REAL results is mainly due to sampling error (χ²: 5.63, df: 13); thus, I focus sub-
sequent analyses on RFB/VMB studies.  
 
Table 2.6 Row II, shows that the relation between CoE and analyst-based proxies is 
twice as strong (r̅: -0.142 vs. -0.074), considerably more significant (p-value: 0.00 vs. 
0.122) and less heterogonous (χ²: 9.03* vs. 83.21***) than for accounting quality-based 
proxies. This stronger correlation might be explained by the fact that analyst-based prox-
ies are more volatile measures of Precision than accounting quality ones, with greater 
variance leading to higher correlations coefficients. For instance, Barron et al.’s (1998) 
analyst forecast precision measure is perceived to be highly sensitive to outliers and meas-
urement error (Barron et al., 2012, p. 21), which makes it a noisy and highly dispersed 
                                                 
11  As the sampling error variance (Se²) is larger than the observed variance (Sr²), the population variance 
(Sp²) is negative; thus, no meaningful confidence interval can be determined.   
12  The effect size between information precision and RFB proxies (r̅: -0.100 ± 0.084) is slightly stronger 
than for VMB proxies (r̅: -0.073 ± 0.103); however, as the number of RFB studies (n=6) is low, a 
separate sub-group is not meaningful.   
13  Average effect size plus/minus two standard deviations (i.e. √Sp²) of the mean (i.e., 95% interval).  
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proxy for Precision. In contrast, Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality (AQ) met-
ric—the most widely used measure of accounting quality—is estimated from a time-se-
ries of firm fundamentals, which increases its robustness and decreases dispersion. To 
that extent, accounting quality studies draw a more conservative picture of the relation 
between Precision and CoE. 
 
A sufficient large number of accounting quality-based studies (n=41) allows for further 
analysis of this subset of observations.14 Designated by a significant chi-square statistic 
(χ²: 83.21***, df: 26), the link between accounting quality and RFB/VMB estimates is 
exposed to moderator effects. As noted before, AQ metrics are a common proxy for ac-
counting quality; Table 2.7, Row II, sub-samples data accordingly and shows that the 
relation between the AQ-metric group and CoE remains moderated (χ²: 68.04***, df: 14) 
and insignificant (r̅: -0.082 ± 0.120), while the opposite is observed for non-AQ metrics—
such as earnings value relevance or accounting conservatism (χ²: 13.08, df: 11; r̅: -0.063 
± 0.020). Differently stated, as the proxies in my sample become more heterogenous, the 
correlation with CoE becomes less—not more—moderated. This is contrary to expecta-
tions in that one would expect that studies sharing the same underlying empirical measure 
also to find similar results. Therefore, the debate over whether Precision impacts CoE is 
in fact a debate over whether accrual quality affects CoE: results for the remaining stud-
ies—which at times use very diverse measures—corroborate the proposition that firms 
with higher accounting quality enjoy lower CoE. 
  
                                                 
14  Given only seven analyst-based studies in my sample, further in-depth analysis for this subset is not 
meaningful.  
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Table 2.6: Results by Information Precision and CoE Measures 
 Acc.Qual. Analyst Total 
RFB/VMB    
r:  -0.074 -0.142 -0.082 
95% CI: [-0.168; 0.020] [-0.211; -0.073] [-0.183; 0.019] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.324 0.554 0.304 
χK−1
2 : 83.21*** 9.03* 105.13*** 
K: 27 5 32 
Sample: 24,194 3,130 27,324 
REAL    
r:  -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
95% CI: [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.053; 0.031] [-0.014; -0.014]# 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 2.484 0.517 1.675 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 5.63 3.87 9.55 
K: 14 2 16 
Sample: 23,826 4,111 27,937 
Total    
r:  -0.044 -0.067 -0.048 
95% CI: [-0.129; 0.040] [-0.206; 0.071] [-0.142; 0.047] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.313 0.161 0.270 
χK−1
2 : 131.18*** 43.50*** 177.89*** 
K: 41 7 48 
Sample: 48,020 7,241 55,261 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Information Precision and 
CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes 
studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying accounting quality 
(Acc.Qual.) and analyst-based (Analyst) proxies for Precision. # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, 
given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population variance 
(Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.    
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Table 2.7: Results by Accounting Quality and CoE Measures  
 AQ-Metric Non-AQ-Metric Total 
RFB/VMB    
r:  -0.082 -0.063 -0.074 
95% CI: [-0.203; 0.038] [-0.083; -0.043] [-0.168; 0.020] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.220 0.918 0.324 
χK−1
2 : 68.04*** 13.08 83.21*** 
K: 15 12 27 
Sample: 13,891 10,303 24,194 
REAL    
r:  -0.011 -0.020 -0.014 
95% CI: [-0.011; -0.011]# [-0.020; -0.020]# [-0.014; -0.014]# 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 2.060 3.889 1.675 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 3.40 1.80 5.63 
K: 7 7 14 
Sample: 13,998 9,827 23,826 
Total    
r:  -0.046 -0.042 -0.044 
95% CI: [-0.154; 0.061] [-0.074; -0.010] [-0.129; 0.040] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.206 0.780 0.313 
χK−1
2 : 106.59*** 24.37 131.18*** 
K: 22 19 41 
Sample: 27,889 20,131 48,020 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Accounting Quality and CoE. 
RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes 
studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying an accrual quality metric 
(AQ-Metric) and those alternative accounting quality measures (Non-AQ-Metric). # zero residual variance is used for 
CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative 
population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.   
 
2.5.1.3 Publication Bias  
To address concerns of publication bias (Møller and Jennions, 2001), I analyse if there 
are differences in result between higher-tier journal and lower-tier journals. As shown in 
Table 2.8, differences in average effect sizes between the two groups follow no clear 
pattern. For instance, when measuring CoE by RFB/VMB proxies, total average affect 
size is larger in higher-tier journals (r̅: -0.097) than in lower-tier ones (-0.067); when 
focusing on realised return-based studies, total average effect size is larger for lower-tier 
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(-0.019) vis-à-vis higher-tier publications (-0.014). However, results in higher-tier jour-
nals are slightly more heterogenous than in lower-tier journals, which can be inferred 
from more significant chi-squares, lower Se
2 Sr
2⁄  ratios and wider confidence intervals. 
Therefore, results tend to be free of publication bias, but the relationship between Preci-
sion and CoE is discussed more controversial in higher-tier outlets.  
 
Table 2.8: Results by Accounting Quality, CoE Measures and Publication Quality 
 Acc.Qual. Analyst Total 
RFB/VMB Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.092 -0.054 -0.154 -0.136 -0.097 -0.067 
95% CI: [-0.194; 0.009] [-0.119; 0.011] [-0.248; -0.060] [-0.187; -0.086] [-0.202; 0.009] [-0.153; 0.019] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.273 0.523 0.555 0.580 0.283 0.376 
χK−1
2 : 47.6*** 26.8** 5.4* 3.4* 56.5*** 42.6*** 
K: 13 14 3 2 16 16 
Sample: 12,698 11,496 994 2,136 13,692 13,632 
REAL Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.014 -0.019 -0.011 - -0.014 -0.019 
95% CI: [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.019; -0.019# [-0.053; 0.031] - [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.019; -0.019# 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 2.019 20.503 0.517 - 1.389 20.503 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 5.4 0.1 3.9 - 9.4 0.1 
K: 11 3 2 - 13 3 
Sample: 22,081 1,745 4,111 - 26,192 1,745 
Total Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.043 -0.049 -0.039 -0.136 -0.042 -0.061 
95% CI: [-0.135; 0.050] [-0.108; 0.009] [-0.162; 0.085] [-0.187; 0.086] [-0.139; 0.055] [-0.144; 0.021] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.235 0.591 0.197 0.580 0.283 0.411 
χK−1
2 : 102.0*** 28.8** 25.4*** 3.4* 127.5*** 46.3*** 
K: 24 17 5 2 29 19 
Sample: 34,779 13,241 5,105 2,136 39,884 15,377 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Information Precision and 
CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes 
studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying accounting quality 
(Acc.Qual.) and analyst-based (Analyst) proxies for Precision. Higher-Tier: 4 & 3 rated journals in ABS2015; Lower-
Tier: 2 & 1 rated journals in ABS 2015, unranked and unpublished work. # zero residual variance is used for CI 
calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative popu-
lation variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.    
 
Overall, results suggest that the relationship between information precision and CoE 
depends on the measurement of CoE: higher Precision leads to lower CoE if measured 
by RFB/VMB proxies, but this link is trivial in asset pricing tests and when future realised 
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returns are used. Furthermore, a material association between RFB/VMB proxies and an-
alyst-based as well as non-AQ metric-based studies is found; however, this relation is 
insignificant in studies using AQ metrics as measures of accounting quality. This warrants 
the conclusion that the controversy over the impact of information precision on firms’ 
CoE stems, by and large, from the debate on the market pricing of accrual quality.  
2.5.2 Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity 
Twenty-eight observations in my sample examine the link between Asymmetry and CoE, 
with most observations relating to published work (n=25; 89%) and appearing in higher-
tier journals (24; 86%). The sample is strongly tilted towards US studies, with only four 
observations (14%) relying on non-US data. Three-quarters of observations apply realised 
returns to proxy for CoE (REAL: 21; 75%) and the remainder exclusively use VMB esti-
mates (VMB: 7; 25%). The vast majority of observations (24; 86%) utilises market mi-
crostructure proxies (i.e., PIN scores, bid-ask-spreads), whereas non-microstructure esti-
mates (e.g., analyst-based proxies) are rarely used (see Table 2.5).  
 
As noted above, a meaningful meta-analysis for the link between Asymmetry and CoE 
is not possible; therefore, proceeding analyses focus on the general conclusion of each 
paper. Figure 2.2, Panel A, shows that about half of all observations confirm the positive 
association between Asymmetry and CoE (n=16; 57%), four observations (14%) tend to 
reject it, and eight observations (29%) provide mixed/conditional results. In particular, 
the level of market competition seems an important conditioning variable, given that 
Asymmetry effects tend to vanish as markets become perfectly competitive (Akins et al. 
(2012), Armstrong et al. (2011), Luong et al. (2011)). Furthermore, findings in 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) and Kang (2010) indicate the existence of January-
effects. 
2.5.2.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity 
Sub-sampling observations according to CoE measurement reveals some interesting 
points (see Figure 2.2, Panel B and C). First, the literature mainly uses realised returns to 
proxy for firms’ CoE (REAL: 21; 75%), with seven observations (25%) relying on VMB 
estimates, and none using traditional RFB ones. Second—and more importantly—there 
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is notable variation in the conclusions reached by REAL studies (reject: 14%; mixed: 
38%; confirm: 48%), but findings are rather uniform when VMB proxies are used (reject: 
14%; confirm: 86%). 
 
 Given that realised returns tend to be noisy proxies of expected returns (Chen et al. 
(2013), Fama and French, 1997, Vuolteenaho (2002)), one might argue that greater 
weight should be placed on studies applying VMB (i.e., ICC) estimates. In other words, 
the reason why “only” 48% percent of REAL studies confirm the positive association 
between Asymmetry and CoE might stem from imprecise CoE estimates. While convinc-
ing evidence exists that VMB proxies show greater validity than realised return-based 
proxies (Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011), Lee et al. (2010, 2015)), 
those estimates are not impeccable either. Beyond the issue of lacking estimates for 
young, small and financial distressed firms due to coverage bias by analysts (Diether et 
al. (2002), Hong et al. (2000), La Porta (1996)), it is in particular the problem of upward 
biased ICC estimates—due to optimistic analyst forecasts (Dugar and Nathan (1995), 
Francis and Philbrick (1993), McNichols and O'Brien (1997))—which raises concerns. 
For example, Hwang et al. (2013) conclude that “as long as the [ICC] estimates are de-
rived from analysts’ earnings forecasts, potential measurement errors in [ICC] estimates 
could remain and influence […] findings”; therefore, the authors call for “more efforts to 
fine-tune [ICC] measures” (p. 165).   
  
Overall, findings suggest that researchers’ choice of CoE measurement affects the con-
clusions reached regarding the relation between Asymmetry and CoE, with extant work 
facing a trade-off between either using comprehensive samples (with noisy return esti-
mates) or valid CoE proxies (with biased samples). This makes it difficult to disentangle 
the economic impact from the impact attributable to measurement errors and sampling 
bias when analysing this link; however, recent advancements in model-based ICC re-
search might help to overcome this predicament in future work (Hou et al. (2012), Li and 
Mohanram (2014)).  
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Figure 2.2: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Measurement of Cost of Equity  
The figure categorises the sample observations in respect to their general conclusion reached regarding Hypothesis 2. 
Panel A shows results for all observations. Panel B and Panel C for REAL-based and VMB-Based observations, re-
spectively.  
 
2.5.2.2 Measurement of Information Asymmetry 
As most studies in my sample rely on market microstructure-based proxies to measure 
information asymmetry (n=24; 86%), I concentrate subsequent analyses on this subset of 
observations. Figure 2.3 shows that PIN scores are most widely used (17; 71%) in the 
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literature, followed by bid/ask spreads operated in some studies (7; 29%). None of the 
spread-based studies reject the direct link between Asymmetry and CoE (Figure 2.3, Panel 
C), which suggests that higher bid/ask spreads indicate greater information asymmetry 
and can induce higher CoE. In contrast, the association between PIN scores and expected 
rate of returns is somewhat debated (reject: 24%, mixed: 18%, confirm: 59%): Mohanram 
and Rajgopal (2009, p. 241) conclude that “there is not much evidence [that] PIN is a 
source of priced information risk” and Duarte and Young (2009) show that it is the il-
liquidity component of PIN which explains the positive relation with CoE, and not the 
Asymmetry part of it. However, the majority of studies confirm the negative CoE effects 
arising from asymmetric information (Figure 2.3, Panel B); together with new evidence 
from longer sampling periods (e.g., Aslan et al. (2011), Brennan et al. (2016)) and im-
proved estimation techniques (Hwang et al., 2013), this substantiates the proposition of 
PIN being an important driver of CoE.15   
 
 Taken findings together, prior evidence corroborates the conjecture of informational 
disparity between investor groups causing an increase in firms’ CoE. However, recent 
analytical and empirical evidence demonstrates that high levels of market competition 
tend to subdue these Asymmetry effects. More specifically, Akins et al. (2012), Armstrong 
et al. (2011) and Luong et al. (2011) show that—consistent with the analytical model of 
Lambert et al. (2012)—the significance of Asymmetry on CoE declines as market compe-
tition increases; that is, in perfectly liquid markets, in which both informed and unin-
formed investors act as price takers, asymmetric information has no material effect on 
firms’ CoE. This puts forward market competition as an important conditioning variable 
in future research.16 
                                                 
15  See also Boehmer et al. (2007), Yan and Zhang (2012) and William Lin and Ke (2011) for a discussion 
on how to improve PIN score estimates.    
16  Common proxies for market competition include: investor concentration (Akins et al., 2012), institu-
tional ownership (Luong et al., 2011) and number of shareholders (Armstrong et al. (2011), Barron et 
al. (2012)).  
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Figure 2.3: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Measurement of Information Asymmetry  
The figure categorises the sample observations in respect to their general conclusion reached regarding Hypothesis 2. 
Panel A shows results for all microstructure-based observations. Panel B and Panel C for PIN-based and Bid/Ask-
Spread-Based observations, respectively.  
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Kumar et al. (2008), Zhang (2006)).17 Sixty-two observations in my sample analyse the 
link between Quantity and CoE of which most work pertain to published work (n=50; 
81%) and appear in higher-tier journals (37; 60%). Ten percent of studies use realised 
returns to proxy for expected returns (n=6), with VMB measures prevailing in the disclo-
sure literature (VMB: 50; 81%; RFB: 6; 10%). Whilst some studies include firms from 
multiple countries in their sample (13; 21%), the great majority are single country studies 
(49; 79%). Interestingly, only twenty-five observations (40%) relate to US firms—which 
is exceptionally low compared to the US-bias in Precision and Asymmetry studies (81 and 
86 percent, respectively)—and the remaining thirty-seven studies either focus on Non-
US countries (29; 47%) or inseparably include both US and Non-US firms (8; 13%) in 
their samples (see Table 2.5).  
 
Table 2.5 also reports the type of disclosure examined and the disclosure metric used 
by researchers. Eleven observations (18%) are categorised as having a clear focus on fi-
nancial disclosure, twenty-two (35%) as evaluating non-financial disclosure aspects, and 
the remining twenty-nine (47%) as partial-financial (i.e. all those studies with an empha-
sis on the general quality of firms’ disclosure). Most studies apply self-constructed indi-
ces to measure disclosure levels (38; 61%), followed by thirteen studies (21%) relying on 
third-party providers (e.g., AIMR, S&P scores) and eleven (18%) observations using sim-
ple dummy variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
 
Examining the general conclusion of each paper, about seventy percent of all observa-
tions (n=44; 71%) tend to confirm the negative association between Quantity and CoE, 
six studies reject it (10%), and the remaining twelve papers (19%) provide mixed/condi-
tional results for this link. For instance, Francis et al. (2008) show that the negative rela-
tion between disclosure and expected returns tend to vanish after controlling for earnings 
quality; Evans (2016) and Kim and Shi (2011) suggest that the timeliness and the sign of 
earnings announcements (good/bad) as well as the degree of market competition are im-
portant conditioning variables; and Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) and Gietzmann and 
                                                 
17  Recently, Souissi and Khlif (2012) also meta-analyse the impact of disclosure on cost of equity capital; 
however, my analysis differs from theirs in that it operates a larger sample (56 vs. 22 studies), covers a 
longer sampling period (1997-2010 vs. 1997-2017) and analyses substantially more firm-years (342,116 
vs 9,553). Furthermore, I include both mandatory and voluntary disclosure studies, while Souissi and 
Khlif (2012) focus on voluntary disclosure only.  
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Ireland (2005) demonstrate that the impact of disclosure on CoE is extenuated by ac-
counting conservatism (i.e., only firms adopting aggressive accounting policies can re-
duce their CoE by increased disclosure activity). This qualitative assessment is consistent 
with meta-analytic results (see Table 2.9). The mean effect size between Quantity and 
CoE is -0.066 with a 95% confidence interval between -0.190 and 0.058, illustrating that 
findings vary across studies. A highly significant χ² of 241.21 with 61 degrees of freedom 
along with only 26 percent of observed variance explained by sampling error (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) 
rejects the null of homogenous data and pinpoints the presence of moderating effects.  
2.5.3.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity 
As before, I divide my sample into two sub-groups according to CoE measurement (Table 
2.9, Row II & III). Total average effect size for the RFB/VMB group (r̅: -0.075 ± 0.129) 
is about three times larger than for the REAL group (-0.026 ± 0.037), however, none of 
the REAL studies examines the association in a pure financial disclosure setting, where 
CoE effects are most pronounced, which tend to explain this difference in effect size 
(Columns II-IV).18 More importantly, both effect sizes are insignificantly different from 
zero (p-value: 0.256 and 0.171), which indicates that the choice of CoE measurement 
does not explain mixed results in the disclosure literature.   
2.5.3.2 Measurement of Quantity  
Table 2.9 distinguishes studies according to which type of disclosure is examined by re-
searchers: financial (FF), partial-financial (PF) and non-financial (NF) disclosure studies. 
Row IV shows an economically and statistically significant correlation of about 12 per-
cent between CoE and FF studies (p-value: 0.019), but a markedly reduced and statisti-
cally insignificant effect size of only five percent for PF and NF studies (p-values: 0.358 
and 0.361). This reveals that financial disclosure is twice as important to investors than 
non-financial and partial-financial disclosure. However, this is not to say that non-finan-
cial information is irrelevant; for example, a relatively large strand of research within the 
                                                 
18  The effect size for VMB proxies (r̅: -0.084 ± 0.128) is markedly stronger than for RFB measures (r̅: -
0.017 ± 0.071) which—as in the case of the REAL group—is attributable to the fact that none of the 
RFB studies focus on financial disclosure. 
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NF category (n=10; 16%) documents a significantly inverse association between Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility disclosure and CoE (r̅: -0.056 ± 0.022, unreported).19 Moreo-
ver, findings are robust to researchers’ choice of how to measure disclosure levels; that 
is, irrespective of using self-constructed disclosure indices (SCI) or simple dummy vari-
ables to proxy for disclosing and non-disclosing firms, the effect size is always signifi-
cantly negative for FF studies (SCI: -0.101 ± 0.069; Dummy: -0.126± 0.106), but insig-
nificant and much weaker for NF and PF studies (see Table 2.10).20  
 
Next, I examine if different disclosure requirements across countries moderate results. In 
doing so, I categorise the studies in three different ways: first, I distinguish between US 
and Non-US studies; second, I assign each study a disclosure regulation score and allocate 
studies with a score below the sample average of 0.83 to the LOW group and the remain-
der to the HIGH group;21 third, I follow Souissi and Khlif (2012) and form groups based 
on countries transparency culture, where the high disclosure environment group (HDE) 
includes US, UK and Canadian studies and the low disclosure environment group (LDE) 
covers the remaining countries in my sample.22 
 
Table 2.11, Column V, shows that total disclosure effects are about 3.5 times larger in 
Non-US (r̅: -0.139) than in US studies (-0.039). Similarly, studies concentrating on less 
regulated (LOW: -0.126) and transparent countries (LDE: -0.141) document an approxi-
mately three times stronger correlation between disclosure and CoE than studies focusing 
on more regulated and transparent countries (HIGH: -0.062; HDE: -0.043). However, the 
magnitude of these differences varies by disclosure types; for instance, the CoE effect of 
financial disclosure in US settings is “only” 2.5 times larger than in Non-US settings, 
                                                 
19  Corporate Social Responsibility studies: Bachoo et al. (2013), Clarkson et al. (2013), Déjean and 
Martinez (2009), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2014), Ng and Rezaee (2015), Plumlee et al. 
(2015), Reverte (2012), Richardson and Welker (2001), Wu et al. (2014).  
20  Given that error variances (Se²) for FF and NF studies using externally provided disclosures scores 
(EXI) are larger than observed variances (Sr²), confidence intervals cannot be calculated and a compar-
ison with PF studies is not meaningful.    
21  Consistent with Core et al. (2015), I measure the level of disclosure regulation by the index of disclosure 
requirements in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006). In the case of multi-country studies, I 
report a weighted average per observation (weight: firm-years per country).  
22  LDE countries: Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Sweden Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates. 
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while partial- and non-financial disclosure effects are about three and 4.5 times larger 
(similar patterns can be observed for HIGH and LOW as well as HDE and LDE studies). 
What is more, within each sub-sample a substantial amount of variation in results is now 
attributable to sampling error (e.g., 𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄  ratios of 0.54 and 0.48 for US and Non-US 
studies vis-à-vis 0.26 for the sample as a whole); together with less significant chi-square 
statistics, this confirms that disclosure environments across countries moderate results. 
 
Overall, results confirm that the more financial information firms disclose, the greater 
their CoE benefits. However, findings also suggest that in countries where disclosure reg-
ulation and requirements are strong (such as the US), investors appreciate firms’ disclo-
sure efforts to a much lesser extent than in weaker regulated countries.  
2.5.3.3 Publication Bias  
As before, I analyse if there are differences in result between higher-tier and lower-tier 
publications. Table 2.12 shows that differences in average effect sizes between the two 
groups follow no clear pattern: higher-tier journals report a stronger effect size when 
RFB/VMB proxies are used (high: -0.081; low: -0.055), while lower-tier journals’ effect 
size is stronger for REAL proxies (-0.020; -0.158); similarly, higher-tier studies find 
stronger CoE effects for financial disclosure (-0.119; -0.044), while lower-tier studies 
report a stronger relation with partial-financial disclosure (-0.038; -0.138)—average ef-
fect sizes are similar for non-financial disclosure (-0.061; -0.040). However, results in 
higher-tier journals are somewhat more heterogenous than in lower-tier journals as indi-
cated by more significant chi-squares, lower Se
2 Sr
2⁄  ratios and wider confidence intervals. 
This suggests that results are free of publication bias, but the impact of corporate disclo-
sure on firms’ CoE is debated more controversially in higher-tier outlets. 
 
To summarize, findings show that researchers’ choice of CoE measurement does not 
explain mixed results in the disclosure literature, but it is the type of disclosure (financial 
vs. partial-/non-financial) as well as the disclosure setting (strongly vs. weakly regulated 
countries) which moderates results. Robustness tests show that these findings are widely 
insensitive to how disclosure levels are measured by researchers. 
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RFB/VMB     
r:  -0.117 -0.069 -0.053 -0.075 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.215; 0.078] [-0.167; 0.060] [-0.204; 0.054] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.288 0.331 0.263 0.258 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 72.55*** 79.85*** 217.38*** 
K: 11 24 21 56 
Sample: 10,423 8,625 17,560 36,607 
REAL        
r:  - -0.025 -0.060 -0.026 
95% CI: - [-0.066; 0.017] [-0.060; -0.060]# [-0.063; 0.011] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : - 0.599 - 0.686 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - 8.34 - 8.75 
K: - 5 1 6 
Sample: - 7,460 333 7,793 
Total        
r:  -0.117 -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quantity and 
CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes 
studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or 
not at all (NF) on financial disclosure. # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance 
(Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level. 
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SCI         
r:  -0.101 -0.039 -0.052 -0.050 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.145; 0.067] [-0.217; 0.12] [-0.179; 0.079] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.654 0.317 0.205 0.270 
χK−1
2 : 9.17* 60.00*** 63.36*** 140.89*** 
K: 6 19 13 38 
Sample: 2,537 13,934 7,098 23,569 
EXI         
r:  -0.049 -0.128 -0.026 -0.104 
95% CI: [-0.049; -0.049]# [-0.278; 0.022] [-0.026; -0.026]# [-0.231; 0.023] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 1509.313 0.500 1.980 0.594 
χK−1
2 : 0.00 18.00** 1.01 21.89** 
K: 2 9 2 13 
Sample: 456 1,492 127 2,075 
Dummy         
r:  -0.126 -0.062 -0.055 -0.083 
95% CI: [-0.232; -0.020] [-0.062; -0.062]# [-0.109; 0.00] [-0.186; 0.020] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.117 - 0.456 0.173 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 25.60*** - 15.36** 63.47*** 
K: 3 1 7 11 
Sample: 7,430 659 10,667 18,756 
Total         
r:  -0.117 -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quantity and 
CoE. Distinction is made between type of disclosures—studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not at all (NF) on 
financial disclosure—and disclosure metrics— studies using self-constructed disclosure indexes (SCI), externally pro-
vided third-party indices (EXI) or simple dummy variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-disclosing firms 
(Dummy). # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the 
observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, 0.10 level.   
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Table 2.11: Results by Disclosure Types and Disclosure Regimes 
Panel A: US and Non-US Firms    







US         
r:  -0.050 -0.056 -0.022 -0.039 
95% CI: [-0.136; 0.035] [-0.102; -0.010] [-0.073; 0.028] [-0.104; 0.026] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.484 0.720 0.592 0.539 
χK−1
2 : 12.39* 13.88 15.20* 46.38*** 
K: 6 10 9 25 
Sample: 3,346 6,986 9,267 19,599 
Non-US         
r:  -0.131 -0.173 -0.098 -0.139 
95% CI: [-0.131; -0.131]# [-0.375; 0.028] [-0.264; 0.069] [-0.361; 0.037] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 1.352 0.437 0.517 0.478 
χK−1
2 : 2.96 34.33*** 19.33** 60.68*** 
K: 4 15 10 29 
Sample: 768 1,720 1,266 3,754 
Panel B: High and Low Disclosure Regulation   
HIGH         
r:  -0.117 -0.035 -0.053 -0.062 
95% CI: [-0.220; -0.014] [-0.093; 0.024] [-0.166; 0.061] [-0.176; 0.052] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.262 0.544 0.203 0.221 
χK−1
2 : 38.13*** 27.58** 69.05*** 176.65*** 
K: 10 15 14 39 
Sample: 9,978 14,118 16,351 40,446 
LOW         
r:  -0.111 -0.153 -0.083 -0.126 
95% CI: [-0.111; -0.111]# [-0.381; 0.075] [-0.187; 0.021] [-0.314; 0.061] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : - 0.320 0.721 0.400 
χK−1
2 : - 37.47*** 9.71 50.04*** 
K: 1 12 7 20 
Sample: 445 1,800 944 3,188 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 2.11: Results by Disclosure Types and Disclosure Regimes (cont.) 
Panel C: High (HDE) and Low Disclosure Environments (LDE)    







HDE         
r:  -0.060 -0.056 -0.026 -0.043 
95% CI: [-0.159; 0.039] [-0.097; -0.015] [-0.107; 0.054] [-0.122; 0.037] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.490 0.782 0.426 0.489 
χK−1
2 : 18.38** 14.07 28.14*** 65.46*** 
K: 9 11 12 32 
Sample: 3,668 7,016 9,590 20,275 
LDE         
r:  -0.111 -0.186 -0.083 -0.141 
95% CI: [-0.111; -0.111]# [-0.398; 0.026] [-0.187; 0.021] [-0.326; 0.044] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : - 0.390 0.721 0.429 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - 30.74*** 9.71 46.66*** 
K: 1 12 7 20 
Sample: 445 1,491 944 2,879 
Total         
r:  -0.117 -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-
error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and 
sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quantity and 
CoE. Distinction is made between types of disclosures (i.e., studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not at all (NF) 
on financial disclosure) and the following disclosure regimes: Panel A reports results for US and non-US firms, Panel 
B categorises studies according to their disclosure regulation scores, with studies below the sample average of 0.83 
being assigned to the LOW group and the remainder to the HIGH group; Panel C distinguishes between high disclosure 
environments (HDE: US, CA, UK) and a low disclosure environments (LDE: AUS, BR, CH, DE, EG, FR, ID, MY, SP, 
TW) with the respective countries assigned to each group in parentheses. # zero residual variance is used for CI cal-
culation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population 
variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.    
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Table 2.12: Results by Disclosure Types, CoE Measures and Publication Quality 







RFB/VMB Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.119 -0.044 -0.057 -0.133 -0.061 -0.040 -0.081 -0.055 
95% CI: [-0.219; -0.020] [-0.044; -0.044] [-0.172; 0.058] [-0.352; 0.085] [-0.187; 0.064] [-0.121; 0.041] [-0.208; 0.047] [-0.184; 0.073] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.252 9.654 0.322 0.410 0.194 0.469 0.209 0.401 
χK−1
2 : 35.8*** 0.2 37.3*** 29.3*** 56.7*** 21.3** 153.3*** 59.8*** 
K: 9 2 12 12 11 10 32 24 
Sample: 10,033 390 7,286 1,340 11,007 6,553 28,325 8,282 
REAL Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  - - -0.018 -0.158 -0.060 - -0.020 -0.158 
95% CI: - - [-0.018; -0.018]# [-0.158; -0.158]# [-0.060; -0.060]# - [-0.020; -0.020]# [-0.158; -0.158]# 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : - - 2.534 - - - 2.329 - 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - - 1.6 - - - 2.2 - 
K: - - 4 1 1 - 5 1 
Sample: - - 7,099 361 333 - 7,432 361 
Total Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.119 -0.044 -0.038 -0.138 -0.061 -0.040 -0.068 -0.059 
95% CI: [-0.219; -0.020] [-0.044; -0.044]# [-0.124; 0.049] [-0.328; 0.051] [-0.184; 0.061] [-0.121; 0.041] [-0.170; 0.034] [-0.190; 0.071] 
Se
2 Sr
2⁄ : 0.252 9.654 0.362 0.440 0.212 0.469 0.209 0.393 
χK−1
2 : 35.8*** 0.2 44.2*** 29.6*** 56.7*** 21.3** 177.1*** 63.6*** 
K: 9 2 16 13 12 10 37 25 
Sample: 10,033 390 14,385 1,701 11,340 6,553 35,757 8,643 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-
square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quantity and CoE. RFB/VMB 
contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies 
focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not at all (NF) on financial disclosure. Higher-Tier: 4 & 3 rated journals in ABS2015; Lower-Tier: 2 & 1 rated journals in ABS 2015, unranked and 
unpublished work. # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population 
variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level. 
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2.6 Summary and Discussion  
This paper provides a quantitative review of the literature examining the impact of idio-
syncratic information on firms’ expected rate of returns. For the links between Preci-
sion/Quantity and CoE meta-analytic results are provided and for the link with Asymmetry 
descriptive statistics only due to data constraints. In total, results of 113 unique papers are 
reconsidered and findings suggest that the association between firm-specific information 
and CoE is subject to moderate effects. This is indicated by insignificant average effect 
sizes (Precision: -0.048 ± 0.095; Quantity: -0.066 ± 0.124) and a notable amount of stud-
ies (29%) which only find conditional results for the link between Asymmetry and CoE.  
 
The empirical measurement of both CoE and information attributes partially explain 
these mixed results. First, the conjectured positive relationship between Precision and 
CoE is only significant in studies using non-accrual quality proxies for Precision and 
RFB/VMB proxies for CoE (r̅: -0.063 ± 0.020); that is, the link between information pre-
cision and expected returns seems trivial in asset pricing tests (REAL proxies) or when 
accrual quality metrics are used. Second, almost all VMB studies confirm the positive 
association between Asymmetry and CoE (86%), but there is notable variation in the con-
clusions reached by REAL studies (reject: 14%; mixed: 38%; confirm: 48%). Third, 
mixed results for the link between Quantity and CoE are moderated by disclosure type 
(financial vs. partial-/non-financial) and disclosure settings insofar as firms’ in compara-
tively weakly regulated countries tend to enjoy between 2 to 4 times greater CoE benefits 
from more expansive disclosure—depending on the type of disclosure—than firms in 
strongly regulated markets (such as the US or the UK). 
 
Putting results into greater perspective, the following observations are particularly 
noteworthy. First, valuation model-based CoE estimates dominate the literature overall 
(i.e., 60 percent of all 138 observations use such proxies), but depending on which infor-
mation link being examined the popularity of REAL, RFB and VMB proxies varies: 
Asymmetry studies mainly conduct asset pricing test or use realised returns to proxy for 
expected returns (75%), Quantity studies predominantly use VMB proxies (81%), with 
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the greatest balance being observed for Precision studies (REAL: 33%; VMB: 54%). In-
terestingly, traditional RFB estimates are rarely used to forecast CoE (Precision: 13%; 
Asymmetry: 0%; Quantity: 10%), but of course are implicitly relied on in asset pricing 
tests. Second, there is large variety of different proxies for the information attributes, and 
results crucially depend on which proxy is used. For instance, the debate on the impact of 
Precision on firms’ CoE is mainly an argument about the market pricing of accrual qual-
ity; the association between Asymmetry and CoE stems from the controversy over the 
pricing of PIN; and the impact of Quantity on CoE varies by disclosure types examined.  
 
 Given these results, my main two conclusions are as follows. First, wide variation 
in the empirical measurement of CoE and information attributes across studies hinders 
the assessment of the relative importance of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity as deter-
minates of firms’ expected rate of returns; that is, which of the three attributes has com-
paratively greater CoE relevance cannot be answered conclusively by this study. There-
fore, a comprehensive research design that allows to concurrently examine the different 
information attributes and CoE measures within one empirical model seems required to 
disentangle the underlying complexity between idiosyncratic information and expected 
rate of returns. My paper on “The Impact of Idiosyncratic Information on Expected Rate 
of Returns: A Structural Equation Modelling Approach” (Section 3) offers such a meth-
odology and contributes new evidence to the debate on the pricing of information risk. 
 
Second, VMB measures are highly popular and frequently used in the literature; hence, 
extant findings crucially hinge upon the empirical soundness of those measures. While 
convincing evidence exists that VMB proxies are indeed better measures of CoE than 
RFB and REAL (Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011), Lee et al. (2010, 
2015)), one should not neglect concerns raised in regard to the construct validity of these 
proxies. On the one hand, analyst-based ICC estimates tend to be upward biased (Easton 
and Monahan, 2005, 2016), which may distort findings (Hwang et al., 2013, p. 165); on 
the other hand, ICC estimates are mostly unavailable for young, small and financial dis-
tressed firms—the sort of firms which would be of “greatest interest to researchers exam-
ining issues related to information asymmetry, earnings quality, and disclosure where an 
ICC approach is used most often” (Li and Mohanram, 2014, p. 1153). In seminal work, 
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Hou et al. (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014) recommend the use of mechanical earn-
ings forecasts to overcome these analyst-based deficiencies and to increase applicability 
of the ICC methodology; however, the extent to which their models are valid for the 
smallest, youngest and least followed firms in capital markets has not yet been examined. 
My paper on “Implied Cost of Capital and Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasting Models: 
Evidence from Newly Listed Firms” (Section 4) fills this gap. 
2.7 Appendix  
Appendix 2.1: Journal Index 
Journal Abbreviation ABS 2015 
Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review ATBMR n/a 
Accounting in Europe AIE 2 
Accounting Review TAR 4 
Accounting, Organizations and Society AOS 4 
Advanced Science Letters ASL n/a 
Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting AIA 2 
Applied Economics AE 2 
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting AJBA n/a 
Asian Review of Accounting ARA 2 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics APJAE 2 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies APJFS n/a 
Australian Accounting Review AAR 2 
Australian Journal of Management AJM n/a 
Business Research BR n/a 
China Finance Review International CFRI 1 
Contemporary Accounting Research CAR 4 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management CSREM 1 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade EMFT n/a 
European Accounting Review EAR 3 
European Management Journal EMJ 2 
Global Journal of Business Research GJBR n/a 
Industrial Management and Data Systems IMDS 2 
International Business Review IBR 3 
International Journal of Accounting IJA 3 
International Journal of Forecasting IJF 3 
International Review of Economics and Finance IREF 2 
International Review of Financial Analysis IRFA 3 
Journal of Accounting and Economics JAE 4 
Notes: Table continued next page.  
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Appendix 2.1: Journal Index (cont.) 
Journal Abbreviation ABS 2015 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy JAPP 3 
Journal of Accounting Research JAR 4 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance JAAF 3 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research JAAR 2 
Journal of Banking and Finance JBF 3 
Journal of Business JB n/a 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting JBFA 3 
Journal of Business, Economics and Finance JBEF n/a 
Journal of Corporate Finance JCF 4 
Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science JEFA n/a 
Journal of Empirical Finance JEF 3 
Journal of Finance JF 4 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis JFQA 4 
Journal of Financial Economics JFE 4 
Journal of Intellectual Capital JIC 2 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money JIFMIM 3 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management JMFM 2 
Journal of Risk and Insurance JRI 3 
Management Decision MD 2 
Management Science MS 4 
Management Science and Engineering MSE n/a 
Managerial and Decision Economics MDE 2 
Managerial Finance MF 1 
North American Journal of Economics and Finance NAJEF 2 
Pacific Accounting Review PAR 1 
Quarterly Journal of Finance QJF 1 
Review of Accounting and Finance RAF 2 
Review of Accounting Studies RAST 4 
Review of Finance (European Finance Review) RF 4 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting RQFA 3 
SSRN SSRN n/a 
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3 The Impact of Idiosyncratic Information on Ex-






This study applies an innovative structural equation modelling approach to examine the 
repercussions of idiosyncratic information on expected rate of returns. Using nine differ-
ent proxies for cost of equity (CoE) and three different indicators for each information 
attribute (viz. Quantity, Asymmetry and Precision), this paper provides for a sample of 
7,091 firms confirmatory evidence that companies with high (low) quality information 
environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) CoE than otherwise identical firms, with 
Precision and Asymmetry being of equal CoE relevance, while Quantity effects being 
economically negligible; however, findings also show that the significance of this impact 
decreases with firm size, maturity and profitability as well as market competition. Fur-
thermore, informational differences between companies explain substantial variation in 
analyst-based implied cost of capital (ICC) estimates, but none in traditional risk factor-
based return proxies (RFB), indicating that the former impound much more firm-specific 
information than the latter. Given the generally higher construct validity of ICC over RFB 
proxies, this suggests that incorporation of idiosyncratic information in the measurement 
of risk factor-based proxies might help improve the empirical soundness of those esti-
mates.   
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3.1 Introduction  
Extensive literature in accounting and finance investigates the extent to which idiosyn-
cratic information affects price formation and return structures in capital markets. This 
line of inquiry commonly examines the proposition that firms with high (low) quality 
information environments should enjoy relatively low (high) costs of equity (e.g., Easley 
et al. (2002); Francis et al. (2005a)). Analytical work by Easley and O'Hara (2004, 
hereafter: EO) and Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2012, hereafter: LLV) models this link 
elegantly and nominates a set of information attributes that characterise the overall quality 
of a firm’s information environment (viz. Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry); however, 
the empirical validity of these models is subject to great debate.  
 
Given on the one hand that the construct validity of different cost of equity (CoE) 
proxies is an ongoing debate in itself (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Easton and 
Monahan (2016)), and on the other hand that proxies for the information attributes are 
large in numbers as informed by both accounting and finance research, the empirical lit-
erature is voluminous, and the conclusions reached vary widely depending on the proxies 
researchers use. Moreover, extant work examining the association between firm-specific 
information and expected rate of returns neglects the fact that interrelations between 
Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry exist and that direct and indirect paths between the 
attributes and CoE are of varying importance (Figure 3.1 depicts the prevailing method-
ological approach in current studies).  
 
With that in mind, the main objective of this paper is to consolidate and reconcile 
previous empirical findings by means of a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach. 
More specifically, the first part of this paper analyses to what extent differences in firms’ 
information environments impact investors’ CoE expectations: holding the measurement 
of CoE constant while varying the informational part of the model. The second part ex-
amines the explanatory power of idiosyncratic information for different CoE measures: 
holding the informational part constant while varying CoE measurement. 
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Figure 3.1: Prevailing Methodological Approach 
Illustration of the methodological approach taken in extant work. Information attributes (i.e., Quantity, Precision and 
Asymmetry) are treated as directly measurable by means of different proxies and their impact on CoE is assessed by 
multivariate regression analyses. Dashed line between information precision and asymmetry indicate a recent study 
by Bhattacharya et al. (2012) who use path analysis to decompose the association between information precision and 
CoE into a direct and indirect path mediated by information asymmetry; however, path analysis maintains the assump-
tion of direct, error-free measurability of the attributes by a single-indicator (one observed measure per attribute). 
Variable names as defined in Table 3.1.  
  
There are two major advantages to this study’s SEM approach vis-à-vis extant research 
designs in examining the CoE effects of firms’ information environments. First, SEM 
allows measuring each information attribute by multiple proxies (i.e., factor analyses 
identify shared variability between the proxies as a measure of the information attributes), 
while previous studies only use one proxy per attribute (i.e., direct measurability of the 
information attributes is assumed); similarly, I estimate firms’ expected rate of returns 
(CoE) from both risk factor-based (RFB) and valuation model-based (VMB) CoE proxies. 
As a result, widely used proxies for Quantity, Precision, Asymmetry and CoE in previous 
studies are now concurrently accommodated and directly tested within one empirical 
model. Second, interrelations among information attributes and associations between the 
attributes and CoE are estimated simultaneously, which provides test results for the model 
as whole rather than just for path coefficients individually as in previous work (Figure 




                                                 
23  Appendix 3.1 provides a more detailed description of the SEM methodology and why it is an appropriate 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Model  
Oval figures indicate latent constructs (i.e., information attributes) which are only indirectly measurable through their 
impact on observable indicator variables/proxies (rectangular figures). One-headed arrows indicate regression rela-
tionships, and the end of each arrow indicates the dependent construct. Plus (minus) signs represent positive (negative) 
predicted relations between information attributes and indicator variables. Pos.(Neg.) indicates hypothesised associ-
ation between latent constructs. Error terms are suppressed. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Overall, this study makes three contributions to the literature. First, using a SEM ap-
proach extends Bhattacharya et al. (2012, hereafter: BEOS)—who use path analysis—
from a methodological perspective; that is, SEM acknowledges that information attributes 
are latent constructs which are only indirectly measurable by two or more proxies, while 
path analysis maintains the less realistic assumption of direct, error-free measurability of 
the respective attributes via a single empirical measure. Having this conceptual benefit, I 
use three different proxies (alias indicators) for each information attribute to infer firms’ 
Quantity, Asymmetry and Precision, and test nine different CoE measures.24 Hence, only 
the “good” part of each proxy is retained to contribute to the measurement of its assigned 
attribute, which mitigates bias in estimated structure coefficients (emanating from the 
errors-in-variable problem) and increases the empirical robustness of my findings (Rao, 
1973). 
 
                                                 
24  I test three valuation model-based (i.e., implied cost of capital) estimates, three traditional risk factor-
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Second, results from the first part of my analysis bring new evidence to the debate over 
the pricing of information risk (e.g., Core et al. (2008), Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009), 
Shevlin (2013)). Findings corroborate the proposition that firms with higher (lower) qual-
ity information environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) cost of equity than otherwise 
identical companies, with Precision (-0.447) and Asymmetry (0.437) being of equal CoE 
relevance, while Quantity (0.139) effects are economically negligible (structure coeffi-
cients in parentheses). However, the strength of this impact varies with firm size, maturity 
and profitability as well as market competition about companies’ shares (i.e., stock li-
quidity). This can be inferred from decreasing levels of explanatory power as one moves 
from AMEX (CoE R²: 0.603) to NASDAQ (0.339) to NYSE (0.182) stocks, with the 
latter stocks being much larger, older and more profitable than the former two. In addi-
tion, the direct association between Asymmetry and CoE for high competition stocks is 
almost four times weaker (0.058) than for low competition stocks (0.209) and about 1.5 
times weaker (high: -0.519; low: -0.328) for Precision; this can be seen as an empirical 
extension of the LLV (2012) model insofar as it is not only Asymmetry, but also Precision 
effects which tend to decrease as market competition, and thus, stock liquidity, increases. 
  
 Third, findings from the second part of my analysis contribute to the discussion 
about the empirical validity of different CoE measures (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2005), 
Easton and Monahan (2016)). The SEM model explains a significant amount of variation 
in VMB (i.e., implied cost of capital) proxies (R²: 0.244), but none of the variation in 
traditional RFB measures (i.e., rCAPM, rFF3, rFF4). As VMB proxies derive from ana-
lyst forecasts (hence, impounding more idiosyncratic information than RFB measures), it 
is unsurprising that Quantity, Asymmetry and Precision explain variation in the former 
much better than in the latter. However, combining this observation with the fact that 
VMB generally show greater construct validity than RFB proxies (Botosan et al. (2011), 
Lee et al. (2010)), implies that firm-specific information might be the missing “explana-
tory link” between the two. Differently stated, the incorporation of idiosyncratic infor-
mation in the measurement of risk factor-based estimates might improve those proxies’ 
construct validity and thus help reconcile prevailing performance differences with im-
plied cost of capital (ICC) estimates.  
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To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study which provides simultaneous evi-
dence on how Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry affect firms’ CoE within a comprehen-
sive empirical model and, as such, might be acknowledged as a “first step” (Beyer et al., 
2010, p. 309) in the right direction to disentangle the underlying complexity between 
firm-specific information and expected rate of returns.25  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a theoretical 
framework for the conceptual model and derives the research hypotheses. Section 3.3 
describes the measurement of the indicators and cost of equity proxies along with a de-
scription of the estimation and assessment of the study’s SEM models. The main analyses 
are conducted in Section 3.4, and concluding remarks are provided in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses  
3.2.1 Market Microstructure and Information-Based Models 
The idea behind the conceptual model in this study (see Figure 3.2) is widely consistent 
with seminal work on the interrelation between idiosyncratic information and firms’ CoE 
by Easley and O’Hara (2004), who are the first scholars to present an information-based 
model that bridges the gap between market microstructure and asset pricing theory.26 
While it should not be overlooked that incomplete information models (Merton, 1987), 
                                                 
25  In a recent working paper, Hinson and Utke (2016) give an introduction on the applicability of SEM in 
archival accounting research and provide some empirical results for the impact of disclosure on cost of 
capital. Their paper also builds on BEOS (2012); however, my paper differs from theirs in at least four 
accounts; (1) their paper has a predominate focus on the impact of disclosure on CoE and as such tests 
only two hypotheses. In contrast, my paper examines six hypotheses which pertain to the relations be-
tween Quantity, Precision, Asymmetry and CoE; (2) their analysis is limited to one SEM model, while 
I provide six different SEM specifications with a particular focus on differences across groups of firms; 
(3) this study offers insights on the relative importance of idiosyncratic information as an explanatory 
variable for different CoE measures—which theirs do not; and (4) my paper operates a much larger 
sample (60,995 vs. 7,642 observations) and spans a much longer sampling period (1993-2010 vs. 2000-
2010) than their paper.  
26  Most past economic research (including the asset pricing literature) is mainly focused on the study of 
price equilibria, with only little – if any – consideration given on how these equilibria are actually at-
tained. The rather new field of market microstructure research attempts to overcome this negligence in 
that the decomposition of the price building process into its underlying determinants is at the forefront 
of this line of inquiry. One of the more recent approaches in this attempt is to study the “information-
aggregation properties of prices and markets” by means of information-based models. A central objec-
tive of this particular subfield of market microstructure research is to answer how different sets of in-
formation may impact the price formation and, thus, the return structure in capital markets (O'Hara, 
1995). 
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asymmetric information models (Admati, 1985) and liquidity effect models along the 
work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan et al. (1998) and Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) propose insightful theoretical explanations for the impact of infor-
mation on the price and return behaviour of assets, it is EO (2004) who model the “effects 
of estimation risk and information asymmetry within a unified framework” (Botosan et 
al., 2004, p. 239).  
3.2.2 Impact of Information Attributes on Cost of Equity   
EO (2004) demonstrate that a firm’s CoE decreases in Precision (i.e., decreases in accu-
racy of the available information about the future value of the firm) and increases in 
Asymmetry (i.e., increases in the fraction of uninformed investors and private signals 
about the future value of the firm). The economic intuition behind their model is as fol-
lows. First, investors demand to be rewarded for bearing uncertainty about a firm’s future 
prospects, which stems from imprecise information given to them, implying that firms 
that disclose higher quality financial and non-financial data to investors can benefit from 
reduced CoE. Second, uninformed investors (who only have access to public information) 
require compensation for “losing out” against privately informed investors (who have 
access to both public and private information) when making investment decisions. The 
higher this informational disparity between these two groups is, the larger the CoE pre-
mium induced by Asymmetry; however, LLV (2012) illustrate that in perfectly liquid mar-
kets in which both the informed and uninformed act as price takers, asymmetric infor-
mation has no effect on the CoE over and above its impact on average precision about the 
future value of the firm. This subtle extension of the EO (2004) model entails that the 
degree of market competition represents a crucial conditioning variable in empirical set-
tings. 27 
 
By reviewing some notable empirical studies that draw upon the EO (2004) and/or 
LLV (2012) model, I validate the hypothesised links between the information attributes 
and CoE in my conceptual model, reveal the most commonly used proxies for the respec-
                                                 
27  A detailed description of the EO (2004) and LLV (2012) model is provided in Appendix 3.2 and Ap-
pendix 3.3, respectively.  
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tive information attributes in extant work (which are then used as measures for the infor-
mation attributes in later analyses) and present evidence about the extent to which each 
proxy is associated with CoE on a stand-alone basis. The empirical measures for the in-
formation attributes are introduced and discussed below, and the procedure for estimating 
them is in the methodology section.  
3.2.2.1 Information Precision and Cost of Equity  
The theoretical link between Precision and CoE has received much attention in empirical 
studies, resulting in two important strands of research. The first strand uses earnings qual-
ity metrics, and the second one utilises security analysts’ forecasts as empirical measures 
of information precision.   
 
Earnings Quality. Earnings quality metrics are a natural choice for Precision indicators, 
given that “higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a 
firm’s financial performance” than lower quality earnings (Dechow et al., 2010, p. 344). 
Extensive empirical evidence shows that investors regard earnings as an important source 
of information about the performance of a company which substantiates their inclusion 
as measures of information precision (e.g., Biddle et al. (1995), Charitou et al. (2001), 
Francis et al. (2003), Liu et al. (2002), Strong (1993), Strong and Walker (1993)). In a 
seminal study, Francis et al. (2004, hereafter: FLOS) find that for seven different earnings 
metrics, higher earnings quality leads to lower CoE. The strongest effects are observed 
for the accrual quality (AQ) and value relevance (VR) metrics, which I use as an account-
ing-based and market-based indicator for earnings quality, respectively. Recent studies 
corroborate the empirical validity of AQ and VR and demonstrate that higher earnings 
quality, and thus lower earnings management, lead to favourable cost of equity effects 
(e.g., Aboody et al. (2005), Barth et al. (2013), Francis et al. (2005a, hereafter: FLOS), 
Gray et al. (2009), Kim and Qi (2010), Ogneva (2012)).28  
                                                 
28  Although Core et al. (2008) strongly question the validity of this evidence, the authors acknowledge 
that accruals quality is certainly not irrelevant as they find a positive association between AQ and market 
beta. This result is indicative of accrual quality having (at least) an indirect effect on CoE through mar-
ket beta. Ogneva (2012) further reconciles these opposing views in that she relies on Campbell and 
Shiller’s (1988a, 1988b) return decomposition to show that accruals quality is positively associated with 
future cash flow shocks and as such hinders the detection of an association between AQ and realised 
returns. What is more, Gray et al. (2009) replicate the methodology of both Francis et al. (2005) and 
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Security Analyst Forecasts. Barron et al. (2005) demonstrates that the precision of ana-
lyst forecasts is a reliable measure for the general information precision of sophisticated 
investors; hence, several papers suggest the use of analyst forecast-based proxies as 
measures of Precision (e.g., Barry and Brown (1985), Barron and Stuerke (1998)). Draw-
ing upon the framework in Barron et al. (1998), which shows that observable character-
istics of analyst forecasts allow for inferences about the public, private and total precision 
of analysts’ information sets, we employ total analyst forecast precision (AFP_Total) as 
an indicator for information precision in this study. This choice is motivated by robust 
evidence for a negative association between total analyst forecast precision and CoE (Bar-
ron et al. (2012); Botosan and Plumlee (2013)). Given this empirical evidence along with 
the analytical insights from the EO (2004) model, I formulate Hypothesis 1.  
 
H1: The higher (lower) the information precision of a firm, the lower (higher) its CoE. 
3.2.2.2 Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity  
Numerous studies evaluate the proposition that an increase in informational disad-
vantages between groups of investors provokes unfavourable CoE effects. This literature 
can be categorised into two different streams. The first derives its Asymmetry proxies 
from market microstructure data, and the second—which is based on the LLV (2012) 
prediction that the impact of information asymmetry on CoE is conditional on the degree 
of market competition—puts forward firm-ownership-based measures.  
 
Market Microstructure. Bid-ask spreads and PIN scores are two prevalent measures of 
Asymmetry. The former is an indirect proxy for information asymmetry (i.e., bid-ask 
spreads increase as market-makers are exposed to greater adverse selection problems), 
with ample empirical evidence documenting a positive relationship between spread-based 
proxies and firms’ CoE (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Bhattacharya et al. (2012), 
Levi and Zhang (2015)). In contrast, the latter is a direct measure of information asym-
metry in that it uses order-imbalances to infer the probability that the next trade order is 
from a privately informed investor, i.e., based on private information. Seminal evidence 
                                                 
Core et al. and find for a sample of Australian firms that, irrespective of the asset pricing approach 
taken, AQ is priced in security markets. 
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establishing a positive association between PIN scores and expected rate of returns is 
contributed by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) and verified in—among others—
Brennan et al. (2016), Duarte et al. (2008), Easley et al. (2010) and Yan and Zhang 
(2014).29 Given this sheer volume of positive empirical findings, I use both PIN scores 
and bid-ask spreads (SPREAD) as measures of information asymmetry in this study.     
 
Market Competition. Following the LLV (2012) model, the impact of information asym-
metry on CoE is conjectured to be conditional on the degree of market competition. Three 
recent empirical studies scrutinise this new analytical insight, but they deliver mixed em-
pirical results. While Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins et al. (2012) provide evidence 
supporting the prediction of a diminishing impact of information asymmetry on the CoE 
as markets approach perfect competition, Barron et al. (2012) show that, irrespective of 
market setting, information asymmetry has a significant unfavourable effect on firms' ex-
pected rate of returns. Reconciliation of these opposing results is hindered by the variety 
of proxies employed in each paper.30 However, consistent with the cited studies, I hy-
pothesise that the degree of market competition is indicative of the degree of information 
asymmetry, i.e., greater competition among informed investors leads to a quicker revela-
tion of private information in prices and consequently reduces informational disad-
vantages between investors.31 Because the dispersion of shares among investors tends to 
be the main determinant of market competition (Armstrong et al., 2011, p. 11), I use the 
investor concentration measure (INV_Conc) first suggested by Akins et al. as an indicator 
for market competition, with greater concentration being conjectured to be associated 
                                                 
29  Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) conclude that “there is not much evidence to support the interpretation 
that information risk, proxied by PIN, is a source of priced information risk.” However, they 
acknowledge that while their paper suggests “PIN is not priced risk, it is difficult to make more general 
statements about the pricing of information risk since information risk can […] be proxied by different 
empirical variables” (ibid., p. 241). By using a spread-based proxy as a complementary indicator, I 
address their concern with respect to PIN scores. 
30  First, Armstrong et al. and Barron et al. share a common proxy for market competition (number of total 
shareholders), but use distinct proxies for information asymmetry; i.e., Armstrong et al. deploy a market 
microstructure proxy (bid-ask spreads) while Barron et al. apply an analyst forecast-based proxy. Sec-
ond, Akins et al. use number of institutional investors as well as an investor concentration measure to 
proxy for market competition; and proxy for information asymmetry by means of the information and 
non-information asymmetry component of bid/ask spreads as well as adjusted PIN scores. 
31  For instance, Armstrong et al. (2011, p. 9) argue that “if the number of shareholders increases, the slope 
of the price curve caused by any information asymmetry decreases....”  See also Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994).  
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with less competition and thus greater information asymmetry. Taken together, the em-
pirical findings support Hypothesis 2.  
 
H2: The higher (lower) the information asymmetry between investors, the higher (lower) 
the firm’s CoE.  
3.2.2.3 Information Quantity and Cost of Equity  
The EO (2004) and LLV (2012) model primarily examine the CoE effects of Precision 
and Asymmetry.32 However, I also include Quantity as an information attribute in my 
model because the estimation risk literature shows that if the amount of information about 
a firm is low, investors have difficulties accurately estimating the return parameters of 
this particular firm, which makes it a riskier investment and hence induces higher CoE 
(e.g., Clarkson et al. (1996), Kumar et al. (2008), Lewellen and Shanken (2002), Zhang 
(2006)). 
 
Supported by evidence in (Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985)—who show that the period 
of listing is negatively associated with risk-adjusted returns—and Clarkson and 
Thompson (1990)—who find that average beta risk for newly issued firms declines over 
the next few months of listing—I use Listing as an indicator for Quantity. Given that 
firms’ operating histories tend to be positively associated with the amount of information 
prior to their listing (Clarkson and Satterly (1997), Ecker (2014), Lee et al. (2003)), I 
consider firm age (Age) as a complementary indicator.  
 
A large stream of research investigates if there exists a negative association between 
corporate disclosure and expected rate of returns.33 Disclosure scores are intuitive proxies 
for information quantity; however, I refrain from using them given that they tend to be 
noisy indicators of Quantity (i.e., disclosure scores tend to capture both a quantity and 
                                                 
32  Only an exogenous increase in prior information and/or private and public information in the EO and 
LLV model lead to a decrease in the CoE, ceteris paribus. 
33   See, amongst others, Campbell et al. (2014), Core et al. (2015) for an analysis of mandatory disclosure; 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Francis et al. (2008) for voluntary disclosure; Baginski and Rakow (2012), 
Evans (2016) for financial disclosure; and Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Ng and Rezaee (2012) for non-finan-
cial disclosure.   
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quality dimension) and there is no consensus on their measurement.34,35 Instead, I apply 
a self-constructed relative media coverage (RMC) index based on prior evidence which 
shows that information quantity increases with media coverage (Kross and Schroeder, 
1989). I summarise the above in Hypothesis 3. 
 
H3: The larger (smaller) the quantity of available information about a firm, the lower 
(higher) its CoE. 
3.2.3 Interrelations between Information Attributes  
The opportunity to model interrelations between latent constructs and treat them simulta-
neously as dependent and independent variables is a key benefit of SEM models. This 
facilitates the objective of this study to consolidate the extensive empirical evidence in 
extant research within one model. As shown in Figure 3.2, I hypothesise that beyond the 
direct paths, indirect paths from the attributes to the CoE exist. While the EO (2004) and 
LLV (2012) models are silent on these indirect associations, empirical findings on the 
relation among the information attributes warrant their inclusion.  
3.2.3.1 Quantity and Precision  
Sufficient evidence supports the conjecture that information quantity is positively associ-
ated with information precision and, furthermore, that causality runs from Quantity to 
Precision. For instance, disclosure levels tend to be positively associated with analysts’ 
forecast precision (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1996) demonstrate that increased disclosure 
levels lead to more accurate and less dispersed forecasts; Byard and Shaw (2003) report 
that higher quality disclosure increases both private and public analysts' forecast preci-
sion) which supports the notion of more disclosure (i.e., more quantity) leading to greater 
accuracy in analysts’ forecasts (i.e., higher information precision).  
 
                                                 
34  For instance, Cheng et al. (2006, p. 179) state that “while prior empirical research has used the quantity 
of disclosure as a proxy for the quality of disclosure quality, in many cases disclosure quantity and 
quality are not separable information attributes.” 
35  Some authors use self-constructed disclosure scores (e.g., Botosan (1997), Kothari et al. (2009)), while 
others rely on commercially available ones (e.g., Healy et al. (1999), Richardson and Welker (2001)), 
and yet others use simple dummy variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-disclosing firms 
(e.g., Ogneva et al. (2007), Cao et al. (2017)).  
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In addition, disclosure levels show a significant association with earnings quality, alt-
hough the sign of the association is debated. Some studies find a positive (complemen-
tary) relation, i.e., firms with better earnings quality disclose more expansively (e.g., 
Francis et al. (2008), Waymire (1985), Cox (1985), Imhoff (1978)), while others find a 
negative (substitutive) relation (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1993), Tasker (1998)). These 
contradictory results might stem from the fact that proxies for disclosure levels tend to 
capture both a quantity and quality dimension.36 However, irrespective of the sign of the 
association, the key insight is that disclosure levels tend to have a significant effect on 
firms’ earnings quality, which in turn supports the conclusion of Quantity influencing 
Precision. Therefore, I formulate Hypothesis 4.  
 
H4: The higher (lower) the quantity of available information about a firm, the higher 
(lower) the firm’s information precision.   
3.2.3.2 Quantity and Asymmetry  
Empirical evidence conclusively shows that as the quantity of information about a firm 
increases (proxied by disclosure levels in the following studies), the fraction of privately 
informed investors (information asymmetry) decreases. This holds true irrespective of 
whether spread-based proxies (Healy et al. (1999), Heflin et al. (2005), Welker (1995)) 
or PIN-based proxies (Brown and Hillegeist (2007), Brown et al. (2004)) as measures of 
information asymmetry are applied. These results also advocate the assumed causality 
from Quantity to Asymmetry. Derived from these findings, I express Hypothesis 5.   
 
H5: The higher (lower) the quantity of available information about a firm, the lower 
(higher) the information asymmetry between investors.  
3.2.3.3 Precision and Asymmetry  
Recent findings lend support to the notion of information asymmetry being negatively 
associated with information precision, where causality is assumed from the former to the 
                                                 
36  Say, one proxy for disclosure level mainly captures the quality dimension of disclosure, while another 
one has a greater exposure to the quantity dimension. Then the former is by construction more likely to 
be positively associated with earnings quality (given that it measures the same underlying concept) than 
the latter proxy which mainly captures the quantity dimension of disclosure. 
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latter information attribute. For instance, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that earnings 
quality (measured by the AQ metric) is negatively associated with the adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spreads, and Bhattacharya et al. (2012) conclude that “there appears 
to be a limited (in magnitude) feedback path from information asymmetry [proxied as the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads] to earnings quality….” (p. 472). This 
lends support to Hypothesis 6.   
 
H6: The higher (lower) the information precision of a firm, the lower (higher) the infor-
mation asymmetry between investors.  
  
In summary, this study’s conceptual model is informed by both contemporary analyt-
ical and empirical evidence. The direct relations between the attributes and CoE follow 
from the theoretical models developed by EO (2004) and LLV (2012), while the interre-
lations among the attributes, and therefore, the indirect paths with CoE, are motivated by 
recent findings in empirical work. Ideally, the comprehensiveness of the hypothesised 
model not only provides new insights on the extent to which (and under what circum-
stances) differences in firms’ information environments affect investors’ return expecta-
tions, but also on the relative importance of firm-specific information as an explanatory 
variable for different CoE measures. 
3.3 Methodology  
3.3.1 Empirical Measures of Indicators and Cost of Equity  
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the constructs and their respective indicators applied 
in my model and the databases used to estimate them. To conserve space, detailed de-
scriptions of how each indicator is estimated are relegated to Appendix 3.4 for Quantity, 
Appendix 3.5 for Precision, Appendix 3.6 for Asymmetry and Appendix 3.7 for CoE 
measures. All variables which are not derived from yearly data (such as Listing, Age, 
RMC, AQ, VR), but estimated from quarterly or daily information instead (such as 
AFP_Total, PIN, SPREAD, INV_Conc) are time-series averages of lead, lag and current 
observations centred around the fiscal year-end of each firm. This mutes potential noise 
in the proxies surrounding the release of fiscal year-end information and is consistent with 
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empirical work relying on comparable data (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Botosan and 
Plumlee (2013)). Similarly, risk factor-based proxies (e.g., rFF4) are calculated six 
months after firms’ fiscal year-ends, and valuation model-based proxies (e.g., rPEG) are 
derived from the first available consensus analyst forecasts immediately made after firms’ 
earnings announcements. 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of Constructs and Indicators 
Construct 
Indicator  




Quantity       
Period of listing (IPO)  Listing  pos.  SDC Platinum, Osiris & CRSP 
Firm age (incorporation)  Age  pos.  Osiris 
Relative media coverage  RMC  pos.  Factiva 
Precision       
Accrual quality  AQ  pos.  Compustat 
Earnings value relevance  VR  pos.  Compustat & CRSP 
Total analyst forecast precision  AFP_Total  pos.  I/B/E/S  
Asymmetry       
Probability of an informed trade  PIN  pos.  Stephen Brown 
Bid/Ask spread  SPREAD  pos.  CRSP 
Investor concentration  INV_Conc  pos.  CDA/Spectrum (s12) 
CoE – Risk Factor-Based (RFB)       
Capital Asset Pricing Model  rCAPM  pos.  
Kenneth French & CRSP Fama-French 3-factor model  rFF3  pos.  
Carhart’s 4-factor model  rFF4  pos.  
CoE – Risk Factor-Based + VIX (FVIX)       
Capital Asset Pricing Model + FVIX  rFVIX  pos.  
Kenneth French, 
Alexander Barinov & CRSP 
Fama-French 3-factor model + FVIX  rFVIX3  pos.  
Carhart’s 4-factor model + FVIX  rFVIX4  pos.  
CoE – Valuation Model-Based (VMB)       
Price-Earnings-Ratio  rPE  pos.  
I/B/E/S & Compustat  Price-Earnings-Growth  rPEG  pos.  
Abnormal Earnings Growth Model   rAEGM  pos.  
Future Realised Returns (FRR)       
Annualised 12-month Buy-Hold-Return  ret12  pos.  
CRSP Annualised 24-month Buy-Hold-Return  ret24  pos.  
Annualised 36-month Buy-Hold-Return  ret36  pos.  
Table shows indicators per information and CoE construct including variable names, predicted association with the 
respective construct and the databases used to measure the indicator.  
3.3.1.1 Information Quantity 
My three indicators to infer information quantity are period of listing (Listing), firm age 
(Age) and relative media coverage (RMC). Period of listing (firm age) is the number of 
years since a firm’s initial public offering (incorporation) and is calculated as the differ-
ence between the year of fiscal year-end and the year of the IPO (incorporation). Inspired 
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by the work of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 2008) and Beattie et al. (2002, 2004), the 
idea behind the RMC index is that variations in media coverage—which are unexplained 
by industry membership and firm size (i.e., residuals)—are a good proxy for firm promi-
nence that, in turn, tends to be positively associated with higher information quantity 
(Kross and Schroeder, 1989); thus, the RMC index is positive (negative) for firms that 
enjoy more (less) media coverage than the expected average firm in the same industry 
and of similar size. All indicators are assumed to be positively associated with Quantity.  
3.3.1.2 Information Precision  
I measure information precision by two earnings quality indicators, accrual quality and 
earnings value relevance, and one indicator for the precision of analyst forecasts, 
AFP_Total. The accrual quality metric (AQ) is based on the McNichols (2002) modifica-
tion of the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; however, I deviate from previous studies and 
multiply the AQ metric by negative one to establish a more intuitive relation with Preci-
sion: the lower (higher) the information precision of a firm, the lower (higher) its accrual 
quality. The measurement of the earnings value relevance metric (VR) in this study is 
similar in estimation and interpretation to the AQ metric above: the lower (higher) the 
information precision of a firm, the less (more) value relevant its earnings.37 That is, VR 
is assumed to be positively associated with Precision.   
 
As with respect to the security analyst-based indicator (AFP_Total), I draw upon sem-
inal work in Barron et al. (1998), that shows that observable characteristics of analysts’ 
forecasts (viz. forecast dispersion, squared error in the mean forecast and the number of 
forecasts) can be used to make inferences about the degree of information precision of 
the public and private information sets available to security analysts. The sum of those 
two components reflects the total precision of analysts’ information sets and substitutes 
well for the general information precision of sophisticated investors (Barron et al., 2005). 
The empirical estimation of AFP_Total in this study is widely consistent with Botosan 
and Plumlee (2013) and hypothesised to be positively related with Precision.   
                                                 
37  Value relevance of earnings is expressed as the degree to which both a firm’s earnings and change in 
earnings explain its stock returns, where greater explanatory power indicates more transparent and value 
relevant earnings, respectively (Barth et al. (2013), FLOS (2004)). 
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3.3.1.3 Information Asymmetry  
I use bid-ask spreads (SPREAD) and probability of informed trading (PIN) scores as two 
microstructure proxies for information asymmetry. Copeland and Galai (1983) and 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) formally show that bid-ask spreads are valid proxies for the 
exposure of market-makers to the adverse selection problem and as such capture well the 
degree of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.38 Con-
sistent with Stoll (1978), I use the average of simple daily percentage spreads as an indi-
cator for firms’ bid-ask spreads (SPREAD). PIN scores are firm-specific proxies for in-
formation asymmetry that measure the probability that the next trade order is from a pri-
vately informed investor, where larger PIN scores signify larger information asymmetry 
(Easley et al. (1996, 1997), Brown and Hillegeist (2007)). The underlying notion of the 
PIN model is that while it is impossible to directly observe which trades are based on 
private information, one can use imbalances between buy and sell orders to infer the prob-
ability of information-based trading for a given stock. I obtain quarterly PIN scores from 
Stephen Brown’s website.39 
 
These two microstructure proxies are complemented by investor concentration 
(INV_Conc) as a measure of market competition. The estimation of  INV_Conc is similar 
to Akins et al. (2012), but I use information on mutual fund holdings instead of institu-
tional investor holdings due to data restrictions. It is conjectured that higher values of 
concentration denote less competition in the trading of firms’ stocks; hence, INV_Conc is 
assumed to be positively associated with information asymmetry.40 
                                                 
38  Jack Treynor, publishing under his pseudonym Walter Bagehot (1971), gives an intuitive explanation 
as to why greater bid-ask spreads are associated with greater information asymmetry. In essence, he 
argues that market makers are aware of the fact that they lose against the privately informed and, there-
fore, have to cover their loses by trading profitably with the uninformed. The only way they can avoid 
this adverse selection problem is to quote different prices for buying and selling orders, i.e. profiting 
from different bid and ask prices in order to maintain their own liquidity. This then implies that bid-ask 
spreads, which stem from adverse selection problems market makers are exposed to, are informative 
about the fraction of privately informed investors in the market.  
39  http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data  
40  Akins et al. multiply the index by negative one, so that higher values indicate more competition (p. 41); 
however, to maintain consistent interpretation between all of our indicators and asymmetry (viz. a con-
jectured positive association), we refrain from this modification.  
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3.3.1.4 Cost of Equity and Future Realised Returns  
I calculate nine different proxies for firms’ CoE: three risk factor-based (RFB) ones, three 
market sentiment (i.e., VIX) augmented proxies, and three valuation model-based (VMB) 
estimates (i.e., implied cost of capital). I use rCAPM, rFF3, and rFF4 as my RFB proxies 
(Carhart (1997); Fama and French (1993); Lintner (1965); Mossin (1966); Sharpe (1964)) 
and re-estimate them with an additional risk-factor for expected market volatility (i.e., 
FVIX) to capture market sentiment: rFVIX, rFVIX3 and rFVIX4 (Ang et al., 2006).41 
Given that RFB proxies tend to be “imprecise estimates of the cost of equity” (Fama and 
French, 1997, p. 154), I follow previous work (e.g., Gordon and Gordon (1997); Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002); Claus and Thomas (2001); Gebhardt et al. (2001); Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005); Gode and Mohanram (2003)) and also estimate three implied 
cost of capital (ICC) estimates: rPE, rPEG, rAEGM (Easton, 2004).   
 
In the first part of my analysis (Section 3.4.2 Results of SEM Analyses), the CoE con-
struct is kept constant and inferred from one VMB (rPEG) and one RFB (rFF4) proxy. 
Those two proxies are chosen based on results from the second part of my analysis (Sec-
tion 3.4.3 Results of CoE Analyses) where it is shown that rPEG and rFF4 provide the 
most parsimonious and well-fitted SEM specifications among all tested CoE combina-
tions (Figure 3.3 illustrates the interrelation between the two analytical steps). Moreover, 
inclusion of those two opposing CoE measures also results in a robuster estimate of ex-
pected returns in that CoE is now a measure of shared variance or commonality between 
the two (i.e., SEM controls for measurement error in the two proxies). While the RFB 
methodology assumes that past realised returns are a reliable guide for expected returns, 
VMB estimates derive from future dividend/earnings expectations and current market 
prices. Considering both proxies concurrently ensures that the final CoE construct cap-
tures—or at least controls for—both an ex post and an ex ante perspective. 
 
I also calculate annualised 12, 24 and 36 months buy-and-hold returns, against which 
I validate the CoE measures. Each stock is assumed to have been bought six months after 
                                                 
41  The notion underlying the FVIX factor is that companies with more (less) negative return sensitivity to 
VIX index changes have higher (lower) CoE. FVIX reflects the monthly excess return on a factor-
mimicking portfolio that tracks daily changes in the VIX index (Barinov, 2013, p. 1880). 
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a firm’s fiscal year-end and held for the subsequent 12, 24 and 36 months. These total 
returns are annualised (geometric mean) to make them comparable.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Feedback Loop between Analytical Steps 
The figure illustrates the interrelation between the two analytical steps in this study. In the first step, the measurement 
of CoE is kept constant. In the second step, the measurement of the information part is kept constant. Results from the 
first step inform the constant part in the second step—and vice versa.   
3.3.2 Sample and Data Selection  
My sample includes all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed securities that are covered 
on the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CMM) database and have fiscal year ends from 1993-
2010. This 18-year period is the longest possible sampling period for all necessary infor-
mation. Data availability is greatest for RFB proxies; hence, I build our sample around 
all firms with available risk factor-based CoE estimates to maximises number of obser-
vations; this results in a final sample of 7,091 firms and 60,995 firm-years. Given that 
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Part II: Explanatory Power of Idiosyn. Information for Different CoE Proxies 
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sample size varies for each proxy. For instance, for only 1,887 of the 7,091 RFB sample 
firms RMC can be calculated (see Table 3.2). While varying sample size poses serious 
problems in OLS regressions, SEM copes reasonably well with missing data. Assuming 
that data are missing at random—a reasonable assumption for my sample—item non-
response can be ignored, and maximum-likelihood missing data techniques ensure that 
parameter estimates are valid and efficient (Schafer and Graham, 2002).42 
 
Overall, my sample is tilted towards larger and more profitable firms. The average 
sample return on assets (ROA) ranges from a low of 3.06 percent (for SPREAD and RFB 
proxies) to a high of 4.76 percent (for Age). Comparing these figures against the average 
median ROA of 1.78 percent for all CMM listed firms from 1993-2010 reveals sample 
bias towards more profitable firms (see Appendix 3.8). Average market capitalisation 
coverage varies between 30 percent (for Age) and 72 percent (for RFB proxies) of total 
CMM market capitalisation ($323,647bn; Appendix 3.9). Given that, for example, the 
Age sample only covers 7 percent of all CMM listed firms, but accounts for 30 percent of 
CMM market cap, reveals that the sub-samples tend to be biased towards larger firms.  
 
                                                 
42  Rubin (1976) provides three categories of missing data depending on the mechanism causing it; (1) 
missing-completely at random (MCAR), (2) missing at random (MAR) and (3) missing not at random 
(MNAR). When observations of a variable are missing completely at random, the missing observations 
are a random subset of all observations (i.e. there are no systematic differences between the missing and 
observed values) and the missing and observed values will have similar distributions. Missing at random 
means there might be systematic differences between the missing and observed values, but these can be 
entirely explained by other observed variables. For example, if analyst forecast precision data are miss-
ing at random, conditional on how long a firm has been listed on an exchange, then the distributions of 
missing and observed analyst forecast precision will be similar among firms with the same years of 
listing. Differently stated, if two firms share some observed values (e.g. same years of listing) they 
should also share similar statistical behaviour on other observations (e.g. analyst forecast precision), 
irrespective of whether those observations are observed or missing. In contrast, data is assumed to be 
not missing at random if neither MCAR nor MAR holds; that is, even after controlling for all the avail-
able observed data, the missing values remain related to the unseen observations themselves (Little and 
Rubin, 2002).  
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics by Constructs & Indicators 
    Quantity   Precision   Asymmetry 
Fiscal Year   Listing Age RMC   AQ VR  AFP_Total   PIN  SPREAD INV_Conc 
1993   1,038 574 760   1,019 2,215 523   1,866 2,847 1,845 
1994   1,079 618 787   1,609 2,237 587   1,955 2,876 1,979 
1995   1,099 669 789   1,667 2,198 577   2,089 2,841 2,002 
1996   1,183 732 852   1,655 2,200 642   2,264 2,871 2,065 
1997   1,310 847 933   1,665 2,171 670   2,678 2,941 2,110 
1998   1,452 960 1,049   1,648 2,341 790   2,930 3,060 2,211 
1999   1,533 1,041 1,078   1,681 2,438 848   2,992 3,073 2,324 
2000   1,566 1,112 1,123   1,734 2,456 849   2,916 2,740 2,326 
2001   1,685 1,207 1,220   1,852 2,540 942   3,033 3,295 2,505 
2002   1,796 1,287 1,304   2,100 2,751 1,018   3,203 3,456 2,679 
2003   1,878 1,368 1,369   2,179 2,841 1,151   3,357 3,511 2,763 
2004   1,953 1,458 1,445   2,147 2,912 1,327   3,434 3,574 2,723 
2005   1,987 1,531 1,523   2,233 2,975 1,466   3,444 3,568 2,813 
2006   1,964 1,592 1,556   2,127 2,937 1,467   3,313 3,459 2,768 
2007   1,969 1,667 1,588   2,090 2,817 1,501   2,139 3,389 2,750 
2008   2,022 1,753 1,611   2,060 2,793 1,578   1,971 3,417 2,801 
2009   2,128 1,869 1,680   2,056 2,789 1,599   3,297 3,502 2,897 
2010   2,220 1,983 1,752   2,046 2,822 1,655   498 3,536 2,942 
Total Obs.   29,862 22,268 22,419   33,568 46,433 19,190   47,379 57,956 44,503 
Average Obs.    1,659 1,237 1,246   1,865 2,580 1,066   2,632 3,220 2,472 
# of Firms   3,295 1,987 1,887   4,042 5,486 3,618   6,288 6,907 6,167 
Avg. ROA   3.75 4.76 4.73   4.30 3.28 3.96   3.46 3.06 3.39 
Avg. Mkt. Cap % 31.58 29.76 36.41   46.81 61.45 35.11   61.04 68.69 55.12 
Table continued on next page.  
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics by Constructs & Indicators (cont.) 
    Risk Factor-Based (RFB) CoE   Risk Factor-Based + VIX (FVIX) CoE   Valuation Model-Based (VMB) CoE 
Fiscal Year   rCAPM rFF3 rFF4   rFVIX rFVIX3 rFVIX4   rPE rPEG rAEGM 
1993   2,920 2,920 2,920  2,920 2,920 2,911  1,543 1,129 1,125 
1994   2,945 2,945 2,945  2,945 2,945 2,936  1,605 1,089 1,084 
1995   2,923 2,923 2,923  2,923 2,923 2,915  1,595 1,135 1,116 
1996   2,998 2,998 2,998  2,998 2,998 2,990  1,678 1,252 1,238 
1997   3,094 3,094 3,094  3,094 3,094 3,086  1,724 1,347 1,331 
1998   3,262 3,262 3,262  3,261 3,261 3,250  1,785 1,419 1,413 
1999   3,333 3,333 3,333  3,332 3,332 3,321  1,754 1,317 1,309 
2000   3,283 3,283 3,283  3,282 3,282 3,271  1,697 1,253 1,242 
2001   3,450 3,450 3,450  3,449 3,449 3,438  1,708 1,555 1,545 
2002   3,619 3,619 3,619  3,618 3,618 3,607  1,875 1,659 1,654 
2003   3,692 3,692 3,692  3,691 3,691 3,680  2,069 1,901 1,897 
2004   3,750 3,750 3,750  3,749 3,749 3,739  2,170 2,029 2,023 
2005   3,739 3,739 3,739  3,738 3,738 3,728  2,217 2,053 2,043 
2006   3,601 3,601 3,601  3,599 3,599 3,589  2,160 2,055 2,030 
2007   3,519 3,519 3,519  3,516 3,516 3,507  2,074 2,017 1,992 
2008   3,552 3,552 3,552  3,549 3,549 3,540  1,943 2,037 2,028 
2009   3,639 3,639 3,639  3,636 3,636 3,627  2,130 2,253 2,235 
2010   3,676 3,676 3,676  3,673 3,673 3,663  2,193 2,238 2,228 
Total Obs.    60,995 60,995 60,995   60,973 60,973 60,798   33,920 29,738 29,533 
Average Obs.    3,389 3,389 3,389   3,387 3,387 3,378   1,884 1,652 1,641 
# of Firms   7,091 7,091 7,091   7,088 7,088 7,074   4,998 4,933 4,919 
Avg. ROA   3.06 3.06 3.06   3.06 3.06 3.05   4.08 3.82 3.83 
Avg. Mkt. Cap % 71.86 71.86 71.86   71.86 71.86 71.21   70.43 55.92 51.97 
Average Return-On-Assets (Avg. ROA) equals the average median ROA (Income Before Extraordinary Items / Total Assets) from 1993 to 2010. Average Market Capitalisation (Avg. Mkt. 
Cap %) equals the average market capitalisation (common shares outstanding x fiscal year end closing stock price) in percent of total CMM market cap ($323,647bn) from 1993 to 2010. 
Detailed ROA and Market Capitalisation figures by constructs and indicators are provided in Appendix 3.8 and Appendix 3.9, respectively. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1.
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3.3.3 SEM Estimation and Model Fit Statistics  
Before estimating the SEM models, I standardise all indicator variables to mean zero and 
variance one to ensure equal contribution to their respective scale. All models are run in 
MPLUS and converged to an admissible solution. The method of estimation is full infor-
mation maximum likelihood estimation with standard errors adjusted for firm clusters. I 
only report standardised model estimates since unstandardized parameter coefficients are 
of no economic meaning. When comparing models between groups, I assume measure-
ment equality and apply chi-square difference tests to examine whether differences in 
structure coefficients across the groups are statistically significant (Kline, 2011, p. 215).43  
 
Model fit is assessed on how well a particular SEM specification resembles observed 
variance-covariance in the sample data with predicted variance-covariance by the model; 
that is, the better actual correlations for the empirical measures of Quantity, Precision, 
Asymmetry and CoE reconcile with estimated ones by the conceptual SEM, the greater 
overall model fit. Given the inapplicability of the chi-square statistic in large sample stud-
ies like this one, I follow Hu and Bentler (1999) and appraise model fit according to the 
following index levels: (1) TLI ≥ 0.95 and SRMR ≤ 0.09; (2) CFI ≥ 0.95 and SRMR ≤ 
0.09; and (3) RMSEA ≤ 0.06 and SRMR ≤ 0.09.44 In addition, I examine correlation 
residuals (calculated as the difference between model-implied and observed-sample cor-
relations) to detect sample correlations that are not well explained by the overall model. 
As a general rule, absolute differences greater than 0.10 are regarded as problematic 
(Kline, 2011, p. 171). 
  
                                                 
43  To test for statistical significant differences in structure coefficients, I compare the model chi-square 
statistic of the nested model (at which the structural path of interest is constraint to be equal between 
groups), with the comparison model where all paths are free to vary. If the Chi-square difference is 
statistically significant, the equal-fit hypothesis is rejected (i.e., the difference between group coeffi-
cients is statistically significant).    
44  The model chi-square statistic is the most commonly used model test statistic in SEM research. It is 
structured as a “badness-of-fit” measure in that higher values indicate worse model fit: significant re-
sults (say, p < 0.05) denote overall model misspecification. However, unless perfect model fit is at-
tained– which is unlikely in any real world application – the model chi-square statistics increases with 
sample size. Thus, in very large samples (e.g. N = 5,000, Kline, 2011, p. 201) even minor model-data 
discrepancies can lead to test statistics rejecting an otherwise valid model (Fan et al., 1999). With num-
ber of observations well exceeding this threshold (N = 60,995 for most of my models), the model chi 
square statistic is an invalid measure of model fit in this study.   
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the indi-
cators. In the text, I also report for each construct its Cronbach’s alpha that, on a scale 
from zero to one, provides guidance on how well the empirical proxies used in this study 
measure Quantity, Asymmetry, Precision and CoE. Coefficients below 0.50 indicate that 
most observed score variance is due to random error. However, when sample size is suf-
ficiently large—as it is in this paper—somewhat lower Cronbach’s alphas are acceptable 
(Kline (2011), Little et al. (1999)). 
3.4.1.1 Information Quantity 
The average (median) firm in my sample is incorporated for 27.8 (18.0) years and listed 
on one of the three major US exchanges for 14.7 (11.0) years, implying that the average 
firm is in existence for about 13 (seven) years before going public. These figures are 
similar to median IPO age figures reported on Jay Ritter’s website.45 A negative median 
value for the RMC index suggests that firms in the sample tend to enjoy less media cov-
erage than the average company in the same industry and of similar size. Because this is 
a novel approach to measure media coverage, comparability with other studies is not pos-
sible. All three indicators are significantly positively correlated with an adequate 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66.46  
3.4.1.2 Information Precision 
Sample characteristics for the earnings quality indicators are consistent with previous 
studies, but less so with respect to total analyst forecast precision (AFP_Total). An aver-
age (median) AQ metric of -0.061 (-0.040) for my sample compares well with FLOS 
(2005), who report a mean of 0.044 (0.031). My average VR metric of -0.410 (-0.348) is 
similar to figures reported in FLOS (2004)—mean: 0.423 (0.416).47 However, mean 
                                                 
45  https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
46  In line with my main SEM results, Cronbach’s alphas are based on standardised indicator variables. 
47  As noted above, each of the earnings quality metrics is multiplied by negative one which explains the 
differing signs between my metrics and those of previous studies.   
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(1,059), median (947) and interquartile range (1,310) figures for AFP_Total are incon-
sistent with statistics reported in Barron et al. (2012)—mean: 3,049, median: 288, IQR: 
1,312—and Botosan and Plumlee (2013)—mean: 2,113, median: 947, IQR: 2,847—
which signifies an increased sensitivity of this measure towards extreme outliers and 
measurement error (Barron et al., 2012, p. 21).   
 
Although all three indicators are significantly positively correlated, the economic sig-
nificance of the association between total analyst forecast precision and the two earnings 
quality metrics is negligible (ρ: 0.019 and 0.020). The reduced relevance of AFP_Total 
is also reflected by a low Cronbach’s alpha of 0.43, which only increases to an acceptable 
level of 0.54 once total analyst forecast precision is excluded from the measurement 
model. Taken together, this points in the direction of AFP_Total not measuring infor-
mation precision to the extent it was hoped. 
3.4.1.3 Information Asymmetry  
Descriptive statistics for both market microstructure and market competition indicators 
are matching results in previous studies. A mean PIN score of 0.205 for the average firm 
in my sample falls within the range of reported average scores of 0.150 to 0.300 in extant 
work (Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Brown and Hillegeist (2007), Duarte et al. (2008); 
Easley et al. (2002)) and sample SPREADS (mean: 0.019; median: 0.010) are compatible 
with several differently estimated spread figures in Corwin and Schultz (2012, Table 3). 
Average INV_Conc (mean 0.195; median: 0.103) is like absolute figures reported in 
Akins et al. (mean: -0.17; median: -0.09) and all three indicators are significantly posi-
tively correlated with an adequate Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65.48   
3.4.1.4 Cost of Equity and Future Realised Returns  
Summary statistics for the VMB and RFB proxies are widely consistent with former evi-
dence. Reported mean (0.124) and median (0.103) values for rPEG are comparable to 
results in Barron et al. (2012)and Easton and Monahan (2005). Similarly, mean (0.103) 
and median (0.093) expected returns for rFF4 are like figures in Barth et al. (2013) and 
                                                 
48  Opposing sings explained by the fact that Akins et al. multiply the index by negative one, from which I 
refrain to maintain consistency among the indicators. 
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Kothari et al. (2009).49 The VIX augmented RFB proxies rFVIX, rFVIX3 and rFVIX4 are 
equal to their VIX-free counterparts in terms of average predicted CoE levels, but with 
somewhat higher standard deviations.  
 
Consistent with findings in the comparative literature (Lee et al. (2015), Lee et al. 
(2010)), VMB and RFB measures are slightly negatively correlated. This suggests that 
they “do not capture the same underlying construct” (Botosan et al., 2011, p. 1102).50 
However, if there is no clear theory (or, as in this case, an ongoing debate) about which 
indicators are more valid estimates of a particular construct, the inclusion of all available, 
rather than only highly homogenous indicators, is recommended, even though they might 
be plagued by low internal consistency (Little et al., 1999, p. 207). This further supports 
the use of both VMB (rPEG) and RFB (rFF4) proxies as indicators for the CoE construct 
in the first part of this analysis.    
 
Average one-year ahead realised returns (17.1 percent) are similar to findings in pre-
vious work, but median future realised returns (8.7) are somewhat lower (e.g., Botosan et 
al. (2011), Guay et al. (2011)). Average annualised two- and three-year ahead returns 
(10.8 and 8.9) converge towards median levels of 8.6 and 7.8 percent over time. Among 
the VMB proxies, rPEG exhibits the strongest positive association with FRR (ret12: 
0.148; ret24: 0.121; ret36: 0.097); in contrast, rFF4 is best-behaved among the RFB prox-
ies in that it shows the least negative association with FRR (ret12: -0.022; ret24: -0.074; 
ret36: -0.089).51 These findings conform to the general tenor in the performance literature 
of VMB proxies being more reliable measures of CoE than RFB proxies, given their 
stronger positive association with future realised returns (Lee et al., 2015). 
 
                                                 
49  In contrast to this paper, both studies manipulate CoE to lie between 0.00 and 0.50 which explains 
slightly higher mean and median values then in this paper (e.g. mean in Barth et al.: 0.160; Kothari et 
al.: 0.146). However, if setting all observation to the same range, my statistics are similar (mean: 0.134).     
50  Cronbach’s alpha not applicable due to negative correlations between the proxies.  
51  The inclusion of (ex ante) investor sentiment about future market volatility in the CoE estimates only 
slightly improves the negative correlations with future returns. For instance, rFVIX4, the volatility risk 
factor augmented rFF4 proxy, shows significant negative correlations of -0.021, -0.066 and -0.083 with 
annualised 12-, 24- and 36-month buy-and-hold returns. 
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics by Constructs & Indicators 
Construct  
Indicator 
  Mean   Std. Dev.   10%   25%   Median   75%   90% 
Quantity                 
Listing    14.668  12.614  5.000  7.000  11.000  17.000  27.000 
Age   27.862  26.232  7.000  11.000  18.000  35.000  70.000 
RMC  -10.134  1663.926  -816.942  -535.663  -245.481  111.810  591.685 
Precision                
AQ   -0.061  0.067  -0.128  -0.073  -0.040  -0.023  -0.014 
VR    -0.410  0.269  -0.749  -0.523  -0.348  -0.225  -0.145 
AFP_Total   1059.000  1440.074  29.941  105.310  412.833  1414.583  3070.200 
Asymmetry               
PIN    0.205  0.107  0.088  0.123  0.184  0.268  0.352 
SPREAD   0.019  0.027  0.001  0.003  0.010  0.024  0.046 
INV_Conc   0.195  0.224  0.029  0.048  0.103  0.248  0.508 
CoE-RFB               
rCAPM   0.084  0.106  -0.018  0.006  0.063  0.138  0.222 
rFF3   0.115  0.127  -0.009  0.038  0.104  0.181  0.262 
rFF4   0.103  0.208  -0.026  0.026  0.093  0.174  0.261 
CoE-FVIX               
rFVIX  0.079  0.127  -0.052  0.005  0.063  0.140  0.230 
rFVIX3  0.115  0.148  -0.034  0.040  0.110  0.187  0.273 
rFVIX4  0.102  0.238  -0.057  0.022  0.100  0.184  0.276 
CoE-VMB               
rPE   0.069  0.060  0.030  0.047  0.064  0.084  0.109 
rPEG   0.124  0.096  0.068  0.084  0.103  0.137  0.196 
rAEGM   0.139  0.310  0.079  0.093  0.113  0.146  0.206 
CoE-FRR               
ret12   0.171  1.169  -0.361  -0.125  0.087  0.324  0.659 
ret24   0.108 
 0.356  -0.253  -0.072  0.086  0.242  0.455 
ret36   0.089 
 0.251  -0.193  -0.045  0.078  0.204  0.365 
The table reports summary statistics for the indicator variables used in the SEM analysis. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.4: Pearson Correlations for Indicators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) Listing 1.000                                         
(2) Age .611 1.000                                       
(3) RMC .228 .119 1.000                                     
(4) AQ .188 .196 -.031 1.000                                   
(5) VR .135 .181 -.022 .370 1.000                                 
(6) AFP_Total -.013† .048 -.022 .019 .020 1.000                               
(7) PIN -.207 -.150 -.068 -.074 -.032 .086 1.000                             
(8) SPREAD -.156 -.058 .036 -.071 -.096 .058 .420 1.000                           
(9) INV_Conc -.168 -.143 .011† -.123 -.094 .029 .522 .491 1.000                         
(10) rCAPM -.058 .001† -.008† -.040 -.021 .102 -.070 .133 .008† 1.000                       
(11) rFF3 -.049 .000† -.060 .030 .018 .056 -.024 .076 -.007† .597 1.000                     
(12) rFF4 -.031 -.001† -.049 .032 .049 .058 -.038 .015 -.015 .258 .745 1.000                   
(13) rFVIX -.034 .029 .003† .014 .052 .099 -.065 .137 .013 .928 .563 .243 1.000                 
(14) rFVIX3 -.030 .008† -.055 .023 .032 .051 -.046 .018 -.035 .481 .865 .653 .521 1.000               
(15) rFVIX4 -.018 .009† -.049 .028 .077 .056 -.059 -.022 -.029 .215 .683 .944 .246 .744 1.000             
(16) rPE .000† .022 -.010† .094 .064 -.108 .127 .150 .142 -.007† .011 -.005† .011 -.004† -.009 1.000           
(17) rPEG -.045 -.057 .000† -.186 -.205 -.176 .135 .179 .129 -.042 -.053 -.057 -.061 -.052 -.058 .140 1.000         
(18) rAEGM -.011† -.012† .000† -.064 -.070 -.106 .045 .081 .048 -.001† -.007† -.015 -.005† -.009† -.016 .061 .309 1.000       
(19) ret12 -.021 -.021 -.005† -.012 -.035 .011† .049 .104 .055 -.054 -.025 -.022 -.047 -.017 -.021 .076 .148 .033 1.000     
(20) ret24 -.016 -.010† -.009† .017 -.027 .038 .091 .123 .077 -.150 -.099 -.074 -.136 -.082 -.066 .089 .121 .023 .447 1.000   
(21) ret36 -.003† .000† -.013 .047 -.002† .044 .101 .123 .077 -.138 -.102 -.089 -.124 -.085 -.083 .086 .097 .019 .320 .777 1.000 
Pearson correlation coefficients based on pairwise deletion. † p > 0.10, * p > 0.05. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1. 
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3.4.2 Results of SEM Analyses   
Table 3.5 reports main results along with fit and descriptive statistics for all SEM models 
tested in this paper. Based on these results, I provide several figures to ease interpretation 
of my findings.    
3.4.2.1 Measurement Model  
Before the direct and indirect links between the information attributes and CoE can be 
analysed, an acceptable measurement model needs to be attained. Model fit must be ade-
quate, and each attribute should load statistically significantly with predicted signs on its 
pre-specified indicators. As a base model, I first estimate the conjectured SEM model and 
report factor loadings and structure coefficients in Figure 3.4. Fit statistics for my base 
model show good levels of fit for the structural model (SRMR: 0.048) and acceptable 
levels for the measurement model (CFI: 0.912; TLI: 0.873; RMSEA: 0.013, Table 3.5, 
Panel C).  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Base Model  
All coefficients standardized and significant at the 1% level or better. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm are reported in parentheses. Error terms are suppressed. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1. 
 
As conjectured, all proxies are positively correlated with their respective information 
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explained in Listing [R² = (0.876)² = 0.767]. Factor loadings on PIN, SPREAD and 
INV_Conc are all positive and significant, with Asymmetry explaining on average 56 per-
cent of indicators’ variance. Precision is substantially correlated with the earnings quality 
indicators AQ and VR, but only weakly associated with AFP_Total (R² = 0.011). Interest-
ingly, the CoE construct explains about 60 percent of variance in rPEG, but practically 
none in rFF4. This indicates that VMB proxies are more likely to capture changes in 
firms’ information environments than RFB proxies. I elaborate further on this point in 
Section 3.4.3 Results of CoE Analyses. As a result, the measurement of CoE is less well 
behaved; however, I follow the recommendation of Little et al. (1999) and keep both 
rPEG and rFF4 as CoE proxies. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Best-Fit Model 
All coefficients standardized and significant at the 1% level or better. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm are reported in parentheses. Variable names as defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Closer inspection of the correlation residuals of the base model reveals that four resid-
uals exceed the critical value of 0.10; AFP_Total is responsible for three of these viola-
tions (see Table 3.6). In particular, the model over-predicts its association with PIN (cor-
relation residual: 0.148) and SPREAD (0.140), but under-predicts its association with 
rPEG (-0.138). Excluding AFP_Total from the base model leaves factor loadings and 
structure coefficient almost unchanged (see Figure 3.5), but increases overall model fit 
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models (chi-square difference: 265.8; p-value: 0.000) and improved fit indexes for the 
best-fit model (Table 3.5, Panel C). Thus, all subsequent analyses are based on this best-
fit SEM specification. 
 
To summarise, information asymmetry between investors is reliably measured by all 
three empirical proxies (PIN, SPEARD, INV_Conc); similarly, the amount of available 
information to investors is well measured by both the period of time a firm is listed (List-
ing) and in existence (Age), with media coverage contributing significantly, but econom-
ically weakly, to its measurement (RMC). Notably, firms’ information precision tends to 
be best proxied by earnings quality metrics (AQ, VR); that is, exclusion of AFP_Total 
increases model fit substantially. One explanation might be that AFP_Total is a catch-all 
measure for the overall quality of firms’ information environments, rather than a proxy 
for Precision: analysts take a holistic approach in appraising companies, and thus, the 
accuracy of their forecasts not only depends on the precision of provided information, but 
also (1) on the extent to which they have access to private information and (2) on the 
amount of firm-specific information available to them. Therefore, if one seeks an aggre-
gate measure for the overall quality of a firm’s information environment, AFP_Total 
seems to be a valid proxy as substantiated by its significant negative association with all 
three VMB proxies (rPE: -0.108; rPEG: -0.176; rAEGM: -0.106; see Table 3.4). If, on 
the other hand, a more detailed examination of the respective information attributes is 
required, their measurement tends to be best conducted by the proxies suggested in the 
best-fit model.    
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Table 3.5: SEM Model Variations 
Panel A: Structural Coefficients (standardized)    









Direct Effects   Base   Best-Fit   BEOS   AMEX NASDAQ NYSE   LOW HIGH   1993/99 2000/10 
Quant.   Prec.   0.277   0.277   0.265   0.276†  0.260 0.217   0.175 0.318   0.241 0.259 
Quant. Asym.   -0.242   -0.241   -0.251   -0.250† -0.272 -0.303   -0.122 -0.155   -0.210 -0.108 
Prec. Asym.   -0.114   -0.116   -0.083   -0.009† 0.122 -0.275   0.060 -0.057   -0.238 -0.171 
Quant.  CoE   0.145   0.139   0.134   0.206† 0.185 0.096   0.104 0.086   0.048* 0.128 
Asym.  CoE   0.441   0.437   0.572   0.490* 0.450 0.206   0.209 0.058   0.372 0.667 
Prec.  CoE   -0.470   -0.447   -0.697   -0.629 -0.454 -0.334   -0.519 -0.328   -0.428 -0.481 
                                      
Indirect & Total Effects   Base   Best-Fit   BEOS   AMEX NASDAQ NYSE   LOW HIGH   1993/99 2000/10 
Quant. (direct)  CoE   0.145   0.139   0.134   0.206† 0.185 0.096   0.104 0.086   0.048* 0.128 
Quant. (ind.)  CoE   -0.251   -0.243   -0.341   -0.279† -0.226 -0.147   -0.114 -0.114   -0.202 -0.226 
Quant (total)  CoE   -0.105   -0.104   -0.207   -0.091† -0.042 -0.051   -0.011† -0.028†   -0.154 -0.098 
                                     
Prec. (direct)  CoE   -0.470   -0.447   -0.697   -0.629 -0.454 -0.334   -0.519 -0.328   -0.428 -0.481 
Prec. (ind.)  CoE   -0.05   -0.051   -0.047   -0.004† 0.055 -0.056   0.012† -0.003   -0.089 -0.114 
Prec. (total)  CoE   -0.52   -0.498   -0.745   -0.633 -0.399 -0.391   -0.507 -0.331   -0.512 -0.595 
Table continued on next page.  
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Table 3.5: SEM Model Variations (cont.) 
Panel B: Explained Variance (R-Square)   









Dependent Variable  Base  Best-Fit  BEOS  AMEX NASDAQ NYSE  LOW HIGH  1993/99 2000/10 
CoE       0.414   0.413   0.860   0.603 0.339 0.182   0.292 0.103   0.396 0.761 
Prec.        0.076   0.077   0.070   0.076 0.068 0.047   0.031 0.101   0.058 0.067 
Asym.        0.087   0.087   0.081   0.064 0.072 0.204   0.016 0.033   0.124 0.050 
  
Panel C: Fit Statistics   









Statistic    Base   Best-Fit   BEOS   AMEX NASDAQ NYSE   LOW HIGH   1993/99 2000/10 
DoF.       38   29   29   111 111 111   70 70   70 70 
χ²       413.2   147.4   607.2   906.3 906.3 906.3   2332.8 2332.8   730.2 730.2 
χ² p-value       0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
CFI       0.912   0.959   0.848   0.833 0.833 0.833   0.607 0.607   0.840 0.840 
TLI       0.873   0.936   0.764   0.797 0.797 0.797   0.495 0.495   0.794 0.794 
RMSEA       0.013   0.008   0.022   0.019 0.019 0.019   0.038 0.038   0.018 0.018 
SRMR       0.048   0.038   0.050   0.072 0.072 0.072   0.090 0.090   0.090 0.090 
Obs.       60,995   60,995   43,008   4,018 27,612 29,365   22,251 22,252   21,475 39,520 
Table continued on next page.  
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Table 3.5: SEM Model Variations (cont.) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics    









Mean  Base  Best-Fit  BEOS  AMEX NASDAQ NYSE  LOW HIGH  1993/99 2000/10 
Age (years)       27.86  27.86  27.94  28.36 23.81 30.55  26.57 33.36  29.08 27.47 
Listing (years)       14.67  14.67  13.64  12.31 11.75 17.89  12.42 17.77  13.00 15.35 
Market Cap (mUSD)   3,861.29  3,861.29  3,314.54  310.50 1,494.65 6,569.55  1,166.39 7,213.98  2,656.83 4,515.22 
ROA (%)    1.85  1.85  1.40  -1.47 -2.50 7.19  3.04 3.89  2.75 1.35 
† p > 0.10, * p > 0.05. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. BEOS model based on sample 1993 – 2005. Competition groups formed on basis of INV_Conc and 
split at the 50th percentile. Measurement equality across groups is assumed.  
 
Table 3.6: Correlation Residuals for Hypothesised (Base) SEM Model 







Listing 0.005                     
Age -0.003 -0.002                   
RMC 0.022 -0.037 0.003                 
AQ 0.001 0.079 -0.073 0.006               
VR -0.023 0.062 -0.070 0.006 0.004             
AFP_Total -0.055 0.017 -0.023 -0.043 -0.041 0.031           
PIN -0.033 0.020 -0.005 0.040 0.055 0.148 0.013         
SPREAD 0.001 0.066 0.086 -0.002 -0.021 0.140 0.014 0.003       
INV_Conc 0.014 -0.007 0.095 -0.101 -0.072 0.081 0.007 -0.001 0.001     
rPEG -0.001 -0.020 0.049 0.021 0.001 -0.138 -0.056 0.078 -0.071 0.010   
rFF4 -0.066 -0.017 -0.070 0.009 0.034 0.064 -0.008 0.070 0.003 0.002 0.000 
Correlation residuals are the difference between model-implied correlations and observed (sample) correlations.   
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3.4.2.2 Structural Model  
Having established the measurement model (which as a corollary provides novel evidence 
on the relative importance of the various information proxies used in extant research), the 
focus of our analysis can now be shifted towards the first research question: To what 
extent does information quantity, precision and asymmetry affect a firm’s CoE?  
 
Consistent with hypotheses H4 and H5, the best-fit model (see Figure 3.5) shows a 
significant positive association between Quantity and Precision (0.277; p-value: 0.000) 
and a significant negative association between Quantity and Asymmetry (-0.242; p-value: 
0.000). This endorses the notion that information quantity is the precursor or antecedent 
of these two attributes. Only as the amount of available information about a firm increases 
(e.g., increased disclosure) can investors begin to evaluate the accuracy of the information 
and informational disadvantages between the informed and uninformed can be resolved 
(i.e., asymmetry decreases). The direct effect of Quantity on CoE diverges from its as-
sumed negative association (0.139; p-value: 0.000; rejecting H3); however, the total ef-
fect remains significantly negative (-0.104; p-value: 0.000), given that the indirect effects 
(i.e., Quantity on CoE through Precision and Asymmetry, respectively) are almost two 
and a half times as important (-0.243; p-value: 0.000) than the direct one.  
 
With respect to the direct associations between Precision, Asymmetry and CoE, it is 
shown that as firms increase the accuracy of provided information (e.g., by increased 
earnings quality), they can expect to enjoy favourable CoE effects (-0.447; p-value: 0.000; 
confirming H1). Similarly, firms that enact effective measures to reduce information 
asymmetry between the privately informed and publicly uninformed (e.g., decrease in-
vestor concentration) tend to benefit from lower return expectations (0.437; p-value: 
0.000; confirming H2). The direct Asymmetry and Precision effects in this study are about 
twice as strong as those reported in BEOS (2012) and are even stronger when the model 
is re-estimated over their sampling period from 1993 to 2005 (see BEOS model in Table 
3.5). The fact that the average firm in BEOS (2012) is larger and more established than 
in my study and, furthermore, that information risk tends to be conditional on firm size 
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and maturity (e.g., Clarkson and Thompson (1990); Ecker (2014)), may explain these 
magnified effects.52  
 
Consistent with BEOS (2012), the direct effect of Precision on CoE accounts for al-
most 90 percent of the total effect between the two constructs (-0.498; p-value: 0.000), 
with the indirect effect explaining 10 percent of the total association (Precision via Asym-
metry on CoE: -0.051 = -0.116 x 0.437). The rather low importance of the indirect effect 
can be explained by the weak negative association between Precision and Asymmetry       
(-0.116; p-value: 0.000; confirming H3). Given this finding, BEOS concludes that “if 
there is a trade-off between improving the quality or precision of information and increas-
ing equality of access to information [decreasing Asymmetry], our results suggest that the 
former effect dominates the latter effect” (p. 477). 
 
However, their conclusion hinges upon a weak economic association between Asym-
metry and Precision. For instance, if one assumes that lower Asymmetry causes higher 
Precision, instead of higher Precision causing lower Asymmetry (i.e., interchanging the 
causality assumption in our SEM model), the conclusion changes accordingly. In such a 
model (unreported), all structure coefficients are unchanged, but because the indirect ef-
fect is mediated by information precision—Asymmetry via Precision on CoE (indirect 
effect: 0.051 = -0.115 x -0.447)—the direct effect of Asymmetry (and not Precision) ac-
counts now for 90 percent of the total CoE effect. Therefore, the debate is arguably less 
a question of which information attribute dominates the other in terms of its impact on 
total CoE effects than which attribute do firms have greater discretion over? Given that 
both direct effects show similar strength, I posit that firms can enjoy equally strong (di-
rect) positive CoE effects from either providing more accurate information to investors 
or distributing private information more equally between them. Thus, if there is a trade-
                                                 
52  The BEOS sample only contains Value Line firms that have existed for at least seven years, resulting 
in a total sample of 12,648 firm-years, for which they report an average sample ROA of 5.06 percent 
and market cap coverage of 42.96 percent. Over the same period, my IBES sub-sample contains 19,138 
firm-years, with ROA of 3.84 percent and market cap coverage of 50.81 percent, illustrating that my 
sample contains a greater number of smaller, younger and less profitable firms than in BEOS. Market 
cap coverage equals percentage of total market capitalization accounted for by sample firms; BEOS 
uses CRSP figures, this study uses CMM figures for total market cap. Difference between Value Line 
and IBES analyst forecasts discussed in Philbrick and Ricks (1991). 
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off, firms should dedicate scarce resources to those activities for which the potential of 
improvement is expected to be most positive.  
 
To summarise, these initial results corroborate the proposition that firm-specific infor-
mation has a significant impact on firms’ CoE on its merits, but also show that firms’ 
information environments are clearly governed by the influence of Asymmetry and Pre-
cision, which raises the question of what relevance Quantity is to firms and investors 
alike. The next section elaborates on this.  
3.4.2.3 Relative Importance of Idiosyncratic Information  
A central objective of this study is to offer new insights on the extent to which differences 
in firms’ information environments affect investors’ return expectations. To assess the 
relative importance of idiosyncratic information as a determinant of CoE, I test for sys-
tematic differences between (1) firms with different firm-characteristics; (2) firms with 
different levels of market competition; and (3) sub-sample periods 1993/99 and 2000/10. 
Table 3.7 reports results of these tests.  
 
Firm Characteristics. As a natural experiment, I categorise the sample firms into groups 
of stock exchange membership to test for structural differences between firms of different 
size, age and profitability. As shown in Figure 3.6, the average NYSE firm is much larger 
(market cap: 6,569 mUSD), older (31 years), longer listed (18 years) and more profitable 
(ROA: 7.2 percent) than firms trading on AMEX and NASDAQ.53 The rather low struc-
ture coefficients between Quantity and Precision (0.277) and Quantity and Asymmetry     
(-0.241) expose some sort of a ceiling effect for information quantity. That is, while 
Quantity tends to be of increased importance to investors when they are assessing the 
prospects of smaller, younger and less profitable firms, its relevance appears to plateau 
as firms mature. Evidence for this supposition is provided by decreasing direct, indirect 
and total effects of Quantity on CoE as one moves from AMEX (direct: 0.206; indirect:  
-0.279; total: -0.091) to NASDAQ (0.185; -0.226; -0.042) to NYSE stocks (0.096; -0.147; 
-0.051). This observation is consistent with findings in the estimation risk literature which 
                                                 
53  Unreported one-way ANOVA tests show that all mean levels for Age, Listing, Market Cap and ROA 
are significantly different between exchanges (p-value: 0.000), except for Listing and ROA differences 
between AMEX and NASDAQ firms (p-value: 0.268 and 1.000).  
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shows that for stocks for which there is limited amount of information (i.e., smaller and 
younger firms), investors have difficulties accurately estimating their return parameters, 
which makes these firms more risky investments and hence induces higher CoE (e.g., 
Clarkson and Thompson (1990), Ecker (2014)). 
 
What is more, NYSE firms are significantly less exposed to information risk than 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. First, this is delineated by significantly different direct ef-
fects between the exchanges: for instance, the direct impact of Asymmetry on CoE for 
NASDAQ (0.450, p-value: 0.000) and AMEX (0.490, p-value: 0.026) stocks is about 
twice as strong than for NYSE stocks (0.206, p-value: 0.001). Correspondingly, AMEX 
firms tend to benefit most (in the form of reduced CoE) from providing more precise 
information to investors (-0.629; p-value: 0.005), whereas these effects are lowest for 
NYSE (-0.334; p-value: 0.000) and moderate for NASDAQ stocks (-0.454; p-value: 
0.000). Second, the model explains just 18.2 percent of CoE variance for NYSE firms, 




Figure 3.6: Best-Fit Model by Stock Exchanges 
The figure shows standardized structural coefficients of the best-fit model, categorised by firms’ stock exchange mem-
bership (AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE), along with descriptive and model statistics. Information extracted from Table 3.5. 




Age (yrs) 28.36 23.81 30.55
Listing (yrs) 12.31 11.75 17.89
Market Cap. (m$) 310.50 1,494.65 6,569.55
ROA (%) -1.47 -2.50 7.19
Model Statistics
CoE R² 0.603 0.339 0.182
CFI 0.833 0.833 0.833
SRMR 0.072 0.072 0.072
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Table 3.7: Chi-square Difference Tests Between Structure Coefficients Across Groups 
Panel A: Differences in Structural Coefficients (standardized)  
    Grouping:  
Exchange 
 Grouping:  
Competition 
 Grouping:   
Time 
        AMEX – NYSE   NASDAQ – NYSE   AMEX – NASDAQ   LOW – HIGH     1993/99 – 2000/10 
Direct Effects   Difference p-value   Difference p-value   Difference p-value   Difference p-value     Difference p-value 
Quant.   Prec.   0.059* 0.100   0.043 0.000   0.016† 0.163   -0.143† 0.999     -0.018 0.002 
Quant.  Asym.   0.053 0.026   0.031 0.000   0.022* 0.095   0.033 0.000     -0.102 0.000 
Prec.  Asym.   0.266 0.000   0.397 0.000   -0.131* 0.095   0.117 0.007     -0.067 0.000 
Quant.  CoE   0.110 0.008   0.089 0.000   0.021 0.010   0.018 0.000     -0.078 0.001 
Asym.  CoE   0.284 0.009   0.244* 0.062   0.040 0.012   0.151 0.000     -0.295 0.000 
Prec.  CoE   -0.295 0.004   -0.120† 0.153   0.295 0.004   -0.191 0.000     0.053 0.012 
† p > 0.10, * p > 0.05. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better; p-value of 0.999 denotes a negative Chi-square difference between the nested and comparison model 
and as such a statistically insignificant difference. Competition groups formed on basis of INV_Conc and split at the 50th percentile. 
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Market Competition. There is an ongoing debate if—as shown in LLV (2012)—Asym-
metry effects are indeed conditional on market competition (Akins et al. (2012), 
Armstrong et al. (2011), Barron et al. (2012)). To evaluate this conjecture and to contrib-
ute new evidence to this discussion, I divide my sample into two groups of LOW and 
HIGH competition firms based on INV_Conc (where higher institutional investor concen-
tration denotes lower competition) and test for significant differences between the struc-
tural coefficients across the two groups (all differences significant at the 1% level, except 
for Quantity on CoE, see Table 3.7). As Figure 3.7 shows, the direct effect of Asymmetry 
on CoE for the low competition group (0.209, p-value: 0.003) is about 3.5 times as strong 
as it is for the high competition group (0.058 p-value: 0.000) which suggests that as mar-
kets become more liquid (i.e., approaching perfect market competition), the impact of 
asymmetric information on CoE declines. Similarly, the effects of Precision on CoE are 
significantly higher for low competition firms than for the high competition segment. 
Considering the explanatory power of all three attributes, the model explains three times 
as much CoE variation for LOW group stocks than for HIGH group firms (R-Square: 29.2 
and 10.3 percent, respectively).    
 
These patterns are comparable to the dampened impact of idiosyncratic information 
on firms’ expected returns as one moves from the smaller and younger AMEX/NASDAQ 
firms to the lager and older NYSE stocks. Given that the average firm in the LOW (HIGH) 
competition sample exhibits similar firm characteristics as the average AMEX/NASDAQ 
(NYSE) firm, this is unsurprising.54 However, it illustrates that Asymmetry and Precision 
effects tend to move in concert with each other in that they simultaneously gain and lose 
in relevance as size and maturity characteristics of firms change. Differently stated, it is 
not only Asymmetry, but also Precision effects which decline as market competition in-
creases and firms become older and more established: this contrasts with LLV’s (2012) 
conjecture and can be seen as an empirical extension of their model. Thus, it might be 
fruitful to identify a common information risk factor that captures both firms’ asymmetry 
and precision characteristic in order to bridge the gap between asymmetry/liquidity re-
search (e.g., Amihud (2002), Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) and precision/accounting 
                                                 
54  Unreported one-way ANOVA tests show that all mean levels for Age, Listing, Market Cap and ROA 
are significantly different between LOW and HIGH groups (p-value: 0.000). 
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quality research (e.g., FLOS (2004, 2005)). A first promising step in this direction is taken 
by Ecker et al. (2006).   
 
 
Figure 3.7: Best-Fit Model by Market Competition 
The figure shows standardized structural coefficients of the best-fit model, categorised by LOW and HIGH market 
competition firms, along with descriptive and model statistics. Competition groups formed on basis of investor concen-
tration (INV_Conc) and split at the 50th percentile. Information extracted from Table 3.5. All coefficients are significant 
at the 5% level or better. 
 
Sampling Periods. To examine if regulatory reform (e.g. Regulation Fair Disclosure 
2000, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) and stock market turmoil (dot-com bubble 2000/02, fi-
nancial crisis 2007/08) in the early 2000s affected the importance of idiosyncratic infor-
mation for market participants, I split the sample into two periods (1993/99; 2000/10) and 
compare structure coefficients across them to test if there are significant structural differ-
ences between the 1990s and 2000s (all differences significant at the 1% level, see Table 
3.7). Most structure coefficients for the two periods are widely similar in terms of their 
economic significance; however, the direct effect of Asymmetry on a firm’s CoE is twice 
as strong in the 2000s (0.667, p-value: 0.000) than in the 1990s (0.372, p-value: 0.002), 
with the 2000s period explaining 76.1 percent in CoE variation, compared to only 39.6 
percent for the 1990s (see Figure 3.8).  
 
One explanation might be that regulatory change in the beginning of 2000 made pri-
vate information more precious, causing more—not less—information asymmetry be-














Age (yrs) 26.57 33.36
Listing (yrs) 12.42 17.77
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ROA (%) 3.04 3.89
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investors.55 While findings in Duarte et al. (2008) and Gomes et al. (2007) broadly sup-
port this argument, convincing evidence also exists to the contrary: for instance, Lee et 
al. (2014) show that regulatory reforms reduced security mispricing and Chen et al. (2010) 
document a decrease in cost of equity in the post-Reg-FD period. My methodology does 
not allow for further investigation of this increased Asymmetry effect and, thus, any strong 
conclusions in this regard would be premature. On a more general level, though, results 
indicate that—irrespective of market conditions and regulatory reform—firms’ infor-
mation quality remains of material importance to investors.   
 
 
Figure 3.8: Best-Fit Model by Sampling Periods 
The figure shows standardized structural coefficients of the best-fit model, split into sampling periods (1993/99; 
2000/10), along with descriptive and model statistics. Information extracted from Table 3.5. All coefficients are signif-
icant at the 5% level or better. 
 
To sum up, findings substantiate the proposition that firms with high (low) quality 
information environments enjoy relatively low (high) costs of equity. More specifically, 
results suggest that (1) CoE relevance of idiosyncratic information is negatively corre-
lated with firm size, maturity and profitability, since younger, smaller and less profitable 
                                                 
55  To reduce information asymmetry (mainly between large institutional and small retail investors), the 
SEC enacted Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) that requires companies to disclose material information 
to all investors at the same time. Let us assume that for fear of lawsuits over not releasing material 
information to all investors on time, companies not only disclose less overall information, but in partic-
ular starkly reduce disclosing private information to selected investors, just as FD intended. Under such 
regulation, it is likely that very few investors can maintain their access to informal (alias private) infor-
mation, which leads to an enlarged portion of uninformed (alias publicly informed) investors. While 
under this new rule (public) information is now simultaneously disseminated among all investors, there 
is less information to be distributed in the first place—a concern raised by SEC commissioner Unger 
(2000) and investment professionals alike (AIMR, 2001). Having an increased fraction of publicly in-
formed investors whose only source of information is now diminished results in greater information 
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firms tend to benefit to a much greater extent from investing in the quality of their infor-
mation environments than older, bigger and more profitable firms do; and (2) information 
risk—in the form of Asymmetry and Precision effects—tends to decrease with market 
competition as it facilities quicker revelation of private information in stock prices, which 
lowers firms’ costs of equity.      
3.4.3 Results of CoE Analyses   
The proceeding paragraphs examine the extent to which the informational part of the best-
fit SEM model explains variations in different CoE measures. This is an interesting in-
quiry, because if firm-specific information is indeed of varying relevance for VMB prox-
ies compared to RFB proxies, then idiosyncratic information might offer an alternative 
explanation for why the former proxies are more valid measures of expected returns than 
the latter (Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011), Lee et al. (2010, 2015)). 
Table 3.8 reports main results along with fit statistics for the different CoE measurement 
combinations. Based on these results, I provide several figures to ease interpretation of 
my findings. 
3.4.3.1 Measurement Variations   
I begin this analysis by separately estimating the best-fit SEM model for three CoE con-
structs: (1) CoE-RFB which is composed of the RFB proxies rCAPM, rFF3, rFF4; (2) 
CoE-FVIX which includes the VIX augmented RFB measures rFVIX, rFVIX3, rFVIX4; 
and (3) CoE-VMB which reflects the ICC measures rPE, rPEG, and rAEGM. The focus 
is on changes in the direct CoE effects (specified in H1-H3), given that all other structure 
coefficients (i.e., Quantity on Precision; Quantity on Asymmetry; Precision on Asym-
metry) are unchanged under varying CoE measurement (see Table 3.8, Panel A). 
 
Figure 3.9 shows results for the CoE-RFB model. The three factor loadings for rCAPM 
(0.455), rFF3 (1.313) and rFF4 (0.567) conform to expectations (positive and signifi-
cantly non-zero) and show high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.77). However, 
the direct CoE effects are either incompatible with predictions or insignificant. First, the 
positive association between Precision and CoE leads to the rejection of hypothesis H1 
(0.046; p-value: 0.007). Second, the direct CoE effects stemming from Asymmetry and 
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Quantity are statistically and/or economically weak (Asymmetry: 0.016, p-value: 0.037; 
Quantity: -0.036; p-value: 0.112). As a result, the model explains a mere 0.3 percent of 
CoE-RFB variation and displays rather poor model fit-statistics. Findings for CoE-FVIX 
are similar to CoE-RFB (see Figure 3.10).  
 
Figure 3.11 depicts factor loadings and structure coefficients for the CoE-VMB model. 
The construct loads significantly positive on all three ICC measures (rPE: 0.694; rPEG: 
1.044; rAEGM: 0.320), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.40. The direct effect between Quan-
tity and CoE is inconsistent with H3, but negligible from an economic perspective (0.102, 
p-value: 0.000). More importantly, Precision (-0.353, p-value: 0.000) and Asymmetry 
(0.323, p-value: 0.000) both constitute an economically and statistically meaningful im-
pact on CoE and are in line with hypotheses H1 and H2. This leads to a well-fitted model 
that explains 24.4 percent of firms’ expected returns. 
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Figure 3.9: RFB CoE Construct 
The figure shows factor loadings for the risk factor/based CoE construct and standardized structure coefficients for 
Precision, Quantity and Asymmetry. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: FVIX CoE Construct 
The figure shows factor loadings for the VIX augmented risk factor/based CoE construct and standardized structure 




Figure 3.11: VMB CoE Construct 
The figure shows factor loadings for the valuation model/based CoE construct and standardized structure coefficients 
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Table 3.8: CoE Measurement Variations 
Panel A: CoE Measurement Variations & Structural Coefficients (standardized)  
        Risk-Factor-Based (RFB)   Risk Factor-Based + VIX (FVIX)   Valuation-Model-Based (VMB) 
CoE Factor Loadings   RFB1 RFB2 RFB3 RFB4   FVIX1 FVIX2 FVIX3 FVIX4   VMB1 VMB2 VMB3 VMB4 
rCAPM      0.455   x x                     
rFF3      1.313 0.757 x                       
rFF4      0.567 0.984   x                     
rFVIX                0.416   x 0.284           
rFVIX3                1.253 0.731 x             
rFVIX4                0.593 1.016   0.864†           
rPE                          0.694 0.571   1.281† 
rPEG                          1.044 1.264 1.001   
rAEGM                          0.320   0.321 0.064† 
                                    
Direct Effects   RFB1 RFB2 RFB3 RFB4   FVIX1 FVIX2 FVIX3 FVIX4   VMB1 VMB2 VMB3 VMB4 
Quant.   Prec.   0.283 0.279 - -   0.283 0.276 - 0.275   0.276 0.275 0.277 0.276 
Quant.  Asym.   -0.239 -0.239 - -   -0.240 -0.240 - -0.240   -0.240 -0.242 -0.241 -0.242 
Prec.  Asym.   -0.120 -0.120 - -   -0.119 -0.119 - -0.119   -0.120 -0.117 -0.116 -0.109 
Quant.  CoE   -0.036† -0.100 - -   -0.035* -0.086 - -0.098†   0.102 0.073 0.106 0.003† 
Asym.  CoE   0.016 -0.031† - -   -0.035 -0.056 - -0.059   0.323 0.209 0.342 0.295† 
Prec.  CoE   0.046 0.086 - -   0.010† 0.098 - 0.119†   -0.353 -0.315 -0.343 0.279† 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 3.8: CoE Measurement Variations(cont.) 
Panel B: Explained Variance (R-Square)                     









Dependent Variable    RFB1 RFB2 RFB3 RFB4   FVIX1 FVIX2 FVIX3 FVIX4   VMB1 VMB2 VMB3 VMB4 
CoE       0.003 0.013 - -   0.002 0.015 - 0.020   0.244 0.151 0.249 0.136 
Prec.        0.080 0.078 - -   0.080 0.076 - 0.076   0.076 0.076 0.077 0.076 
Asym.        0.088 0.087 - -   0.088 0.087 - 0.087   0.088 0.087 0.088 0.085 
  
                    
                    
Panel C: Fit Statistics                     
        Risk-Factor-Based (RFB)   Risk Factor-Based + VIX (FVIX)   Valuation-Model-Based (VMB) 
Statistic    RFB1 RFB2 RFB3 RFB4   FVIX1 FVIX2 FVIX3 FVIX4   VMB1 VMB2 VMB3 VMB4 
DoF.       38 29 - -   38 29 - 29   38 29 29 29 
χ²       991.5 886.8 - -   1038.9 1348.6 - 1011.1   197.3 134.9 93.8 98.9 
χ² p-value       0.000 0.000 - -   0.000 0.000 - 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CFI       0.000 0.000 - -   0.000 0.000 - 0.000   0.910 0.974 0.943 0.960 
TLI       -0.509 -1.443 - -   -1.230 -3.864 - -1.398   0.870 0.960 0.912 0.938 
RMSEA       0.020 0.022 - -   0.021 0.027 - 0.042   0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 
SRMR       0.041 0.037 - -   0.045 0.039 - 0.042   0.059 0.071 0.036 0.058 
Obs.       60,995 60,995 - -   60,995 60,995 - 60,995   60,660 60,660 60,659 60,660 
† p > 0.10, * p > 0.05. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. All estimates standardised. For RFB3, RFB4 & FVIX3 model failed to converge. 
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3.4.3.2 Measurement Combinations  
To elaborate on the role of idiosyncratic information in the measurement of CoE, I sim-
ultaneously reflect RFB, FVIX and VMB proxies in the measurement model (Table 3.9). 
This allows checking for measurement error in the different proxies and controls robust-
ness to my findings.  
 
Figure 3.12 illustrates factor loadings and structure coefficients for the RFB-VMB 
CoE construct. As shown the VMB estimates load positively and highly significantly on 
the respective CoE construct (rPE: 0.728; rPEG: 0.996; rAEGM: 0.349), while loadings 
for the RFB proxies are negative and insignificant (rCAPM: -0.128; rFF3: -0.104; rFF4: 
-0.125). Amending the RFB estimates by an additional risk factor for market-wide vola-
tility expectations (FVIX) leaves results unchanged (see Figure 3.13).56 More im-
portantly, structure coefficients and explained variance of CoE for both RFB-VMB and 
FVIX-VMB are almost identical to the results for the VMB-CoE construct stand-alone 
(see Figure 3.11). This is direct evidence that valuation model-based proxies are more 
likely to capture changes in firms’ information environments than risk factor-based prox-
ies do.  
 
 
Figure 3.12: RFB-VMB CoE Construct 
The figure shows factor loadings for the RFB-VMB CoE construct and standardized structure coefficients for Precision, 
Quantity and Asymmetry. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. 
                                                 
56  I do not report results for the RFB-FVIX combination given that results are alike to measuring CoE by 
RFB (Figure 3.9) and FVIX (Figure 3.10) stand-alone. This is due to due to high correlations of 0.93 
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Figure 3.13: FVIX-VMB CoE Construct 
The figure shows factor loadings for the FVIX and VMB CoE construct and standardized structure coefficients for 
Precision, Quantity and Asymmetry. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. 
 
The fact that RFB proxies reflect market-wide CoE expectations (as based on stock 
price equilibria and, in the case of FVIX, volatility outlooks), while VMB proxies capture 
investors’ sentiment at the firm level (in the form of analyst forecasts) might clarify why 
firm-specific information is markedly reflected in VMB estimates, but not in RFB/FVIX 
ones: VMB estimates derive from analyst forecasts, with security analysts likely to pay 
greater attention to (or at least show greater sensitivity for) the quality of firms’ infor-
mation environments than average market participants, which explains their stronger as-
sociation with information attributes vis-à-vis RFB estimates. Differently stated, the im-
pact of idiosyncratic information on security analysts’ expectations is much greater than 
on the market as a whole; whether this is good or bad depends on the extent to which the 
inclusion of firm-specific information adds to the construct validity of the various proxies. 
With the comparative literature showing that VMB outperforms RFB measures (Botosan 
and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011), Lee et al. (2010, 2015)), the incorporation of 
idiosyncratic information in the measurement of CoE might increase the empirical sound-
ness of those estimates. 
 
Moreover, among the three RFB-VMB combinations (see Table 3.9), the one consist-
ing of just rFF4 and rPEG reflects the most parsimonious and best-fitted SEM specifica-
tion (i.e., fit-statistics improve as the number of CoE proxies decreases). Interestingly, 
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(R²: 0.413) than in the 2 by 2 (0.244) and 3 by 3 (0.259) ones. Consistent with the previous 
argument, the reason might be that among the VMB proxies, rPEG reflects the greatest 
and purest fraction of analysts’ sentiment because it is exclusively estimated from one- 
and two-year ahead consensus earnings forecasts, while the others either only use one-
year ahead forecasts (rPE) or make ad hoc assumptions unrelated to analysts’ forecasts 
(e.g., perpetual growth in rAEGM).  
 
Overall, findings show that firm-specific information is strongly reflected in VMB es-
timates, but not so in RFB/FVIX ones. A possible explanation is that VMB measures are 
calculated from both idiosyncratic and systematic information, while RFB/FVIX proxies 
derive from systematic information only.57 Given prior evidence that VMB tends to out-
perform RFB proxies, I argue that the inclusion of idiosyncratic information in the meas-
urement of CoE might help increase the construct validity of expected return proxies. A 
first promising step in this direction is taken by Ecker et al. (2006). 
  
                                                 
57  It seems likely that the explanatory power of FVIX proxies would markedly increases if one amends 
RFB proxies by implied volatility estimates on the firm-level, instead of market-wide VIX data as in 
this study; however, due to data restrictions, we cannot carry out this analysis.  
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Table 3.9: Selected CoE Measurement Combinations 
Panel A: CoE Measurement Variations & Structural Coefficients (standardized) 
        RFB x VMB   FVIX x VMB 
CoE Factor Loadings  3x3 2x2 1x1  3x3 2x2 1x1 
rCAPM      -0.087† -0.049           
rFF3      -0.104†             
rFF4      -0.087† -0.062 -0.070         
rFVIX           -0.128† -0.081   
rFVIX3           -0.154†     
rFVIX4           -0.125† -0.088* -0.098 
rPE      0.728       0.744     
rPEG      0.996 1.013 0.777   0.968 0.912 0.601 
rAEGM      0.349 0.316     0.364 0.355   
                      
Direct Effects   3x3 2x2 1x1   3x3 2x2 1x1 
Quant.   Prec.   0.276 0.277 0.277   0.276 0.276 0.275 
Quant.  Asym.   -0.240 -0.241 -0.241   -0.240 -0.242 -0.241 
Prec.  Asym.   -0.120 -0.116 -0.116   -0.121 -0.115 -0.115 
Quant.  CoE   0.112 0.106 0.139    0.116 0.119 0.181 
Asym.  CoE   0.358 0.342 0.437   0.366 0.368 0.555 
Prec.  CoE   -0.340 -0.337 -0.447   -0.340 -0.381 -0.581 
                      
                      
Panel B: Explained Variance (R-Square) 
        RFB x VMB   FVIX x VMB 
Dependent Variable    3x3 2x2 1x1   3x3 2x2 1x1 
CoE       0.259 0.244 0.413   0.264 0.297 0.683 
Prec.        0.076 0.077 0.077   0.076 0.076 0.076 
Asym.        0.088 0.087 0.087   0.088 0.087 0.087 
  
              
              
Panel C: Fit Statistics               
        RFB x VMB   FVIX x VMB 
Statistic    3x3 2x2 1x1   3x3 2x2 1x1 
DoF.       71 48 29   71 48 29 
χ²       842.7 103.6 147.3   615.0 114.5 110.5 
χ² p-value       0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
CFI       0.436 0.908 0.959   0.465 0.901 0.966 
TLI       0.278 0.874 0.936   0.314 0.863 0.947 
RMSEA       0.013 0.004 0.008   0.011 0.005 0.007 
SRMR       0.103 0.048 0.038   0.099 0.047 0.037 
Obs.       60,995 60,995 60,995   60,995 60,995 60,995 
† p > 0.10, * p > 0.05. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. All estimates standardised. For 
FVIX x VMB (3x3) model failed to converge.  
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3.5  Summary and Conclusions  
The empirical literature examining the repercussions of idiosyncratic information on 
firms’ CoE is voluminous, and the conclusions reached vary widely depending on the 
proxies used to estimate information quantity, asymmetry, precision and CoE. By apply-
ing a SEM approach—which allows for contemporaneous analysis of the most commonly 
used empirical measures—I bring new evidence to the discussion about the pricing of 
information risk (e.g., Core et al. (2008), Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009), Shevlin 
(2013)) and the construct validity of different CoE estimates (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005), Easton and Monahan (2016)). 
 
In particular, this study complements BEOS (2012) in that it empirically validates and 
simultaneously tests for the analytical predictions of EO (2004) and LLV (2012). How-
ever, it differs from their path analyses in that my SEM approach is not bound to using 
only one direct proxy per construct, but has the benefit to concurrently rely on several 
indicators for Quantity, Asymmetry, Precision and CoE. This enhances measurement re-
liability of these constructs (as only reflecting shared variance among the indicators) and 
thus the soundness of this study’s empirical conclusions. 
 
Initial results from estimating the conceptual SEM model corroborate the proposition 
that firms with high (low) quality information environments tend to enjoy relatively low 
(high) costs of equity. More specifically, results show that firms’ information environ-
ments are dominated by the direct impact of Precision (-0.447) and Asymmetry (0.437) 
on CoE (structure coefficients in brackets). Quantity, on the other hand, appears to be of 
limited importance (0.139), but it serves as the precursor of Precision (0.277) and Asym-
metry (-0.242); that is, only as the amount of available information about a firm increases 
(e.g., in the form of mandatory and voluntary disclosure) can investors begin to evaluate 
the accuracy of this information and informational disadvantages between informed and 
uninformed investors can be resolved. Relaxing the assumption that information precision 
is mediated by asymmetry (as maintained in BEOS, 2012), and given that both attributes 
show an equally strong impact on CoE, I conclude that if firms must decide to either 
provide more accurate information to investors (increasing Precision) or distribute private 
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information more equally between them (decreasing Asymmetry), they should dedicate 
scarce resources to those corporate activities that show the most room for improvement 
(e.g., investor relations, reporting quality/frequency).   
 
In analysing the relative importance of idiosyncratic information, the following in-
sights are provided. First, it is shown that the younger and smaller firms are the greater 
their CoE benefits from actively investing in high quality information environments. This 
can be inferred from decreasing levels of explanatory power of the model as one moves 
from AMEX (CoE R²: 0.603) to NASDAQ (0.339) to NYSE (0.182) stocks, with the 
latter being much larger, older and more profitable than the former two. Second, the im-
pact of information risk on firms’ CoE decreases as market competition (in the form of 
less investor concentration) increases; that is, Asymmetry effects are almost four times 
weaker for the high competition group (0.058) than for the low competition group (0.209), 
and Precision effects are about 1.5 times weaker (high: -0.519; low: -0.328). Taken to-
gether, results indicate that CoE effects stemming from Asymmetry are approximately 
twice as sensitive to changes in firm size, maturity and market competition than Precision 
(i.e., decaying at a much faster rate), which qualifies my conclusion as follows: if less 
established firms face a trade-off between providing better quality information to inves-
tors and aiming to reduce informational disadvantages between investor groups, they 
should choose the former over the latter, given the greater persistence (i.e., CoE benefits) 
of Precision effects.  
 
The second part of this study examines the explanatory power of firm-specific infor-
mation for different expected return proxies. Findings suggest that valuation model-based 
CoE measures impound significantly more idiosyncratic information than risk factor-
based estimates; that is, informational differences between firms explain substantial var-
iation in the three VMB estimates (CoE R²: 0.244), but none in the RFB (0.003) and FVIX 
(0.003) proxies. Combining this finding with results from the performance literature (in 
which it is shown that VMB outperform RFB proxies) might partially explain the differ-
ence in construct validity between the two groups: VMB proxies capture investors’ sen-
timent (in the form of analysts’ forecasts) on the firm-level, while RFB proxies (based on 
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stock price equilibria) reflect market-wide CoE expectations, which nominates firm-spe-
cific information as the missing explanatory link between the two. That is, the accuracy 
and accessibility of firm-specific information directly affects analysts’ forecasts, but cer-
tainly less so—if at all—the average market participant. On the one hand, this explains 
the much stronger association between information attributes and VMB proxies vis-à-vis 
RFB estimates; on the other hand, it supports the notion that the incorporation of idiosyn-
cratic information in the measurement of RFB proxies might improve the empirical 
soundness of those estimates. 
 
Overall, this study contributes for a large sample of 7,091 firms confirmatory evidence 
that firm-specific information constitutes a significant statistically and economically im-
pact on firms’ cost of equity. However, results also show that the strength of this impact 
tends to be conditional on firm size, maturity, profitability as well as market competition, 
and only becomes pronounced in analyst-based ICC estimates, but not in market-based 
return proxies. Therefore, quantifying this impact via an information risk factor, which 
contemporaneously captures firms’ asymmetry and precision characteristics, could be an 
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3.6 Appendices  
Appendix 3.1: SEM Approach-Based Investigation of the Link between 
Idiosyncratic Information and Cost of Equity 
This paper examines the link between idiosyncratic information and cost of equity by 
means of a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach, which appears to be most ap-
propriate given the peculiarities of this study. On the one hand, the focus lies on infor-
mation constructs which are unlikely to be directly measurable, and on the other hand, it 
is intended to provide an integrated view on the extent to which informational differences 
across firms can (directly and indirectly) impact investors CoE expectations. One key 
strength of SEM is that it simultaneously extends regression and factor analysis in that it 
allows for dependent and independent latent constructs in the regression analysis while 
incorporating the notion of factor analysis, which is usually limited to the investigation 
of correlation structures between observable (non-latent) variables. In that sense, SEM 
merges multiple-regression and confirmatory factor analysis into one analytical step 
(Savalei and Bentler, 2010).  
 
SEM models consists of a structural and a measurement model. The structural model 
usually derives from existing theory and depicts the relation between the latent constructs. 
The measurement model infers the latent constructs by using a range of observable indi-
cators for them. Each latent construct needs to be specified by at least two indicator var-
iables (alias manifest or reference variables). The validation of the measurement model, 
i.e., verifying that the indicator variables measure the latent construct reliably, is a pre-
requisite before the full SEM model can be tested. This first step is referred to as “con-
firmatory factory analysis” (CFA) at which each indicator variable is treated as to have 
two causes: a single factor that measures the latent construct and all other unique sources 
of influence (omitted causes) represented by the error term. The shared variance (com-
monality) among the indicator variables reflects the degree to which the indicators meas-
ure the underlying factor/latent construct Eventually, a good SEM model is one which 
shows greatest resemblance between observed covariances in the data and predicted co-
variances by the model (Kline, 2011).  
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Model fit is assessed on how well a particular SEM specification resembles observed 
variance-covariance in the sample data with predicted variance-covariance by the model. 
Given the inapplicability of the chi-square statistic in large sample studies like this one, I 
evaluate model fit based on the following approximate fit indexes: standardised root mean 
square residual (SRMR), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-
Lewis-Index (TLI) and comparative fit index (CFI).58 These indexes offer a continuous 
measure for how well the model corresponds with observed data and are generally scaled 
as “goodness-of-fit” measures (exception RMSEA), where higher values indicate better 
model-fit.  
 
The SRMR captures misspecification of the structural part of the SEM, while TLI, CFI 
and RMSEA examine measurement model misspecifications. In line with Hu and Bent-
ler’s (1999) recommendation, I appraise model fit according to the following index levels; 
(1) TLI ≥ 0.95 and SRMR ≤ 0.09; (2) CFI ≥ 0.95 and SRMR ≤ 0.09; (3) RMSEA ≤ 0.06 
and SRMR ≤ 0.09; but acknowledge that these levels shall not be mistaken as golden 
rules of model fit (Fan and Sivo, 2005). What is more, Kline (2011, p. 171) suggests to 
scrutinise correlation residuals (calculated as the difference between model-implied and 
observed-sample correlations) in order to detect those sample correlations which are not 
well explained by the overall model. As a general rule, absolute differences greater than 
0.10 are being regarded as problematic in the SEM literature.    
 
 
Appendix 3.2: Description of Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
In a multi-asset, partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium model, Easley and 
O’Hara (EO, 2004) demonstrate that a firm’s CoE is decreasing in information precision 
(i.e., decreasing in accuracy of the available information about the future value of the 
                                                 
58  The model chi-square statistic is the most commonly used model test statistic in SEM research. It is 
structured as a “badness-of-fit” measure in that higher values indicate worse model fit: significant re-
sults (say, p < 0.05) denote overall model misspecification. However, unless perfect model fit is at-
tained– which is unlikely in any real world application – the model chi-square statistics increases with 
sample size. Thus, in very large samples (e.g. N = 5,000, Kline, 2011, p. 201) even minor model-data 
discrepancies can lead to test statics rejecting an otherwise valid model (Fan et al., 1999). With number 
of observations well exceeding this threshold (N = 60,995 for most of my models), the model chi square 
statistic is an invalid measure of model fit in this study.   
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firm) and increasing in information asymmetry (i.e., increasing in the fraction of unin-
formed investors and private signals about the future value of the firm). The EO model 
considers two type of risk-averse investors; (1) the informed, who have access to both 
public and private information about the future value of a risky asset; and (2) the unin-
formed, who only have access to the public information set, but can partially infer some 
of the private information about the future value through price observations. Equation 
(3.1) duplicates the EO model along with a definition of the main parameters.  
 
𝐸[𝑣𝑘 −  𝑝𝑘] =  
𝛿?̅?𝑘




𝐸[𝑣𝑘 −  𝑝𝑘]  expected rate of return as the difference between future value of stock k 
(𝑣𝑘) and buy price of stock k (𝑝𝑘) 
?̅?𝑘  the average per capita supply of stock k in number of shares 
𝛿  coefficient of risk aversion  
𝜇𝑘  fraction of privately informed investors; (1 − 𝜇𝑘) uninformed investors  
𝜌𝑘  precision of prior information 
𝐼𝑘  signals about future value 𝑣𝑘 of stock k 
𝛾𝑘  precision of signals 𝐼𝑘 
𝛼𝑘  fraction of private signals in 𝐼𝑘; (1 − 𝛼𝑘) public signals  
𝜌𝜃𝑘  precision of information revealed through trading 
 
Changing values in the numerator and/or the denominator have a direct impact on the 
expected rate of return of the risky asset (viz. stock k). Focussing on the numerator first 
(and holding parameters in the denominator constant) it is apparent that the CoE of share 
k increases with investors risk aversion (𝛿). Correspondingly, if investors must hold a 
greater (average) number of risky shares k in their portfolios (?̅?𝑘), it follows that the risk 
associated with share k is less widely spread among investors which induces greater risk 
for every single investor; hence, CoE is increasing in the average per capita supply of the 
stock.  
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The major contribution of the model, however, stems from predictions obtained by 
altering parameter values in the denominator (while assuming parameters in the numera-
tor remain unchanged). The model predicts that the CoE is a decreasing function of 
stock’s k information structure, given by  
 
𝜌𝑘 + (1 −  𝛼𝑘)𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘 + 𝜇𝑘𝛼𝑘𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘 + (1 −  𝜇𝑘)𝜌𝜃𝑘 (3.2) 
 
which can be rewritten as and is tantamount to  
 
𝜇𝑘(𝜌𝑘 + 𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘)  + (1 − 𝜇𝑘)(𝜌𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼𝑘)𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘 + 𝜌𝜃𝑘)  (3.3) 
 
Eq. (3.2) reveals the main subsets of information that constitute a firm’s information 
environment: “prior information with precision 𝜌𝑘, public information with precision 
(1 −  𝛼𝑘)𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘, private information with precision 𝛼𝑘𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘, public plus private information 
with precision 𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘 and private information partially revealed through price with preci-
sion 𝜌𝜃𝑘” (Botosan and Plumlee, 2013, p. 1047). As it can be seen from Eq. (3.2), an 
increase in the precision parameter (𝛾𝑘) generates a positive impact on the entire infor-
mation structure, leading to an increased level of information precision in both private 
and public information and eventually lowers the CoE.  
 
The impact of asymmetric information on the CoE is best illustrated with reference to 
Eq. (3.3). On the one hand, asymmetric information is influenced by how widely the in-
formation is disseminated among investors (dissemination: 𝜇𝑘) and on the other hand by 
the extent to which information is truly private and, therefore, only accessible by the in-
formed investors (composition: 𝛼𝑘). It is apparent from Eq. (3.3) that if the fraction of 
privately informed investors (𝜇𝑘) increases, more weight is placed on the richer infor-
mation set 𝐼𝑘𝛾𝑘 which increases the “weighted average assessed precision of information 
in the market” (ibid.) and, therefore, decreases the CoE. The impact of the composition 
of information (𝛼𝑘) on CoE, however, depends on the assumptions made about 𝐼𝑘.  
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In the EO model the information content of 𝐼𝑘 (i.e., the sheer quantity of signals about 
the future value of share k) is assumed to be constant (EO, 2004, p. 1558).59 Varying 𝛼𝑘 
then simply determines the fraction of 𝐼𝑘 which is private and public knowledge; that is, 
variations in 𝛼𝑘 determine the degree to which public information is substituted by private 
information (vice versa). As elucidated in Eq. (3.3), informed investors are unaffected by 
changing levels of 𝛼𝑘 as they observe all available information about stock k. However, 
increasing levels in 𝛼𝑘 decrease both the quantity and precision of available information 
on which the uninformed can base their expectations about the future value of share k. 
This informational disadvantage increases information asymmetry of stock k which trans-
lates into higher expected rate of returns. 
 
In a direct critique of EO (2004), Hughes et al. (2007) present a model in which the 
risk from information asymmetry is fully diversifiable and such is no longer a priced risk 
factor on its very own, but impacts the CoE through its effect on systematic risk factor 
loadings—foremost market beta. Information asymmetry is then sill influential, but now 
mediated by systematic risk factors. Such a model is certainly in greater alignment with 
neoclassic asset pricing theory, which states that idiosyncratic risk is fully diversifiable 
in large economies and, therefore, it is only systematic risk that is priced in the markets. 
However, as long as beta is measured with error (i.e., a well-specified, forward-looking 
beta which subsumes the risk from information asymmetry is not attainable), than infor-
mation asymmetry might still appear as a separate risk factor in empirical work (Lambert 
et al., 2007). Moreover, Hughes et al. (2007, p. 723) themselves acknowledge that their 
theory is “not inconsistent with studies that presume an existence of a systematic ‘infor-
mation risk’ factor.” 
 
  
                                                 
59  This assumption is relaxed in Lambert et al, 2012. 
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Appendix 3.3: Description of Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2012) 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (LLV, 2012) develop a single-asset, partially revealing 
rational expectations equilibrium model which is constituted of risk averse informed and 
uninformed investors.60 Although their major focus lies on the impact of asymmetric in-
formation on the cost of capital under varying levels of market competition, their model 
is general enough to allow for a comprehensive investigation of the impact of all infor-
mation attributes on firms’ CoE. The main argument of the LLV model is that in perfectly 
liquid markets where all investor types act as price takers—that is, perfect market com-
petition in the form of “horizontal demand curves for stocks” (Shleifer, 1986, p. 579) 
exist—asymmetric information has no impact on the CoE over and above its impact on 
average precision about the future value of the risky asset. However, if markets are im-
perfect there is a separate cost of equity effect induced by asymmetric information, even 
when the average precision in the market remains unchanged. The LLV model is shown 
in Eq. (3.4) along with a definition of the main parameters.  
 
𝐸[?̃?] −  𝐸[?̃?] = [
(1 + 𝑟𝐼Π𝐼𝜆)
−1 𝑁𝑟𝐼Π𝐼 +  𝑀𝑟𝑈Π𝑈









𝐸[?̃?] − 𝐸[?̃?]  expected rate of return as the difference between future cash flow of the 
risky asset ( ?̃?) and price of shares in the risky asset ( ?̃?) 
𝑁, 𝑀 number of informed and uninformed investors, respectively   
𝑟𝐼 , 𝑟𝑈 risk tolerances of informed and uninformed investors, respectively  
Π𝐼 = Π𝑉 + Π𝜖 precision of informed investors’ beliefs about the risky asset’s cash flow 
Π𝑈 = Π𝑉 + Π𝛿   precision of uninformed investors’ beliefs about the asset’s cash flow 
𝜆 an informed investor’s coefficient of illiquidity  
?̃? supply of shares in the risky asset  
 
The LLV model measures competition as “the extent to which an informed investor 
anticipates that his demand order will move price” (ibid., p. 13) and is denoted by the 
                                                 
60  Lambert and Verrecchia (2015) offer closed-form solutions to the equilibria conditions in the LLV 
(2012) model, however, leaving the analytical conclusions unaffected.   
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coefficient 𝜆. The genuine assumption is made that if either the number of informed or 
uninformed investors becomes very large, market liquidity increases up to a point where 
it renders both investor types into price takers. This mechanism establishes a perfect mar-
ket in which 𝜆 approaches zero. Furthermore, the precision parameter Π𝐼 subsumes prior 
(Π𝑉) and private (Π𝜖) information available to informed investors. The precision param-




Perfect Market Competition. Assuming that markets are perfectly competitive (i.e. 𝜆 = 
0), then the LLV model reduces to the form shown in Eq. (3.5) and allows for a direct 
comparison with EO (2004) model which also maintains the assumption of perfect market 
competition.  
 
𝐸[?̃?] −  𝐸[?̃?] = [
 𝑁𝑟𝐼Π𝐼 +  𝑀𝑟𝑈Π𝑈





𝑁𝑟𝐼 +  𝑀𝑟𝑈
] (3.5) 
 
Holding the expectation about the supply of the risky asset constant, it follows from 
Eq. (3.5) that CoE is now a decreasing function of the weighted average of the informed 
and uninformed investors’ information precision about the future cash flow of the risky 
asset; hence, the first term in Eq. (3.5) is simply referred to as average precision and 
denoted as:  
 
Π𝑎𝑣𝑔 =
 𝑁𝑟𝐼Π𝐼 +  𝑀𝑟𝑈Π𝑈




The predictions from Eq. (3.5) are similar to these in EO (2004) with regards to infor-
mation precision (𝛾𝑘), but are subtler with respect to information asymmetry which arises 
                                                 
61  Public information is not explicitly considered in the LLV model which is insofar not much of an issue, 
as the main purpose is to demonstrate that the impact of asymmetric information on the CoE depends 
on the level of market competition. Asymmetric information stems from the fact that some investors 
have access to private information, while others do not. Therefore, the model would reach the same 
conclusions even when public information is incorporated into the model. The only difference would 
be that the posterior precision of each investor type (i.e. Π𝐼  & Π𝑈) is increased by the “precision of the 
error term of the public signal” (LLV, 2012, p.7, footnote 6).  
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from the dissemination (𝜇𝑘) and composition (𝑎𝑘) of information. The first prediction of 
the LLV model is that an increase in prior information (Π𝑉) induces an increase in preci-
sion of both the informed and uninformed investors through Π𝐼 = Π𝑉 + Π𝜖 and Π𝑈 =
Π𝑉 + Π𝛿 , respectively. This increases the average precision in the market which lowers 
the CoE of the firm.62 
 
The second prediction—which constitutes the most crucial point of the LLV model—
is that in perfectly competitive markets information asymmetry “has no impact on the 
cost of capital after controlling for any impact it might have on average precision” (ibid., 
footnote 12, emphasis added). Changing degrees of information asymmetry always oper-
ate through changes in average precision first. Only if these changes increase (decrease) 
the average precision about the future payoffs of the risky asset, then the CoE decreases 
(increases), irrespective of whether this change stems from more or less asymmetric in-
formation. The following two examples illustrate as to why information asymmetry and 
CoE do not always move in concert with each other.  
 
First, assume that the composition of information is hold constant, but more investors 
become informed (increasing N). Then more weight is placed on the more accurate infor-
mation set Π𝐼 which increases average precision (Π𝑎𝑣𝑔) and decreases CoE, while also 
decreasing information asymmetry (i.e. private information is now more widely dissem-
inated among investors).63 Second, assume that the fraction of privately informed inves-
tors remains unchanged, while “the amount of private information” (ibid., p.17) grows 
(increasing Π𝜖). Such a shift not only increases the information set of the privately in-
formed, but also the information set of the uniformed as they now can infer more infor-
mation from price due to the arrival of a new private signal in the market (increasing Π𝛿). 
Hence, the average precision in the market increases and the CoE decreases, despite a 
                                                 
62  Note, the same prediction is obtained if one increases the overall precision (𝛾𝑘) of available information 
in the EO model.  
63  Note, that the same prediction is obtained from the EO model if one increases the fraction of privately 
informed investors (𝜇𝑘). 
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simultaneous increase in information asymmetry (i.e., more private information is avail-
able to the informed investors).64 The fundamental insight from above is that in markets 
with perfect competition the “communication of more information to more investors, not 
the reduction of information asymmetry per se, lowers the cost of capital” (Lambert et 
al., 2012, p. 18). Stated differently, a decrease in information asymmetry can either in-
crease or decrease the average precision about the future payoffs of the risky asset; if the 
latter happens the CoE increases.  
 
Imperfect Market Competition. If markets are imperfect (i.e. 𝜆 ≠ 0) than the average 
precision is not just the simple weighted average of the precision of the two investor types 
(as under perfect competition), but is also affected by the degree of market illiquidity as 
shown in Eq. (3.7).  
 
Π𝑎𝑣𝑔 =
 (1 + 𝑟𝐼Π𝐼𝜆)
−1 𝑁𝑟𝐼Π𝐼 + 𝑀𝑟𝑈Π𝑈
𝑁𝑟𝐼 +  𝑀𝑟𝑈
 (3.7) 
 
While mechanically obvious that the average precision decreases as illiquidity (𝜆) in-
creases, the notion behind needs clarification. In imperfect markets the demand of the 
informed depends not only on their risk tolerance and information about the future pay-
offs of the risky asset, but also on the extent to which their demand impacts prices. As 
illiquidity in the markets increases, the informed are less aggressive in trading the stock 
as each trade has now a much greater price impact than under perfect market competition; 
that is, demand curves are no longer horizontal but downward sloping which means that 
price curves are now being upward sloping in demand (Shleifer, 1986). In such market 
settings, the informed are forced to behave much more strategically when to trade and 
how much to trade (Kyle, 1985). Therefore, less of their private information—which 
could be revealed if their demand would not impact price—is now reflected in stock 
                                                 
64  Note, that the opposite would be predicted in the EO model with regard to an increase in information 
asymmetry due to an increase in the composition of information (𝛼𝑘). The differentiating feature be-
tween the two models is, that in the LLV model the information set is assumed to be variable; i.e. new 
private information also lead to an increase in the amount of information, while in the EO model the 
amount of information (𝐼𝑘) is fixed; i.e. any changes in the composition of the information set is a simple 
substitution of private for public signals and vice versa (Botosan and Plumlee, 2013). However, both 
models reach the same conclusion if the fixed quantity assumption of the EO model is relaxed. 
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prices. This decreases the information precision of the uniformed investors—because part 
of their precision depends on the informational content of price realisations—which low-
ers total average precision and increases CoE.  
 
To summarise, in imperfect market settings more private information (which also leads 
to greater information asymmetry) does not lower the CoE to the extent it could under 
perfect competition and this effect intensifies with increasing illiquidity. In other words, 
as illiquidity increases, the average precision which is assessed and available in the mar-
ket is much lower than it could be if markets were perfectly liquid.65 
 
 
Appendix 3.4: Empirical Measures of Information Quantity  
The following three indicators are used to infer information quantity: period of listing 
(Listing); firm age (Age) and relative media coverage (RMC). All of them are assumed to 
be positively associated with information quantity and estimated as described below.  
 
Period of Listing & Firm Age. Period of listing (firm age) is the number of years since 
a firm’s initial public offering (incorporation) and is calculated as the difference between 
the fiscal year end the firm-year pertains to and the year of the IPO (incorporation) with 
incorporation dates being obtained from Osiris. IPO dates are provided by SDC Platinum, 
Osiris and CRSP, however, with varying degrees of firm coverage in each database. SDC 
Platinum is the industry standard for listing information; hence, I combine IPO year data 
according to the following hierarchy: 1st SDC Platinum, 2nd Osiris, 3rd CRSP; that is, in 
case no IPO year information is available on SDC Platinum, data provided by Osiris is 
used. If Osiris data is missing as well, CRSP stock header information is used instead. All 
observations for which the year of incorporation is lager then the IPO year are excluded 
from the sample.   
                                                 
65  To prove the reasoning above, one can specify the model such that an increase in information asymmetry 
leaves average precision unchanged, but at the same time increases CoE—a result which cannot be 
obtained in perfect markets (i.e. λ = 0). This implies that asymmetry has now an impact on CoE over 
and above its impact on average precision which can only stem from an increase in illiquidity (see LLV, 
2012, numerical example in the appendix). This direct impact of information asymmetry on CoE in-
creases with market illiquidity. 
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RMC Index. The RMC index is positive (negative) for firms that enjoy more (less) media 
coverage than the expected average firm in the same industry and of similar size. In esti-
mating the RMC index, the methodology for the relative quantity index described in 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 2008) and initially proposed in Beattie et al. (2002, 2004) is 
followed. The idea behind the RMC index is that variations in media coverage which are 
unexplained by industry-membership and firm size (i.e., the residuals) are a good proxy 
for firm prominence which, in turn, tends to be positively associated with higher infor-
mation quantity (Kross and Schroeder, 1989). I proxy for media coverage of firm i as the 
number of news entries per firm-year on Factiva and use four-digit SIC codes to assign 
each firm into one of  the 48 industries suggested by Fama and French (1997). I run the 
panel regression in Eq. (3.8)—which controls for time and industry effects—and obtain 
the RMC index per firm-year as shown in Eq. (3.9) below.  
 






+ 𝛽𝑘𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (3.8) 
 
𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀?̂?𝑖,𝑡 (3.9) 
 
where 𝑀?̂?𝑖,𝑡 (𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡) is expected (observed) media coverage for firm i at time t; 𝑇𝑗 and 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗  are time and industry dummies, respectively, 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 
sales (Compustat) and 𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the relative media coverage index for firm i at time t.  
 
 
Appendix 3.5: Empirical Measures of Information Precision  
Information precision is measured by two earnings quality indicators (viz. accrual quality 
and earnings value relevance) and one indicator for the precision of analyst forecasts. All 
indicators are assumed to be positively associated with information precision and their 
measurement is described below. 
 
Earnings Quality. In this study, one accounting-based proxy accrual quality (AQ) and 
one market-based indicator earnings value relevance (VR) is used to proxy for firms’ 
earnings quality.  
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Accrual quality metric. The most prevalent accrual quality metric in extant work is the 
one developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) which is shown in Eq. (3.10). The idea 
behind this model is that accrual quality is higher for firms for which working capital 
accruals map better into previous, current and future operating cash flow realisations. A 
better mapping process is seen as indicative of low levels of abnormal accruals which is 
reflected by low regression residuals. The standard deviation of the residuals of the model 
are regarded as a “firm-level measure of accrual quality, where higher standard deviation 
denotes lower quality” (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, p. 40). 
 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡 (3.10) 
 
where ∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 denotes change in working capital as a proxy for accruals, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 is cash flow 
from operations in the current period. In this study, accrual quality (AQ) is based on the 
McNichols (2002) modification of the original Dechow-Dichev model as shown in equa-
tion (3.11) and measured as described in FLOS (2005, pp. 302-303). 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0,𝑖 +  𝛽1,𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2,𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3,𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 
+ 𝛽4,𝑖∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5,𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(3.11) 
 
where 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = total current accruals of 
firm i in year t;  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = cash flow from operations in current pe-
riod;66 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = net income before extraordinary items; 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 −
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = total accruals; ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = change in current assets 
between year t-1 and t; ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = change in current liabilities; ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = change in cash; 
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = change in current/short-term debt; 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = depreciation and amortiza-
tion expense; ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = change in revenues and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡= gross value of property, plant 
and equipment. All variables are deflated by firm i’s average total assets in year t and t-1 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) and winsorized at the 1
st and 99th percentile in each year. 
                                                 
66  Total accruals are calculated from information provided in the balance sheet and income statement (i.e. 
indirect approach followed). As an alternative one could follows the direct approach favoured by Hribar 
and Collins (2002); however results are chiefly unaffected if data from cash flow statement are used 
(FLOS, 2005, footnote 3). 
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Annual cross-sectional estimations of Eq. (3.11) for each of the 48 Fama-French in-
dustries (1997) with at least 20 firms in year t, yield firm- and year-specific residuals 
which form the basis for the accrual metric. First, the standard deviations for each firms’ 
residuals (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) are calculated over years t-4 through t, with large standard deviations in-
dicating poor accruals quality and implying a negative relation with precision.67 Second, 
I multiply the standard deviations by negative one in order to obtain the final accrual 
metric (AQ). This latter step differs from previous studies, but ensures a more intuitive 
interpretation between precision and accrual quality: the lower (higher) the information 
precision of a firm, the lower (higher) its accrual quality, the more (less) negative its 
standard deviation and AQ metric, respectively. That is, the AQ metric is now conjectured 
to be positively associated with precision, in contrast to an assumed negative association 
before the recoding.68  
 
Earnings value relevance. An accounting amount—such as earnings—is regarded as 
value relevant if it is associated with stock prices in a predictable manner; that is, it 
bridges the gap between financial standard setters and equity markets (Barth et al., 2001, 
p. 79).69 In this study, earnings value relevance (VR) is measured as the degree to which 
both a firm’s earnings and change in earnings explain its stock returns, where greater 
explanatory power indicates more transparent and value relevant earnings (Barth et al. 
(2013), FLOS (2004)).    
 
One way to operationalise VR is to measure the explained variability (adj. R²) from 
regressing stock returns on price-deflated earnings and change of earnings for each firm 
                                                 
67  Note that if a firm has consistently large residuals, so that the standard deviation of those residuals is 
small, that firm has relatively good accruals quality because there is little uncertainty about its accruals. 
For such a firm, the accruals map poorly into cash flows, but this is a predictable phenomenon, and 
should not be a reason for priced uncertainty (FLOS, 2005, p. 303).  
68  An alternative approach to estimate the AQ metric is to use firm-specific time-series regressions of 
annual data rather than annual industry cross-sections (see FLOS, 2004, pp. 979-980). However, this 
methodology requires an even longer time-series of firm-specific accounting information to be fully 
estimated. FLOS (2004) uses ten-years of firm data to estimate Eq. (3.11) in firm-specific time-series 
regressions, compared to seven years of firm data following the approach described above. This require-
ment would further reduce sample size, intensifies survivorship bias and thus excludes younger and 
smaller firms from analyses. However, in particular less mature firms constitute an interesting sample 
in which one would expect to observe greatest variety in accrual quality; thus, the industry approach 
taken in this study is to be preferred over this alternative time-series approach. 
69  See also Holthausen and Watts (2001) for an extended discussion of the value relevance literature.  
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over rolling ten-year windows as in FLOS (2004) or eight-year windows as in Bushman 
et al. (2004), with larger values of VR (i.e. larger adj. R²) indicating more value relevant 
earnings. 
 






+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.12) 
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = firm i’s 15-month continuously compounded return ending three month 
after the end of fiscal year t; 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = net income before extraordinary items; ∆𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
= change in net income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t and 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 = market 
value of firm i at the end of year t-1 which is fiscal year closing stock price times common 
shares outstanding.  
 
 However, determining VR by means of firm-specific time-series regressions comes 
at the cost of a starkly diminished sample (see discussion of alternative measurement 
approach for accrual quality in footnote 68). Thus, I operationalise VR analogous the 
measurement of the accrual quality metric; that is, Eq. (3.12) is estimated for each of the 
48 Fama-French industries (1997) with at least 20 firms in year t. This yields firm- and 
year-specific residuals that form the basis for the earnings value relevance metric: 𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
−[ 𝜎(𝜀𝑖,𝑡)] which is the standard deviation of firm i’s residuals (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) calculated over years 
t-4 through t multiplied by negative one to obtain the following interpretation: the lower 
(higher) the information precision of a firm, the less (more) value relevant its earnings, 
the more (less) negative its standard deviations and VR metric, respectively. That is, VR 
is assumed to be positively associated with precision. All level variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile in each year. 
 
Security Analyst Forecasts. Based on seminal work in Barron et al. (1998, BKLS), an-
alyst forecasts can be used to make inferences about the underlying information environ-
ment of a stock. In particular, utilising observable characteristics of analyst forecasts (viz. 
forecast dispersion, squared error in the mean forecast and the number of forecasts), the 
BKLS model allows for an inference about the degree of information precision of the 
public and private information sets available to security analysts (see Eq. (3.13) and (3.14) 
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for calculations). The theoretical validity of theses proxies is established by the fact that 
precision measures based on analyst forecasts substitute well for the general information 
precision of sophisticated investors (Barron et al., 2005).70 Consistent with Botosan and 
Plumlee (2013), I use the sum of public and private as an analyst forecast-based indicator 
for total information precision. 
 
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 =  















where 𝑆𝐸 = squared error in the mean forecast (?̅?𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑖𝑡)²; 𝐷 = forecast dispersion 
1
𝑁−1
∑ (?̅?𝑖𝑡 −  𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ; 𝑁 = number of forecasts; ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = mean forecast for firm i in quarter 
t; 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = actual earnings for firm i in quarter t and 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 = analyst j’s forecast of earnings for 
firm i, quarter t. SE, D and N are obtained from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S summary files 
for the most recent one-quarter ahead earnings forecasts. For instance, if the forecast pe-
riod is June 30th (q2) and there are forecast for q2 in Jan, Feb, March and April available, 
the forecasts given in April for period q2 are to be used. Further, only those observations 
are kept for which earnings are announced within 90 days after the quarter end. I also 
exclude all firm-quarter observations for which D is zero (as I interpret zero variance in 
forecasts as indication of stale forecasts) and a minimum of two unique analyst forecasts 
are required to be included in the sample.  
 
The final measure is a time-series average of the quarterly values for public and private 
over the three quarters q-1 to q+1, where q equals the quarter in which the fiscal year 
                                                 
70  See Barron et al. (2002) for an in-depth explanation of the BKLS model. Sheng and Thevenot (2012) 
propose a modification of the BKLS-based measures; they use a GARCH model to estimate the variance 
of the errors in the mean forecasts which they then substitute for the SE in the original BKLS-model. 
This method reduces measurement error and increase significance of statistical tests. However, the 
downside is that this approach requires extensively long firm-specific time-series data compared to the 
original approach. Thus, I choose to have a larger sample over the benefit of more significant results. 
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ends.71 Following this method, for each firm-year, an average public and private precision 
measure is obtained. Given that Precision in the analytical models is the inverse of the 
variance of the private and public information signals, negative values of public and pri-
vate are not meaningful and, thus, disregarded. The sum of public and private can then 
be thought of as an analyst forecast-based indicator for total information precision.72 It is 
hypothesised that higher (lower) information precision of a firm is indicated by higher 
(lower) values of total analyst forecast precision.  
 
 
Appendix 3.6: Empirical Measures of Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is measured by two microstructure indicators (i.e., probability of 
informed trading scores and bid/ask spreads) and one indicator for market competition 
(i.e., investor concentration). The measurement of each indicator is described below and 
all of them are conjectured to be positively associated with information asymmetry.  
 
Market Microstructure. The annual average of simple daily percentage spreads is used 
as an indirect measure of information asymmetry, and probability of informed trading 
(PIN) scores are employed as a direct one.  
 
Bid-Ask Spreads. Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) formally 
show that bid-ask spreads are valid measures for the exposure of market makers to the 
adverse selection problem, and as such capture well the degree of information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors. While some authors use computationally 
demanding proxies for the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads; I use annual 
averages of simple daily percentage spreads as a valid alternative (e.g. Coller and Yohn 
                                                 
71  As an alternative, Botosan and Plumlee (2013) takes the average over the four quarters q-3 to q. Fol-
lowing this latter approach leaves my SEM results unaffected, but reduces sample size for AFP_Total 
by about 1,000 firm-years.  
72  Note that there is a separate literature that exclusively uses analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for 
information precision (e.g., Diether et al. (2002)), however, dispersion represents only one element of 
uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty arising from analysts’ private information), thus, BKLS-based measures 
are to be preferred as they account for both public (common) and private (idiosyncratic) uncertainty 
(Sheng and Thevenot, 2012, p.21) 
 
 - 122 - 
(1997), Stoll (1978)).73 Consistent with Stoll (1978), for each firm i the daily percentage 
spread is estimated as shown in Eq. (3.15). I then calculate the final SPREAD statistic for 
firm i as the average daily percentage spread over 252 trading days which are centred 
around the fiscal year end date (i.e., the average over daily spreads from t-126 to t+125 is 
taken). In case a firm’s fiscal year end falls on a day of no trading, I use the latest available 
SPREAD statistic which immediately precedes the fiscal year end date.  
 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
|𝑃𝐵 −  𝑃𝐴|
1
2
(𝑃𝐵 +  𝑃𝐴)
 (3.15) 
 




(𝑃𝐵 +  𝑃𝐴) = mid-point of the bid/ask closing prices. 
 
Probability of Informed Trading Scores. Developed by Easley et al. (1996, 1997), PIN 
scores are firm-specific proxies for information asymmetry in that they measure the prob-
ability that the next trade order is from a privately informed investor, with larger PIN 
scores signifying larger information asymmetry. The underlying notion of the PIN 
model—shown in Eq. (3.16)—is that while it is impossible to directly observe which 
trades are based on private information, one can use imbalances between buy and sell 
orders to infer the probability of information-based trading for a given stock.74  
 
𝑃𝐼𝑁 =  
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇 +  𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 (3.16) 
 
where 𝛼 = probability of a private information event; 𝜇 = the daily rate of informed trade 
arrival; 𝜀𝑏(𝜀𝑠) = daily rate of uninformed buy (sell) trade arrival.   
 
However, PIN scores based on the original model tend to be a rather sensitive proxy 
for information asymmetry, given its difficulties to deal with large firms and high trading 
                                                 
73  Different methodologies can be followed in estimating the adverse selection component of bid-ask 
spreads; e.g. Bhattacharya et al. (2012, 2013) follow Huang and Stoll (1996); Armstrong et al. (2011) 
follow Madhavan et al. (1997); and Akins et al. (2012) follow Glosten and Harris (1988).  
74  Brown et al. (2004, pp. 348-349) give a thorough description of the PIN model.  
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volumes. Easley et al. (2010, p. 300) state that PIN scores “provide a better description 
of the information environment among smaller stocks” given the conjecture of the model 
that information events occur only once per day, which seems to be a less reasonable 
assumption for larger firms. Further, the model is plagued by computational under-/over-
flow when dealing with extremely large trading volumes which nowadays are the norm 
rather than the exception. What is more, the model assumes that buy and sell orders from 
uninformed investors are uncorrelated, while in practice a positive association is often the 
case (e.g., release of macroeconomic information or earnings announcements increases 
trading of both uninformed buyers and sellers). Brown and Hillegeist (2007) address these 
shortcomings and provide a robuster  PIN model that extends seminal work in Venter and 
De Jongh (2006).  
 
Stephen Brown provides quarterly PIN scores for all CRSP listed firms from 1993 to 
2010 on his website.75 As recommended by Brown, I drop all firm-quarters for which the 
number of trading days is below thirty and calculate the final PIN measure as a time-
series average of the quarterly PIN values over the three quarters q-1 to q+1, where q 
equals the quarter in which the fiscal year ends.  
 
Market Competition. Consistent with Akins et al. (2012), I measure market competition 
by means of investor concentration, but utilise information on mutual fund holdings in-
stead of institutional investor holdings due to data restrictions. Thomson Reuters’ Mutual 
Funds Holding (s12) database provides security holding information for all registered 
mutual funds that report their holdings with the SEC. The calculation of the concentration 
measure (INV_Conc) is shown in Eq. (3.17). For each firm-year, the final INV_Conc 
measure is an average over the three quarters q-1 to q+1, where q = quarter in which the 
fiscal year ends and it is conjectured that higher values of concentration denote less com-
petition in the trades of firm i’s stocks; hence, INV_Conc is assumed to be positively 
associated with information asymmetry.76 
 
                                                 
75  http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data  
76  Akins et al. multiply the index by negative one, so that higher values indicate more competition (p. 41); 
however, in order to maintain consistent interpretation between all of my indicators and asymmetry 
(viz. a conjectured positive association), I refrain from this modification.  
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where 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑗 = number of shares held by mutual fund j in firm i, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = total shares 
held by all mutual funds in firm i, and N = is the total number of mutual funds invested 
in in firm i.  
 
 
Appendix 3.7: Empirical Measures of Cost of Equity  
The proceeding paragraphs describe the estimation of the risk factor based (RFB) and 
valuation model based (VMB) expected return proxies used in this study.  
 
Risk factor-based CoE proxies. A common method to estimate expected return is to use 
asset pricing models. For instance, the Arbitrage Pricing Theorem (ATP) of Ross (1976) 
states that the expected rate of return of a firm is equal to the risk free rate (𝑟𝑓,𝑡) plus the 
sum of the risk premia (𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) of K risk factors multiplied by the firm’s respective 
sensitivity to these factors (𝛽𝑘)—that is, the CoE of a firm is a linear function of its ex-
posure to a number of different risk factors—see Eq. (3.18). Given this insight, I estimate 
three widely used risk factor based CoE proxies as described below.  
 
𝑒𝑟𝑡 =  𝑟𝑓,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) (3.18) 
 
Carhart’s Four-Factor Model (rFF4). One of the most widely used CoE measures is ob-
tained from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model (rFF4) that extends Fama and French’s 
(1993) three-factor model by a momentum factor which captures the return differences 
between positive and negative momentum stocks (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). In line 
with Barth et al. (2013), I calculate each firm’s cost of equity (𝑟𝐹𝐹4) for year t+1 as of 
year t as shown in equation (3.19). This involves the following steps.   
 
𝑟𝐹𝐹4 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 + ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑡
(𝑆𝑀𝐵)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 + ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡
+  ?̂?𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑈𝑀𝐷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 
(3.19) 
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First, I collect monthly time-series returns on the Fama-French and momentum factors 
from Kenneth French homepage and WRDS database, respectively, and calculate ex-
pected annual factor returns (viz. (𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 / 𝑆𝑀𝐵
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑡 / 𝐻𝑀𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 / 𝑈𝑀𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡) by taking each 
factor’s average monthly return over rolling 60 month windows.77 Monthly average re-
turns are then annualised by compounding over 12 months. Similarly, the expected annual 
risk free rate (?̅?𝑓,𝑡) is obtained, however, 12 month rolling windows instead of 60 month 
windows are used to avoid outdated estimates (Barth et al. (2013), Landsman et al. 
(2011)).  
 
 Second, I estimate Eq. (3.20) by means of rolling time-series regressions over 60 
month windows to attain firm-specific end of month factor loadings (i.e., ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡; 
?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑡; ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑡; ?̂?𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖,𝑡). Finally, I calculate each firm’s CoE (𝑟𝐹𝐹4) six months after 
its fiscal year end by evaluating Eq. (3.19) to ensure that end of year information has been 
impound in stock prices.  
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑚 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑚(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑚 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑚
(𝑆𝑀𝐵)𝑚
+  𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑚 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿)𝑚  + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖,𝑚 × (𝑈𝑀𝐷)𝑚 
(3.20) 
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑚 = firm’s i total monthly stock return; 𝑟𝑓,𝑚 = risk-free interest rate (one-
month treasury bill rate); (𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) = monthly excess return on the market; (𝑆𝑀𝐵)𝑚, 
(𝐻𝑀𝐿)𝑚 and (𝑈𝑀𝐷)𝑚 = monthly returns on the Fama-French and momentum factors.  
 
Fama-French Three-Factor (rFF3) and CAPM model (rCAPM). Following the same 
methodology as for rFF4, I estimate rFF3 and rCAPM by evaluating Eq. (3.21) and (3.22). 
 
𝑟𝐹𝐹3 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 + ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑡
(𝑆𝑀𝐵)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 + ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡 (3.21) 
 
𝑟𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 (3.22) 
                                                 
77  An alternative approach would be to follow Kothari et al. (2009) and simply average the monthly factor 
returns over the entire time-series (in their study from 1963-2000). However, this tends to induce for-
ward looking bias in the calculations and assumes time-invariant factor loadings. 
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Risk factor-based CoE proxies (FVIX augmented). Consistent with Ang et al. (2006), 
I re-estimate the three RFB models with an additional risk-factor for expected market 
volatility (i.e., FVIX). FVIX reflects the monthly excess return on a factor-mimicking 
portfolio that tracks daily changes in the VIX index (Barinov, 2013, p. 1880). The notion 
underlying the FVIX factor is that companies with more (less) negative return sensitivity 
to VIX index changes have higher (lower) CoE. Following the same methodology as for 
rFF4, I estimate rFVIX4, rFVIX3 and rFVIX by evaluating Eq. (3.23) to (3.25).  
 
𝑟𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋4 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 + ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑡
(𝑆𝑀𝐵)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 +  ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡  
+ ?̂?𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝑀𝐷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 +  ?̂?𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 
(3.23) 
 
𝑟𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋3 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 + ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖,𝑡
(𝑆𝑀𝐵)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡 +  ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡  
+ ?̂?𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 × (𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 
(3.24) 
 
𝑟𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋 =  ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑡 + ?̂?𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 ×
(𝐹𝑉𝐼𝑋)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 (3.25) 
 
 
Valuation model-based CoE Proxies. I estimate the four different ICC measures sug-
gested by Easton (2004) which are all based on the abnormal earnings growth model (see 
Eq. (3.26) - (3.28)). The models differ with respect to assumption made about dividend 
payments, short-term and perpetual abnormal earnings growth. The simplest ICC estimate 
(rPE) assumes no dividend payout nor any short- or perpetual growth in abnormal earn-
ings. In contrast, rAEGM makes use of all available assumptions, with rPEG and rMPEG 









                                                 
78  See Echterling et al. (2015) for a recent review of the literature on the computation and assessment of 
different implied cost of capital measures.   
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where eps1 = one year ahead I/B/E/S earnings consensus forecasts and P = current price 
from I/B/E/S pricing files. All observations for which eps1 is negative are excluded.   
 
Price-Earnings-Growth (rPEG) 





where eps1 (eps2) = one (two) year ahead I/B/E/S earnings consensus forecasts and P = 
current price from I/B/E/S pricing files. All observations for which eps1 is larger than 
eps2 are excluded.  
 
Abnormal Earnings Growth (rAEGM) 











(𝐺𝐴𝐸𝐺 +  
𝑑𝑝𝑠1
𝑃
 ); 𝐺𝐴𝐸𝐺  = perpetual growth rate in abnormal earnings set to 
current expected annual risk-free rate minus three percent. The expected annual risk-free 
rate is calculated by first taking the average of the one-month Treasury bill rate over roll-
ing past 12-month windows and then annualise it by compounding over 12 months. Risk-
free rates are from Kenneth French homepage. dps1 = analysts’ mean dividends per share 
estimates for t+1 as reported on IBES summary files; if missing, dps1 is forecasted as 
eps1 x current dividend payout ratio. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛)
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
 for firms with positive earnings and 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛)
0.06 𝑥 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
for firms with current negative earnings. Eps1, eps2 and P as describe above. Current 
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Appendix 3.8: Median ROA (%) by Constructs & Indicators  
 Quantity   Precision   Asymmetry 
Fiscal Year   Listing Age RMC   AQ VR  AFP_Total   PIN  SPREAD INV_Conc 
1993   4.19 5.19 4.92   4.23 3.71 4.08   3.71 3.11 3.52 
1994   4.75 5.71 5.21   4.92 4.19 4.75   4.34 3.74 4.08 
1995   5.11 5.67 5.59   5.20 4.36 5.14   4.49 3.85 4.07 
1996   5.09 6.04 5.77   5.27 4.39 4.76   4.53 3.82 4.07 
1997   5.09 5.98 5.72   5.10 4.33 4.47   4.21 3.91 4.24 
1998   4.23 5.54 4.97   4.42 3.44 3.75   3.44 3.30 3.57 
1999   4.21 4.94 4.92   4.60 3.44 4.04   3.49 3.37 3.58 
2000   3.93 4.84 4.85   4.53 3.39 4.28   3.39 3.06 3.52 
2001   2.40 3.57 3.48   3.04 2.00 2.59   2.07 1.79 2.10 
2002   2.63 3.53 3.61   3.15 2.30 2.70   2.31 2.12 2.38 
2003   2.97 3.95 4.02   3.57 2.76 3.28   2.68 2.52 2.74 
2004   3.71 4.71 4.81   4.67 3.47 4.36   3.50 3.32 3.49 
2005   4.10 5.09 5.24   4.81 3.76 4.51   3.85 3.66 4.06 
2006   4.20 5.33 5.47   4.73 3.66 4.62   3.87 3.68 4.08 
2007   4.01 5.25 5.36   4.86 3.46 4.62   4.00 3.59 4.02 
2008   2.31 3.74 3.85   3.40 1.85 2.93   2.41 1.87 2.41 
2009   1.48 2.52 2.84   2.58 1.50 2.47   1.73 1.46 1.73 
2010   3.00 4.16 4.50   4.40 2.94 3.87   4.27 2.93 3.31 
Average   3.75 4.76 4.73   4.30 3.28 3.96   3.46 3.06 3.39 
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Appendix 3.8: Median ROA (%) by Constructs & Indicators (cont.) 
Sample ROA Valuation Model-Based CoE   Risk Factor-Based CoE   Future Realised Returns     
Fiscal Year   rPE rPEG rAEGM   rCAPM rFF3 rFF4   ret12 ret24 ret36   Market ROA 
1993   3.90 3.94 3.96   3.06 3.06 3.06   3.17 3.32 3.49   1.96 
1994   4.38 4.71 4.71   3.73 3.73 3.73   3.82 3.90 4.02   2.35 
1995   4.50 4.69 4.71   3.78 3.78 3.78   3.90 4.02 4.12   2.32 
1996   4.49 4.40 4.40   3.85 3.85 3.85   3.93 4.03 4.12   2.29 
1997   4.57 4.53 4.52   3.89 3.89 3.89   4.07 4.13 4.24   2.08 
1998   4.03 3.82 3.81   3.29 3.29 3.29   3.37 3.41 3.56   1.60 
1999   4.13 4.14 4.16   3.35 3.35 3.35   3.39 3.46 3.51   1.44 
2000   4.18 4.22 4.22   3.12 3.12 3.12   3.14 3.20 3.30   1.07 
2001   3.14 2.67 2.67   1.78 1.78 1.78   1.85 1.98 2.06   0.74 
2002   3.20 2.86 2.88   2.09 2.09 2.09   2.19 2.29 2.31   1.14 
2003   3.55 3.33 3.33   2.48 2.48 2.48   2.61 2.68 2.74   1.50 
2004   4.31 3.83 3.83   3.28 3.28 3.28   3.34 3.45 3.49   2.29 
2005   4.66 4.33 4.37   3.66 3.66 3.66   3.72 3.80 3.82   2.36 
2006   4.71 4.41 4.38   3.71 3.71 3.71   3.76 3.86 3.91   2.60 
2007   4.84 4.44 4.46   3.66 3.66 3.66   3.70 3.79 3.88   2.17 
2008   3.82 2.81 2.82   1.90 1.90 1.90   1.95 2.04 2.04   0.77 
2009   2.88 2.10 2.14   1.48 1.48 1.48   1.53 1.56 1.65   0.97 
2010   4.22 3.56 3.60   2.95 2.95 2.95   2.98 3.04 3.07   2.46 
Average   4.08 3.82 3.83   3.06 3.06 3.06   3.13 3.22 3.29   1.78 
Market ROA is the median ROA (Income Before Extraordinary Items / Total Assets) of all CMM listed firms from 1993 to 2010.    
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Appendix 3.9: Market Capitalisation (% of Total Market Cap) by Constructs & Indicators 
 Quantity   Precision   Asymmetry     
Fiscal Year   Listing  Age RMC   AQ VR  AFP_Total   PIN  SPREAD INV_Conc   Total Mkt. Cap 
1993   24.72 23.50 30.87   24.76 58.61 22.82   63.71 66.57 43.08   $6,295bn 
1994   24.61 23.29 30.47   43.53 57.36 23.12   63.48 66.56 43.15   $6,512bn 
1995   25.08 24.56 31.49   44.29 58.06 22.57   64.68 65.78 43.45   $8,534bn 
1996   25.27 24.42 31.29   42.51 55.96 21.50   64.17 64.88 45.44   $10,520bn 
1997   28.01 26.52 33.42   42.88 57.59 24.03   66.51 66.42 47.28   $13,741bn 
1998   29.33 27.68 35.31   45.24 59.19 25.41   68.22 67.87 47.33   $16,511bn 
1999   26.85 24.65 33.04   44.64 55.50 26.76   62.93 62.24 47.98   $22,086bn 
2000   33.14 29.82 37.76   47.62 58.93 29.78   66.85 58.37 52.41   $21,486bn 
2001   33.17 30.45 38.65   48.22 61.06 36.69   68.18 68.43 54.69   $18,441bn 
2002   33.90 31.27 38.73   48.81 62.35 39.12   69.56 69.89 58.39   $14,742bn 
2003   33.52 30.27 37.21   47.90 61.52 40.99   68.12 68.12 58.45   $19,679bn 
2004   34.84 31.24 37.33   46.30 61.63 42.21   65.98 68.74 49.09   $22,201bn 
2005   33.62 30.60 36.76   46.55 60.42 41.07   67.16 67.87 59.23   $23,658bn 
2006   33.54 31.19 36.34   46.95 61.38 41.66   68.34 69.62 61.89   $27,300bn 
2007   34.87 33.55 38.61   53.02 65.63 43.66   44.39 73.45 65.76   $28,160bn 
2008   37.57 37.42 42.77   56.30 68.56 49.22   45.92 76.94 71.05   $17,368bn 
2009   37.08 36.55 41.98   56.46 69.51 50.99   72.88 77.39 71.18   $21,759bn 
2010   39.40 38.64 43.39   56.67 72.93 50.41   7.61 77.30 72.31   $24,656bn 
Average   31.58 29.76 36.41   46.81 61.45 35.11   61.04 68.69 55.12   323,647.00 
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Appendix 3.9: Market Capitalisation (% of Total Market Cap) by Constructs & Indicators (cont.) 
 Valuation Model-Based CoE   Risk Factor-Based CoE   Future Realised Returns     
Fiscal Year   rPE rPEG rAEGM   rCAPM rFF3 rFF4   ret12 ret24 ret36   Total Mkt. Cap 
1993   43.25 41.82 41.80   68.66 68.66 68.66   67.65 66.03 65.10   $6,295bn 
1994   44.65 41.44 41.41   68.44 68.44 68.44   66.83 66.08 64.28   $6,512bn 
1995   44.42 40.63 40.45   67.82 67.82 67.82   67.13 65.27 61.86   $8,534bn 
1996   46.18 43.76 43.43   67.01 67.01 67.01   65.20 61.79 59.19   $10,520bn 
1997   48.07 45.02 44.78   68.63 68.63 68.63   65.32 62.76 58.70   $13,741bn 
1998   52.81 51.00 50.94   70.34 70.34 70.34   67.62 63.57 62.40   $16,511bn 
1999   48.38 45.63 45.59   64.73 64.73 64.73   61.71 60.75 60.15   $22,086bn 
2000   50.89 46.57 46.07   69.53 69.53 69.53   68.67 67.86 66.94   $21,486bn 
2001   54.22 53.27 53.22   71.08 71.08 71.08   70.49 69.45 68.60   $18,441bn 
2002   57.92 50.98 50.98   72.58 72.58 72.58   71.48 70.49 68.52   $14,742bn 
2003   57.09 51.68 51.68   70.78 70.78 70.78   69.77 67.61 65.99   $19,679bn 
2004   59.22 51.31 51.29   71.63 71.63 71.63   69.39 67.64 66.48   $22,201bn 
2005   59.80 52.14 52.12   71.03 71.03 71.03   69.07 67.88 66.55   $23,658bn 
2006   61.44 56.51 53.78   72.98 72.98 72.98   72.07 70.73 69.95   $27,300bn 
2007   65.48 63.09 62.46   76.72 76.72 76.72   75.76 75.03 74.10   $28,160bn 
2008   69.25 64.44 64.43   80.24 80.24 80.24   79.48 78.51 78.10   $17,368bn 
2009   71.14 68.62 68.51   80.62 80.62 80.62   79.77 79.25 78.80   $21,759bn 
2010   72.35 67.59 67.55   80.71 80.71 80.71   80.29 79.80 79.09   $24,656bn 
Average   55.92 51.97 51.69   71.86 71.86 71.86   70.43 68.92 67.49   323,647.00 
Total Market Capitalisation in billion USD which represents market value (common shares outstanding x fiscal year end closing stock price) for all CMM listed firms from 1993 to 2010.  
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4 Implied Cost of Capital and Cross-Sectional 
Earnings Forecasting Models: Evidence from 





Elaborating on seminal work by Hou et al. (J Account Econ, 53:504-526, 2012, HVZ) 
and Li and Mohanram (Rev Account Stud, 19:1152-1185, 2014, LM) on how cross-sec-
tional earnings forecasting models can address prevailing limitations in implied cost of 
capital (ICC) research, this study evaluates mechanical earnings predictions for newly 
listed firms in terms of forecast bias, forecast accuracy and earnings response coefficients 
(ERC). Using three cross-sectional earnings forecasting models suggested by HVZ 
(2012) and LM (2014), I provide for a sample of 1,657 IPOs comparative evidence on the 
quality of model-based earnings forecasts and the validity of ICC estimates derived there-
from. Results demonstrate that combining the earnings model of HVZ (2012) with the 
earnings persistence (EP) model of LM (2014) into one forecasting solution (HVZ/EP) 
generates less forecast bias, higher ERCs and more valid ICC estimates vis-à-vis the 
HVZ, EP and RI (residual income) models stand-alone. This suggests that for smaller and 
younger firms more complex forecasting solutions might be required to ensure reliability 
of model-based earnings predictions and ICC calculations. The average IPO in my sample 
has an implied cost of capital of 10.9 percent, which is consistent with model- and analyst-
based ICC estimates in extant research.    
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4.1 Introduction 
The expected rate of return of a firm’s equity (also referred to as cost of equity, discount 
rate or required return) is one of the most crucial numbers in corporate finance: investors 
require reliable estimates for equity valuation, firm managers need it for capital budgeting 
and academics use it as a dependent variable in a variety of settings. While its appropriate 
determination is an ongoing debate, its general influence on corporations is clear: lower 
costs of equity (CoE), lead to higher valuations (i.e., higher stock prices) which is tanta-
mount to increased shareholder wealth.  
 
Traditional risk-factor based (RFB) cost of equity measures (e.g., CAPM, FF3-factor 
estimates) rely on past realised returns to gauge firms’ expected returns. However, the 
unexpected news component in realised returns (i.e., noise) tend to corrupt the reliability 
of factor loading and factor premia estimates within asset pricing models, which may lead 
to “woefully imprecise estimates of the cost of equity” (Fama and French, 1997, p. 154). 
Given this shortcoming, an aspiring literature—in particular in accounting research—ap-
plies the concept of implied cost of capital (ICC) to derive alternative proxies for expected 
rate of returns, which I refer to as valuation model-based (VMB) proxies in this study. 
The applicability of the ICC methodology crucial depends on the availability of reliable 
predictions of future payoffs to shareholders and extant reserach primarily uses analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts to proxy for them. However, with the reliance on these fore-
casts two problems arise.  
 
First, analyst-based earnings forecasts tend to be overly optimistic (e.g., Francis and 
Philbrick (1993), Dugar and Nathan (1995), McNichols and O'Brien (1997)) which may 
result in biased and invalid ICC estimates. For instance, Easton and Monahan (2005, p. 
501) investigate seven different analyst-based ICC estimates and conclude that “for the 
entire cross-section of firms, these proxies are unreliable”, but also confirm that some 
proxies become reliable when “analysts’ forecast accuracy is high”.  Second, young, small 
and financially distressed firms are rarely covered by security analysts (e.g., Diether et al. 
(2002), Hong et al. (2000), La Porta (1996)) which limits the ICC methodology towards 
large and well-established firms. This coverage bias makes analyst-based ICC measures 
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less of an alternative to RFB proxies in that the latter only require firms to have a suffi-
ciently long return history to be estimated.   
 
This paper complements seminal work by Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012, hereafter: 
HVZ) and Li and Mohanram (2014, hereafter: LM) on how cross-sectional earnings fore-
casting models can address analyst-associated deficiencies in ICC research.79 In particu-
lar, I am testing the applicability of the HVZ, EP and RI model for the smallest, youngest 
and least followed firms in equity markets: initial public offerings (IPOs). The main ob-
jective of this paper is to investigate as to what extent the respective models can be used 
to (1) predict earnings and (2) derive implied cost of capital of newly listed firms. More 
specifically, I examine if earnings forecasts based on pre-IPO financial information can 
be used to derive valid ICC estimates for those firms.   
 
For a sample of 1,657 IPOs from 1972-2013, I find that combining the HVZ and EP 
model into one forecasting solution (HVZ/EP) outperforms earnings predictions from the 
HVZ, EP and RI model stand-alone, as indicated by its lower forecast biases and higher 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs). The average (median) forecast bias form the 
HVZ/EP model is -1.61 (-0.32) percent of market value of equity and average (median) 
forecast accuracy equals 6.11 (3.73) percent. These levels are consistent with large sam-
ple study figures in HVZ (2012) and LM (2014), and endorse the general applicability of 
earnings forecasting models for smaller, younger and less followed firms. From the earn-
ings forecasts, I calculate for each model and IPO a composite ICC (rCOMP) at seven 
different points in time after initial listing (using closing price at the end of one, three, 
six, nine, 12, 18 and 24 month of trading).80 Expected returns for the composite ICC are 
highly consistent across all four models and over time. The average (median) IPO in my 
sample has an expected rate of return of 10.9 (8.6) percent, which is consistent with ana-
lyst-based ICC estimates in Liu et al. (2014) for a sample of approximately 800 IPOs. 
 
                                                 
79  HVZ (2012) predict earnings from contemporary accounting data (viz. total assets, dividends, earnings 
and accruals) and LM (2014) propose two parsimonious alternatives to the HVZ model: the earnings 
persistence (EP) and residual income (RI) model. 
80  The composite ICC (rCOMP) is the average of rPE, rPEG, rMPEG and rAEGM (Easton, 2004).  
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To assess the construct validity of my model-based ICC estimates, I regress one-year 
ahead buy-and-hold returns on each models composite ICC. Fama-MacBeth (FMB) co-
efficients for HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP are all negative and insignificant when ICCs are 
calculated from first month closing prices (i.e., MV1), somewhat mixed (7 negative; 5 
positive) for MV3 to MV9, but all positive and significant for forecasting horizons be-
yond (minimum t-stat. 1.80). Inefficient equity valuations, in the form of upward biased 
share prices in the immediate IPO aftermarket, might explain the initially insignificant 
results. What is more, HVZ/EP-based estimates display the highest construct validity 
across all models in that FMB coefficients are consistently close to one from MV12 on-
wards (MV12: 0.94; MV18: 1.04; MV24: 0.96), whereas coefficients for HVZ, EP and 
RI are above one for MV12 (1.31; 1.22; 1.12) and below one for MV24 (0.87; 0.74; 0.75), 
indicating that these estimates are on average too low for MV12 and too high for MV24.  
 
Overall, findings show that the quality of forecasted IPO earnings and validity of ICC 
estimates derived therefrom is highest for the HVZ/EP model, followed by HVZ in sec-
ond, and EP & RI in joint-third place. This implies that when predicting earnings for 
smaller and younger firms model performance decreases with parsimony and, thus, more 
complex forecasting solutions seem required (such as HVZ/EP) for those types of firms.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related literature 
and the earnings forecasting models employed in this study. Section 4.3 outlines the meth-
odology. Section 4.4 evaluates the performance of the model-based earnings forecasts 
and ICC estimates. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.5.  
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 The Association between Realised and Expected Returns  
Based on Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), firms’ realised returns at date t+1 can be 
decomposed into an expected and unexpected return component. Formally: 
 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝑡+1 (4.1) 
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where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the firm’s realised return at date t+1, 𝑒𝑟𝑡 is the expected rate of return (CoE) 
at the beginning of t+1 conditional on all available information at date t and 𝛿𝑡+1 captures 
the unexpected (abnormal) return component from date t to t+1. The unexpected return 
component is due to new information and can be further decomposed into unexpected 
returns due to (1) cash flow news and (2) discount news; that is unexpected stock price 
movements (i.e., abnormal returns) occur either because there are surprising idiosyncratic 
cash flow news and/or because the underlying systematic risk of an asset changes. In 
equation form: 
     
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑒𝑟𝑡 + (𝑐𝑛𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑛𝑡+1) (4.2) 
 
where 𝑐𝑛𝑡+1 is return due to cash flow news and 𝑟𝑛𝑡+1 is return due to discount rate news 
from date t to t+1, respectively. The negative sign on discount rate news ( − 𝑟𝑛𝑡+1) cap-
tures the fact that, ceteris paribus, an increase in future discount rates lead to a decrease 
in stock price, resulting in realised returns being lower than expected returns. 
 
 It follows from equation (4.1) and (4.2) that while in hindsight realised returns can be 
explained by both its expected and unexpected component, the ex ante predictability of 
realised returns is only due to the expected return component; that is, 𝑒𝑟𝑡 is the only “sta-
tistical object that predicts returns” (Lee et al., 2010, p. 7). Although the true expected 
return of a firm is not observable and therefore subject to measurement error, the insight 
is clear: the more precise the measure for expected returns, the more precise the return 
forecasts. In general, the literature takes two main approaches when measuring firms ex-
pected returns; the first approach relies on past realised returns—which I refer to as risk 
factor-based (RFB)—and the second one conforms to the concept of implied cost of cap-
ital—denoted as valuation model-based (VMB) in this paper. Table 4.1 provides an over-
view of commonly applied CoE measures in extant work.  
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Table 4.1: Risk Factor-Based vs. Valuation Model-Based CoE proxies 
Risk Factor-Based (RFB)  Valuation Model-Based (VMB) 
▪ Asset Pricing Models 
- CAPM: rCAPM - (Lintner, 1965, Mossin, 
1966, Sharpe, 1964) 
- Fama-French three factor model: rFF3 -
(Fama and French, 1993) 
- Carhart’s four-factor model: rFF4 - (Carhart, 
1997) 
- Fama-French five factor model: rFF5 - (Fama 
and French, 2015) 
 ▪ Dividend Discount Model  
- Finite horizon: rGOR - (Gordon and Gordon, 
1997) 
- Target price: rBP - (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002) 
▪ Residual Income Model 
- Economy-wide: rCT - (Claus and Thomas, 
2001) 
- Industry method: rGLS - (Gebhardt et al., 
2001)  
▪ Abnormal Earnings Growth Model  
- Price-earnings ratio: rPE - (Easton, 2004) 
- Price-earnings-growth ratio: rPEG - (Easton, 
2004) 
- Modified price-earnings growth: rMPEG - 
(Easton, 2004) 
- Change in abnormal earnings growth: rAEGM 
- (Easton, 2004) 
- Economy-wide growth: rOJN - (Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005)  
- Modified economy-wide growth: rGM - 
(Gode and Mohanram, 2003) 
The table reports commonly used risk factor-based and valuation model-based CoE measures. Reported in parentheses 
are the original sources suggesting the respective proxy.  
 
4.2.1.1 Risk Factor-Based Proxies   
A time-honoured approach in estimating firms’ CoE is to use past realised returns. One 
method to gauge the expected rate of return of a firm is to assume that the unexpected 
return component ( 𝛿𝑡+1) is mean zero over time and firms, which makes average past 
realised returns a natural proxy for future expected returns. This approach has been taken 
by some researchers (e.g., Doukas et al. (2006), Konchitchki et al. (2016)), however, it 
seems problematic to the extent that in particular firm-specific cash-flow news (𝑐𝑛𝑡+1) 
can have a significant impact on firm-level returns (e.g., Chen et al. (2013), Ogneva 
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(2012), Vuolteenaho (2002)).81 A more common method is to directly estimate expected 
returns (𝑒𝑟𝑡) by means of asset pricing models, where it assumed that firms’ CoE equals 
the risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓,𝑡) plus the sum of several different risk-premia—formally: 
 
𝑒𝑟𝑡 =  𝑟𝑓,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) (4.3) 
 
However, irrespective of which asset pricing model is used (e.g., Carhart (1997), Fama 
and French (1993), Fama and French (2015), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Lintner 
(1965), Mossin (1966), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Sharpe (1964)), all of them are 
plagued by the fact that their estimates are based on noisy past realised returns; that is, 
the unexpected news component in realised returns tend to corrupt the reliability of factor 
loading and factor premia estimates in RFB models, which can result in “woefully impre-
cise estimates of the cost of equity” (Fama and French, 1997, p. 154).  
4.2.1.2 Valuation Model-Based Proxies 
Given the limitations of RFB measures, an aspiring literature—in particular in accounting 
research—follows the approach of implied cost of capital (ICC) in estimating firms’ CoE 
(e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Botosan et al. (2004), Francis et al. (2004)). The intuition 
behind the ICC framework is straightforward: use a specific valuation model, accept the 
current stock price as at least semi-strong efficient in the classical efficient market hy-
potheses sense (Fama, 1965, 1970) and back-out the internal rate of return which equates 
current stock price of the firm with its expected future payoffs to shareholders. The inter-
nal rate of return is then considered as market participants’ ex ante assessment of the 
firm’s CoE. More formally, the discount rate (r) that equates 𝑃𝑡−1 and ∑ 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡]
∞
𝑡=1  
in the well-known dividend discount model—Eq. (4.4) —is regarded as a firm’s expected 
rate of return. 
 
 
                                                 
81  Elton (1999, p. 1199) also questions the reliability of average realised returns as proxies for expected 
returns: “The use of average realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that in-
formation surprises tend to cancel out over the period of a study and realized returns are therefore an 
unbiased estimate of expected returns. However, I believe that there is ample evidence that this belief 
is misplaced.” 
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where 𝑃𝑡−1 is the current stock price, 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡] is expected future dividends conditional 
on all available information at time t=0 and r is the discount rate.  
 
The residual income and abnormal earnings growth model are important alternatives 
to the dividend discount model and the ICC methodology can be easily extended towards 
these models (Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Easton (2004), Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005)).82  
4.2.1.3 Performance Evaluation  
The literature suggests three methods to assess the construct validity of the different CoE 
measures: first, comparison of the association between the proxy and future realised re-
turns;83 second, comparison of the association between the proxy and common risk fac-
tors (e.g., market beta, leverage, B/M, volatility, size);84 and third, comparison of the pre-
dictive power of the proxy for future realised returns. 
 
Studying eleven ICC estimates and one RFB proxy in regard to their association with 
common risk factors and explanatory power of future realised returns, Botosan et al. 
(2011) find that the ICC measures based on price-earnings-growth-ratios within an ab-
normal earnings growth model (rPEG) and target prices within a standard dividend dis-
count model (rBP) demonstrate greatest construct validity among all proxies tested. In a 
similar vein, Lee et al. (2010) examine the predictive power of seven ICC and two RFB 
proxies and conclude that “all of the ICC estimates tested perform much better than the 
beta-based measures widely touted in finance textbooks” (ibid., p. 26).85 Taken findings 
                                                 
82  See also Echterling et al. (2015) who provide a recent review of alternate methods of computation. 
83  Two prominent examples following this methodology are Guay et al. (2011) who regress realised re-
turns on different ICC proxies; and Easton and Monahan (2005) who extend Guya et al. in that they 
control for cash flow and discount rate news in their regression.  
84  Botosan and Plumlee (2005) follow this approach to assess the validity of different ICC proxies. Easton 
and Monahan (2016) argue that this approach is illogical, given that the ICC approach is based on the 
assumption that these very risk factors are either unknown or cannot be measured reliably.  
85  Lee et al. (2015) report similar results in both cross-sectional and time-series analyses. 
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together, this suggest that VMB proxies are more valid estimates of firms’ expected re-
turns than RFB ones.    
4.2.2 Earnings Forecasting Models 
Despite the compelling evidence of VMB estimates demonstrating greater construct va-
lidity than traditional RFB measures, the ICC methodology is not impeccable either.  In 
particular, ICC estimates only yield an unbiased CoE estimate if market prices are effi-
cient and forecasted future payoffs are congruent with overall market expectations. As-
suming markets are at least semi-strong efficient—an assumption which seems to be vi-
olated in the immediate IPO aftermarket, as discussed later—then the difficulty in prac-
tice reduces to the reliable measurement of future payoffs to shareholders. Extant research 
mostly uses short- and long-term analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts to proxy for mar-
ket expectations, but with the reliance on these forecasts two problems arise. 
 
First, analyst forecasts tend to be overly optimistic (e.g., Dugar and Nathan (1995), 
Francis and Philbrick (1993), McNichols and O'Brien (1997)) which leads to upward bi-
ased ICC estimates. This bias in analyst forecasts might even be substantial enough to 
render an otherwise valid approach unreliable. For example, Easton and Monahan (2005, 
p. 501) investigate seven different ICC estimates and conclude that “for the entire cross-
section of firms these proxies are unreliable”, but also show that when “analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is high” some of them become valid. In a similar vein, Guay et al. (2011) show 
that the association between ICC proxies and future realised returns is weak, but improves 
substantially once analyst forecast errors are controlled for and, recently, Mohanram and 
Gode (2013) confirm that removing predictable analyst forecast errors significantly im-
proves the validity of ICC estimates. Second, young, small and financially distressed 
firms are rarely covered by security analysts, as reported in Diether et al. (2002), Hong et 
al. (2000), La Porta (1996) and validated by only 22 percent of IPOs in my sample enjoy-
ing immediate analyst coverage.86 This coverage bias limits the ICC methodology to-
                                                 
86  Analyst coverage is assumed if at least one analyst provides an earnings forecast for the first fiscal year 
ending following the IPO.     
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wards large and well-established firms and, thus, makes it less of an alternative for tradi-
tional RFB proxies which only require a firm to have a sufficiently long trading history 
in order to be estimated. 
 
Given these analyst-associated biases, recent advancements in ICC research recom-
mend mechanical earnings forecasts—either from longitudinal or cross-sectional earnings 
models—to gauge future payoffs to shareholders. While longitudinal models impose 
strong data requirements (once again limiting applicability), cross-sectional models re-
main usable even though firms lack a long time-series of earnings realisations; that is, 
because factor loadings in the cross-sectional models are estimated via pooled regressions 
for all firms in the population (say, for the entire Compustat universe), only current firm-
specific information for the independent variables is needed to predict future earnings of 
the sample firms. Three prominent cross-sectional forecasting models are proposed in 
seminal work by HVZ (2012) and LM (2014) whose applicability to (1) predict earnings 
and (2) derive implied cost of capital for newly listed firms is tested as part of my main 
analyses. 
4.2.2.1 The HVZ model  
HVZ (2012) forecast earnings from contemporary accounting data (viz. total assets, div-
idends, earnings and accruals) and find that their model-based earnings predictions are 
superior to analyst forecasts in respect to coverage, forecast bias and earnings response 
coefficients (ERC). They further show that ICC estimates calculated from model-based 
earnings forecasts are more reliable proxies for CoE than the ones based on analyst fore-
casts. The HVZ model builds on previous cross-sectional profitability models (see Fama 
and French (2000), Fama and French (2006), Hou and Robinson (2006)) and is specified 
as:  
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 (4.5) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 is earnings in year t+τ (τ = 1 to 5) of firm i; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total assets; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is divi-
dends; 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable for dividend paying firms; 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is earnings; 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
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is an indicator variable for loss firms; and 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals which I set to 
zero if missing.  
4.2.2.2 The LM models 
LM (2014) propose two parsimonious alternatives to the HVZ model in that their earnings 
persistence (EP) model only requires current earnings data to predict future earnings, and 
their residual income (RI) model predicts earnings based on current earnings, equity book 
value and total accruals data.87 They find that both models outperform the HVZ model in 
terms of forecast accuracy, forecast bias, ERC, and greater construct validity of the 
model-based ICC estimates (i.e., greater correlation with future returns and common risk 
factors). Their earnings persistence (EP) model, specified in (4.6), includes an indicator 
variable for loss firms (𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡) and accounts for different persistence of profits and 
losses in the form of an interaction term (𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑖,𝑡).  
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸 ∗ 𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 (4.6) 
 
Their second model derives from the well-known residual income (RI) model (formal-
ised in a series of influential papers by Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 1996)) 
and is shown in (4.7).   
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝜒0 +  𝜒1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜒2𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜒3(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸 ∗ 𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜒4𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜒5𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 (4.7) 
 
where 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is equity book value. 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals of firm i as described in 
Richardson et al. (2005) and set to zero if missing. 
4.2.2.3 The HVZ/EP model  
Prior evidence shows that financial losses are less persistent than profits (Hayn (1995), 
Li (2011), Resutek (2011)). Given that IPO firms tend to show greater propensity to report 
negative earnings than established firms (e.g., 29 percent of IPOs in my sample are loss 
firms in year t compared to only 20 percent for the Compustat population), it might prove 
                                                 
87  A discussion of their paper is provided in Feng (2014). 
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valuable to combine the HZV and EP model into one comprehensive forecasting solution. 
Thus, I amend the HZV model by an interaction term—see Eq. (4.8)—to account for 
different earnings persistency (𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑖,𝑡). 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝜓0 +  𝜓1𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜓2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓3𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓4𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓5𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓6𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜓7(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸 ∗ 𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4.8) 
 
4.2.2.4 The RW model  
Bradshaw et al. (2012) show that random walk time-series forecasts of earnings compete 
reasonably well with analyst forecasts over varying forecasting horizons and that these 
findings are particularly true for younger and smaller companies. Thus, as a naïve bench-
mark for the cross-sectional earnings forecasting models in this study, I include a random 
walk (RW) model in the main analysis as shown in Eq. (4.9). 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 (4.9) 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Selection  
I use a sample of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq listed firms on the Compustat fundamen-
tals annual files up to 2015 to estimate the earnings models. For the HVZ (EP) model 
205,484 (208,070) firm-year observations with required data are available from 1950 to 
2015. Data coverage for the RI model begins in 1960 with 196,303 firm-year observations 
available up to 2015. Given that each model is estimated over the past ten years (as de-
scribed below), the first factor loadings are attainable in 1959 for the HVZ, EP and 
HVZ/EP model, and in 1969 for the RI model. 
 
My sample of newly listed firms consists of all initial public offerings in the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) database, excluding unit IPOs, closed-end funds, real estate invest-
ment trusts (REITs), American Depositary Receipts and Shares (ADRs & ADSs), non-
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U.S. listed firms, and all companies for which pre-listing accounting information is miss-
ing on Compustat. Also, I only include IPOs for which the difference between the IPO 
date (from SDC) and the fiscal year-end (FYE) date (from Compustat) immediately pre-
ceding the IPO is at least 90 days and at most 365 days which avoids look ahead bias and 
reliance on dated fiscal information when forecasting IPO earnings. I sort the remaining 
2,485 firms by the difference of days between IPO date and FYE date and confirm for the 
top and bottom two percent of this sorting that the fiscal year end information used in this 
study was available in the IPO prospectus (i.e., cross-validating SEC S-1 fillings, pro-
vided via EDGAR from 1996 onwards, with Compustat data).88 Finally, only those IPOs 
are maintained for which all relevant market (CRSP) and accounting data (Compustat) is 
available to predict one- to three-year ahead earnings for all four models. The final sample 
consists of 1,657 IPOs (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: IPO Sample Development 
Description   No. of IPOs 
All US Public & Private Common Stock IPOs from 1962 - 2015 listed on SDC Platinum   9,522 
Excluding Unit IPOs, REITs, ADRs, ADSs   -364 
Excluding IPOs not listed on "U.S Public" market place   -863 
Excluding IPOs not to be found on Compustat   -4,452 
Intersection SDC & Compustat   3,843 
Excluding IPOs with missing pre-IPO data on Compustat   -661 
Including only IPOs for which difference between IPO date (SDC) and FYE date (Com-
pustat) is greater than or equal to 90 days 
  -686 
Including only IPOs for which difference between IPO date (SDC) and FYE date (Com-
pustat) is smaller than or equal to 365 days 
  -11 
Subtotal (Cross-Validation with EDGAR)   2,485 
Excluding IPOs for which required market (CRSP) and accounting information (Com-
pustat) is missing 
  -828 
Final Sample (Intersection SDC, Compustat & CRSP)   1,657 
The table describes IPO sample development in this study. The final sample contains 1,657 IPOs for which all relevant 
accounting and market data is available to forecast one- to three-year ahead earnings for all four cross-sectional 
earnings forecasting models employed (HVZ, EP, RI, HVZ/EP).    
 
                                                 
88  This analysis also showed that cut-offs below 90 days include accounting information on Compustat 
which is not available in the IPO prospectus; conversely, cut-offs above 365 days include outdated 
information.  
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4.3.2 Earnings Forecasts 
Forecasting earnings from cross-sectional models is a two-step procedure: first, factor 
loadings for each model are attained (using all firms listed on Compustat); second, factor 
loadings are multiplied by IPOs accounting information; hence, a newly listed firm must 
only have current financial information available on the independent variables of the re-
spective forecasting model to obtain an estimate of its future earnings. More specifically, 
in the first step I estimate the HVZ, EP, RI, HVZ/EP model using previous ten years of 
data from the whole Compustat universe as of the end of each year t, which includes all 
firms with fiscal year ending (FYE) from June t to May t+1.89 Consistent with HVZ 
(2012), all models are estimated in absolute dollar values—and not on per share basis as 
in LM (2014)—given that the number of shares outstanding reported on Compustat devi-
ates in some instances quite markedly from information reported in the IPO prospectus; 
accounting information, on the other hand, is reported reliably.90  
 
In the second step, for each IPO which occurs between Jan–Dec t+1 accounting infor-
mation immediately preceding the IPO date is multiplied by the “right” factor loadings 
from step one to compute one- to three-year ahead earnings forecasts (four and five-year 
ahead earnings forecasts available upon request). The only financials available to inves-
tors is from the IPO prospectus which generally covers previous 3-years of financial data 
preceding the year of the IPO. For 1,526 (92%) of the IPOs, the latest available infor-
mation pertains to fiscal year t (June t to May t+1) and, therefore, is multiplied by esti-
mated model coefficients for year t.91 For instance, if a firm is initially listed in calendar 
                                                 
89  To mitigate the impact of outliers, all level variables in the respective model are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile in each year. 
90  I draw randomly ten firms from the IPO sample and cross-checked total assets, net income, book value 
of equity and shares outstanding figures from the IPO prospectus with Compustat information. Shares 
outstanding deviated in two from the ten cases, but all other variables have been equal.  
91  For 78 (5%) IPOs, the year of the IPO matches the fiscal year end. Such cases arise because IPOs are 
observed in calendar time (Jan–Dec t+1), but fiscal year ends are aligned from Jun t – May t+1. Thus, 
IPOs very late in t+1 (say, Dec) may also have fiscal year end t+1, because the fiscal year end infor-
mation reported and available to investors might be of, say, Jun t+1. Conversely, for 53 (3%) IPOs there 
is a “two-year” difference between the IPO year and the fiscal end year. This can happen for IPOs 
occurring very early in calendar year t+1 (say Jan), but information reported and available to investors 
is of t-2 (say, May t-1). To ease readability and given that it holds true for almost all IPOs, we refer 
from hereafter to t as the fiscal year end information available before the IPO, irrespective of as to 
whether t+1 or t-1 fiscal year end information is used (of course, in the former case we multiply by t+1 
and in the latter with t-1 model coefficients). 
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year 2006 (t+1), the earnings forecasts are in effect based on pre-IPO financial infor-
mation as of fiscal year 2005, and the year of the first earnings forecast (t+1) coincides 
with the year of the IPO (i.e., 2006). Figure 4.1 illustrates the two-step procedure in ob-
taining IPO earnings forecasts. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline of Earnings Forecasts and ICC estimates 
This figure illustrates the two-step procedure in obtaining earnings forecasts for IPOs; outlines how ICC proxies are 
estimated and indicates data requirements for the two main analyses (A1) and (A2).  
 
To find the “right” factor loadings for the different forecasting horizons (factor load-
ings for 1-year ahead forecasts are different from 2-year ahead forecasts etc.), the earnings 
models are estimated on different sets of previous data. That is, pooled cross-sectional 
regressions for 1-year ahead earnings in year t uses data from year t-11 to t-2; regressions 
for 2-year ahead earnings use data from t-12 to t-3 and so forth. The two-year gap between 
t and the end of the data period for one-year ahead forecasts (and three-year gap for two-
year ahead forecasts etc.) is required to avoid look ahead bias. In the case of one-year 
ahead forecasts, the first “gap year” is needed because the models regress current account-
ing data (t) on lead earnings (t+1). As such, current data must be of t-1 for lead earnings 
to be of t. The second “gap year” avoids that firms going public very early in calendar 
year t+1 use coefficients which are based on earnings that have not yet been reported for 
fiscal year t. As an example, if an IPO occurs in calendar year 2006 (t+1) and thus pertains 
to fiscal year t = 2005, then data from 1994-2003 (t-11 to t-2) is used to estimate factor 
t-1 t t+1
(1) Estimate factor loadings 
of cross-sectional earnings 
models at the end of year t 
using previous 10 years of 
data.
(2) For IPOs from Jan – Dec t+1, obtain 
latest available financial data before the 
IPO: i.e. observe accounting information 
for t (Jun t – May t+1). 
(A1) Observe actual earnings E(t+1)
for the next fiscal year endings from 
Jun t+1 – May t+2 etc. 
Estimate model-based ICC
▪ Obtain model-based 
earnings forecasts by 
multiplying factor loadings 
of (1) with accounting 
variables of (2)  
▪ Use some aftermarket 
closing stock price and 
match to forecasts to find 
ICC  
(A2) Relate model-
based ICC estimates to 
future realised stock 
returns
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loadings that are then applied to calculate earnings for year 2006 (t+1); data from 1993-
2002 (t-12 to t-3) is used to estimate factor loadings that are relevant to calculate earnings 
in year 2007 (t+2) and so forth.  
4.3.3 Implied Cost of Capital Estimates  
4.3.3.1 Market value of equity  
The validity of ICC measures not only hinge upon reliable future earnings estimates, but 
also on efficient market prices. While market efficiency seems a reasonable assumption 
in large sample ICC studies, the efficiency of the IPO pricing process remains a puzzling 
phenomenon (e.g., Cornelli and Goldreich (2003), Lowry and Schwert (2004)). There-
fore, the decision which share price is used to obtain an IPO’s equity valuation is crucial 
and the following peculiarities of the IPO pricing process need to be considered. First, the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing causes offer prices to be on average much lower than 
first day closing prices; however, IPO firms tend to underperform in the long-run, indi-
cating overpricing in the immediate aftermarket (e.g., Ritter (1991), Ritter and Welch 
(2002)). Second, underwriter price stabilisation activities can severely impact stock prices 
in the days immediately following the offering (e.g., Hanley (1993), Ruud (1993)). Third, 
lock-up expirations—occurring mostly 180 days after initial listing—lead to significant 
price drops of about two percent (Brav and Gompers (2000, 2003), Field and Hanka 
(2001)).  
 
To increase the likelihood that the share prices used to estimate IPOs implied cost of 
capital are a fair and efficient reflection of IPOs equity value, I obtain market values at 
seven different points in time. First, I use the aftermarket closing prices on the 21st day of 
trading as reported on CRSP (P1) or, if not available, closing prices at the end of the first 
month of trading (Lowry et al., 2010). Second, I apply closing prices at the end of sixth 
month of trading (P6) given the material impact of lock-up expirations on prices (Brav 
and Gompers, 2000, 2003). Third, I use closing prices at the end of the ninth (P9) and 
eighteenth (P18) month of trading, based on findings in Ecker (2014) that “positive abnor-
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mal returns disappear after the first nine post-IPO months” and “negative abnormal re-
turns persist for 18 months” (p. 907). Fourth, I include closing prices at three (P3), twelve 
(P12) and twenty-four (P24) months of trading to ensure meaningful comparison over time.    
4.3.3.2 ICC methodology  
Consistent with HVZ (2012) and LM (2014), I use a composite ICC estimate (rCOMP) 
in my main analyses which is the average of the four ICC measures suggested by Easton 
(2004): rPE, rPEG, rMPEG and rAEGM. These estimates are all based on the abnormal 
earnings growth model and only require one- and two-year ahead earnings forecasts; how-
ever, their estimations differ with respect to assumption made about dividend payments, 
short-term and perpetual abnormal earnings growth. The simplest ICC estimate (rPE) as-
sumes no dividend payout nor any short- or perpetual growth in abnormal earnings. Con-
versely, rAEGM entertains all available assumptions, with rPEG and rMPEG lying be-
tween those two “extreme” cases— see Eq. (4.10) to (4.13). As earnings are forecasted 
in absolute dollar values, market values of equity (closing price times number of shares 
outstanding) instead of share prices are used in the calculations. Number of shares out-














where 𝐸𝑡+1 (𝐸𝑡+2) equals one (two) year ahead earnings forecasts (in absolute dollar val-
ues) from the HVZ, EP, RI  and HVZ/EP model; 𝑀𝑉 equals equity market value based 
on either closing price at the end of first month of trading (MV1); or closing price at the 
end of the third (MV3), sixth (MV6), ninth (MV9), twelfth (MV12), eighteenth (MV18), 
twenty-fourth (MV24) month of trading; whenever MV3, MV6, MV9 or MV12 is ap-
plied, earnings forecast for the following year are used to avoid reliance on realised earn-
ings; that is, 𝐸𝑡+1 is replaced by 𝐸𝑡+2; and 𝐸𝑡+2 becomes 𝐸𝑡+3. In case MV18 or MV24 
 - 149 - 
is applied, earnings forecasts for the following two years are used; that is 𝐸𝑡+1 (𝐸𝑡+2) is 
replaced by 𝐸𝑡+3 (𝐸𝑡+4).  
 





where 𝐴 = 𝐷𝑡+1 2𝑀𝑉⁄ ; 𝐷𝑡+1 equals dividends in t+1 which are forecasted assuming div-
idend payout ratio at t for firms with positive earnings, or using dividends at t divided by 
six percent of total assets at t as a proxy for dividend payout ratio for firms with current 
negative earnings (Gebhardt et al., 2001).  
 











(𝐺𝐴𝐸𝐺 +  
𝐷𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉
 ); 𝐺𝐴𝐸𝐺  = perpetual growth rate in abnormal earnings set to 
current risk-free rate minus three percent (Gode and Mohanram, 2003).92   
4.3.4 Performance Measures   
4.3.4.1 Forecast bias and accuracy  
I apply forecast bias and forecast accuracy as the main performance measures to examine 
the quality of forecasted IPO earnings. Forecast bias is defined as the difference between 
actual/realised earnings and predicted earnings: a negative bias denotes overpredicted 
earnings and optimistic forecasts. To allow for a meaningful comparison between IPOs, 
forecast bias is scaled by market value of equity at the end of first month of trading 
(MV1). For each model, forecast biases are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile since 
very few observations severely distort mean figures. Forecast accuracy is the absolute 
value of forecast biases (alias absolute forecast error).  
                                                 
92  The current risk free rate is calculated by first taking the average of the one-month Treasury bill rate 
over rolling past 12-month windows and then annualising these averages by compounding over 12 
months (Barth et al., 2013). Treasury bill rates are from Kenneth French website.  
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4.3.4.2 Earnings response coefficient 
Discussed in seminal work by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), earnings re-
sponse coefficients (ERC) are direct measures of market-expectations about future earn-
ings in that they measure stock price reaction to one unit of unexpected earnings, with 
higher ERCs indicating a higher “quality of the earnings expectation model employed” 
(Kothari, 2001, p. 117). Given that the measurement of “announcement” ERCs depend 
on the availability of market-adjusted returns (which are unavailable for IPOs given their 
lack of trading history), I estimate “annual” ERCs instead. That is, every year buy-and-
hold returns (i.e., monthly compounded CRSP total returns) over the next one-, two- and 
three years are regressed on unexpected earnings (i.e., forecast bias) over the same period 
(HVZ, 2012).93 I require at least 15 IPOs for every annual regression and standardise 
unexpected earnings to have mean zero and unit variance in each year.  
4.3.4.3 Fama-MacBeth regressions   
The second part of my analysis investigates the degree to which forecasted earnings can 
be used to derive valid ICC estimates for IPOs. I follow Guay et al. (2011) and evaluate 
the performance of each estimate by running Fama-MacBeth regressions of one-year 
ahead buy-and-hold returns on the composite ICC (rCOMP), where I require at least 15 
IPOs in each fiscal year and set all ICC estimates to a range of 0 and 0.50 as it is unlikely 
that investors would expect returns below zero or above fifty percent (Barth et al., 
2013).94,95 Depending on which market value is used to calculate the ICC measures, it is 
assumed that shares are either bought at the end of the first, third, sixth, ninth, 12th, 18th 
or 24th month of trading and hold for the subsequent 12 months (i.e., monthly compound-
ing of total returns reported on CRSP); these future realised returns are then regressed on 
the corresponding ICC estimates. For instance, ICC measures calculated from market 
                                                 
93  In the one-year example, shares are bought at the end of first month of trading and then hold for 12 
months; these buy-and-hold returns (BHR) are then regressed on each models forecast bias for E(t+1). 
In the two-year example, BHR are based on a 24-months holding period and regressed on the sum of 
forecast biases E(t+1) and E(t+2). The three-year example follows accordingly.  
94  Easton and Monahan (2005) extend Guya et al. and control for cash flow and discount rate news in their 
regressions. However, this approach requires forecast revisions which are not attainable from cross-
sectional models (LM, 2014, footnote 8). 
95  Another approach to analyse the construct validity of ICC measures is to examine their association with 
common risk factors (e.g., market beta, leverage, B/M, volatility, size). Easton and Monahan (2016), 
however, argue that this approach is illogical, given that the ICC approach assumes that these very risk 
factors are either unknown or cannot be reliably measured. 
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prices at the end of the sixth month of trading (i.e., MV6) are regressed on future 
12months buy-and-hold returns, where stocks are also bought at the end of the sixth 
month of trading. The benchmark coefficient of theses univariate regressions is one and 
statistically significant (insignificant) different from zero (one). 
4.4 Analysis and Results  
4.4.1 IPO Sample Summary Statistics   
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for the IPO sample. Consistent with prior evidence 
(e.g., Fama and French (2004)), IPO activity peaked in the 1990s with a total of 885 new 
issues (53 percent), followed by 435 IPOs (26 percent) in the 1980s; the average IPOs 
market cap after one month of trading is 485mUSD, and about 18 percent of IPOs (293) 
relate to the Business Service industry, followed by a combined 14 percent of IPOs be-
longing to the Computer (120) and Electronic Equipment (112) sector, respectively. For 
only 362 IPOs (22 percent) immediate IBES coverage is available, which highlights the 
limitations of the common analyst-based ICC approach for new joiners in capital markets 
and underpins the importance to elaborate further on “analyst-independent” methods to 
provide newly listed firms with reliable CoE estimates.96 
 
As shown in Table 4.4, the average IPO firm in my sample is about 12-17 times smaller 
than the average Compustat firm in respect to book value of equity (BIPO: 66.3mUSD vs. 
BCOM: 994.3), total assets (AIPO: 402.9 vs. ACOM: 3,118.2), earnings (EIPO: 8.2 vs. ECOM: 
103.4), dividends (DIPO: 4.1 vs. DCOM: 36.5), working capital accruals (ACIPO: -4.2 vs. 
ACCOM: -50.0) and total accruals (TACCIPO: 1.7 vs. TACCCOM: 28.3). IPOs are also less 
likely to pay dividends (20 percent), but more likely to report negative earnings (29 per-
cent) in the fiscal year before their initial listing vis-à-vis the average firm on Compustat 
(dividend payers: 53 percent; loss firms: 20 percent). These statistics show that my sample 
is based on smaller, younger and less followed firms in equity markets which corroborates 
the objective of this paper to examine the applicability of the HVZ and LM models for 
those types of firms.   
                                                 
96  Analyst coverage is assumed if at least one IBES forecast is provided for E(t+1).    
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Table 4.3: Distribution of IPO Sample   
Panel A: Distribution by calendar year, IBES coverage and market capitalisation   
Year Freq. IBES IBES (%) Mkt. Cap   Year Freq. IBES IBES (%) Mkt. Cap 
1972 1 - - 43.1   1993 118 23 19.5 24,869.6 
1973 1 - - 82.1   1994 104 27 26.0 15,655.3 
1974 - - - -   1995 101 24 23.8 38,815.7 
1975 - - - -   1996 149 28 18.8 74,644.5 
1976 3 - - 203.9   1997 85 26 30.6 41,683.8 
1977 - - - -   1998 55 22 40.0 27,310.4 
1978 1 - - 44.9   1999 69 15 21.7 144,161.4 
1979 1 - - 25.7   2000 51 14 27.5 51,191.5 
1980 13 - - 1,163.6   2001 12 1 8.3 31,582.5 
1981 40 1 2.5 3,021.0   2002 14 1 7.1 34,824.2 
1982 11 3 27.3 948.3   2003 16 5 31.3 7,289.0 
1983 94 13 13.8 10,179.9   2004 40 16 40.0 32,346.3 
1984 37 3 8.1 2,095.4   2005 38 16 42.1 25,024.3 
1985 30 1 3.3 3,311.6   2006 33 11 33.3 23,674.9 
1986 94 6 6.4 11,488.5   2007 32 12 37.5 59,242.5 
1987 66 13 19.7 8,604.5   2008 5 2 40.0 6,959.1 
1988 25 6 24.0 2,899.8   2009 7 3 42.9 8,466.9 
1989 25 10 40.0 6,015.4   2010 18 5 27.8 12,423.6 
1990 25 7 28.0 2,359.3   2011 18 8 44.4 25,907.0 
1991 79 13 16.5 13,072.4   2012 25 5 20.0 17,378.1 
1992 100 18 18.0 18,349.2   2013 21 4 19.0 17,079.9 
            Total 1,657 362 21.8 804,438.9 
           
Panel B: Distribution by 48 Fama and French (1997) industries  
Industry Name Freq. Freq. (%)   Industry Name Freq. Freq. (%) 
Agriculture 6 0.36   Aircraft 7 0.42 
Food Products 17 1.03   Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq. 3 0.18 
Candy & Soda 1 0.06   Defence 1 0.06 
Alcoholic Beverages 5 0.30   Precious Metals 2 0.12 
Tobacco Products 1 0.06   Non-metallic Mining 1 0.06 
Recreational Products 16 0.97   Coal 1 0.06 
Entertainment 26 1.57   Petroleum and Natural Gas 36 2.17 
Printing and Publishing 8 0.48   Utilities 30 1.81 
Consumer Goods 27 1.63   Telecommunications 48 2.90 
Apparel 23 1.39   Personal Services 26 1.57 
Healthcare 38 2.29   Business Services 293 17.68 
Medical Equipment 87 5.25   Computers 120 7.24 
Pharmaceutical Products 103 6.22   Electronic Equipment 112 6.76 
Chemicals 10 0.60   Measuring and Control Eq. 46 2.78 
Rubber and Plastic Products 9 0.54   Business Supplies 6 0.36 
Textiles 7 0.42   Shipping Containers 6 0.36 
Construction Materials 19 1.15   Transportation 42 2.53 
Construction 7 0.42   Wholesale 51 3.08 
Steel Works 18 1.09   Retail 99 5.97 
Fabricated Products 2 0.12   Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 38 2.29 
Machinery 50 3.02   Banking 51 3.08 
Electrical Equipment 17 1.03   Insurance 36 2.17 
Miscellaneous 7 0.42   Real Estate 9 0.54 
Automobiles and Trucks 13 0.78   Trading 76 4.59 
        Total 1,657 100.00 
Panel A reports number of IPOs by calendar year. Market Cap. (mUSD) is calculated as shares outstanding x closing 
price either at the end of the 21st day of trading or—if not available—end of first month after a firm going-pubic. IBES 
reports number of IPOs for which at least one analyst provides E(t+1) forecasts on IBES. Panel B reports the number 
of IPOs by 48 Fama and French (1997) industries.  
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Table 4.4: IPO Sample vs. Compustat Population Summary Statistics 
Panel A: IPO Sample Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Forecasting Earnings 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% STD Obs. 
B(t) 66.31 -173.16 -0.28 4.78 17.97 1,048.30 661.68 1,657 
A(t) 402.94 1.25 10.17 28.54 105.94 5,399.50 3,212.43 1,657 
E(t) 8.24 -40.83 -0.58 1.39 5.02 165.22 60.48 1,657 
NegE(t) 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 1,657 
NegE*E(t) -2.53 -40.83 -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.80 1,657 
D(t) 4.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 95.63 33.99 1,657 
DD(t) 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 1,657 
AC(t) -4.15 -85.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.53 49.14 1,657 
TACC(t) 1.68 -61.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.78 90.66 1,657 
         
Panel B: Population Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Estimating Earnings models 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% STD Obs. 
B(t) 994.33 -116.82 18.45 78.41 354.58 17,035.00 5,932.06 209,443 
A(t) 3,118.16 2.13 43.02 203.24 1,073.61 56,732.00 14,505.20 221,850 
E(t) 103.41 -123.89 0.48 5.30 34.44 2,211.97 494.67 208,070 
NegE(t) 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 208,070 
NegE*E(t) -6.29 -123.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.61 208,070 
D(t) 36.54 0.00 0.00 0.20 7.00 731.90 181.50 219,800 
DD(t) 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 219,800 
AC(t) -49.90 -1,192.00 -7.06 0.00 0.00 88.10 357.80 250,876 
TACC(t) 28.31 -451.50 0.00 0.00 3.73 937.70 958.76 250,876 
Panel A reports summary statics for the variables used to forecast earnings from the HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP model. 
Panel B reports summary statistics for the same variables for the entire Compustat population from 1950 – 2015. All 
level variables are winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. All values in mUSD, except for NegE, DD and NegE*E). 
  
4.4.2 Model-Based Earnings Forecasts  
4.4.2.1 Coefficient estimates of the cross-sectional models  
Required data for the HVZ and EP model are available from 1950 to 2015 and data cov-
erage for the RI model begins in 1960. As each model is estimated over the past ten years, 
the first estimation period for the HVZ, EP and HVZ/EP models end in 1959 and for the 
RI model in 1969. Average coefficients for each model are reported in Table 4.5 and are 
widely consistent with estimates in HVZ (2012) and LM (2014).  
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates from the HVZ, EP & RI Models 
Panel A: The HVZ model, 1959 - 2015             
  Intercept A(t) D(t) DD(t) E(t) NegE(t) AC(t) Adj. R² 
E(t+1) 2.899 0.003 0.243 0.527 0.848 1.789 -0.033 0.89 
  (4.17) (4.46) (3.93) (2.15) (29.05) (2.41) (-2.49)   
E(t+2) 5.234 0.005 0.336 1.295 0.797 2.831 -0.046 0.83 
  (6.33) (5.91) (4.61) (3.18) (21.71) (2.44) (-2.78)   
E(t+3) 8.011 0.008 0.405 0.836 0.776 2.730 -0.046 0.79 
  (7.90) (6.95) (4.68) (3.37) (18.39) (1.89) (-2.47)   
         
Panel B: The EP model, 1959 - 2015       
  Intercept NegE(t) E(t) NegE*E(t) Adj. R² 
E(t+1) 4.351 -8.321 1.014 -1.196 0.88 
  (6.79) (-4.54) (100.64) (-7.85)   
E(t+2) 7.871 -12.004 1.051 -1.951 0.82 
  (10.04) (-5.33) (78.58) (-8.54)   
E(t+3) 11.004 -13.817 1.105 -2.433 0.78 
  (11.88) (-5.82) (69.95) (-8.59)   
      
Panel C: The RI model, 1969 - 2015           
  Intercept NegE(t) E(t) NegE*E(t) B(t) TACC(t) Adj. R² 
E(t+1) 5.088 -9.635 0.987 -1.000 0.004 -0.007 0.88 
  (7.03) (-5.00) (71.62) (-7.89) (2.73) (-1.28)   
E(t+2) 8.920 -13.483 1.013 -1.630 0.007 -0.011 0.82 
  (9.69) (-5.71) (50.73) (-8.43) (3.03) (-1.10)   
E(t+3) 12.139 -15.086 1.060 -2.102 0.009 -0.020 0.78 
  (11.69) (-5.83) (44.38) (-8.16) (3.21) (-1.53)   
        
Panel D: The HVZ/EP model, 1959 - 2015  
  Intercept A(t) D(t) DD(t) E(t) NegE(t) AC(t) NegE*E(t) Adj. R² 
E(t+1) 3.116 0.003 0.224 -0.119 0.867 -7.429 -0.028 -0.860 0.89 
  (4.48) (3.87) (3.58) (-1.73) (29.33) (-4.15) (-2.15) (-5.59)   
E(t+2) 5.574 0.005 0.310 0.316 0.825 -10.322 -0.040 -1.396 0.83 
  (6.73) (5.25) (4.20) (2.67) (22.31) (4.87) (-2.41) (-6.18)   
E(t+3) 8.347 0.007 0.375 -0.182 0.808 -11.823 -0.038 -1.663 0.80 
  (8.29) (6.30) (4.27) (-2.86) (19.04) (-5.26) (-2.09) (-6.17)   
Each model is estimated annually using previous ten-years of data from 1959-2015 for the HVZ, EP, HVZ/EP and 
1969-2015 for the RI models. For each model, average mean coefficients and time-series average t-statistic based on 
robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.  
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4.4.2.2 Forecast bias and accuracy 
Table 4.6, Panel A reports forecast bias for each of the four cross-sectional earnings fore-
casting models (including the random walk model) and pairwise comparisons between 
each of them are provided in Panel B. Figure 4.2 summarises this information graphically. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Forecast Bias in Percent of Market Value  
Panel A (Panel B) shows median (mean) forecast bias in percent of market value for each of the four cross-sectional 
earnings forecasting models for one- to three-year ahead earnings forecasts. For comparison, the average forecast 
bias in large sample studies (Avg. LS studies) is included in this figure and based on data shown in Table 4.8. 
 
The HVZ, EP and RI models show similar mean forecast biases over the three fore-
casting horizons of about -1.5 percent of market value for E(t+1); -3.0 and -4.5 percent 
for E(t+2) and E(t+3), respectively. All biases are significantly negative and increasing 
over time, which indicates that one-year ahead forecast are less overpredicted than three-
year ahead ones. Comparing median figures, HVZ model forecasts are about 1 to 3 times 
less biased than EP and RI model predictions [HVZ: E(t+1) -0.13; E(t+2) -0.47; E(t+3)   
-1.59] with all median differences being highly significant. The amended HVZ/EP model 
produces the least mean [E(t+1): -0.45; E(t+2): -1.53; E(t+3): -2.85] and median biases 
[E(t+1): 0.20; E(t+2): -0.13; E(t+3): -1.00] among all models. This is illustrated by highly 
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three-year ahead median difference between HVZ-HVZ/EP is insignificant; z-sore:             
-1.85). The RW model consistently underpredicts IPO earnings for E(t+1) to E(t+3) with 
an average forecast bias of approximately 2 percent of market value.   
 
Table 4.7 reports forecast accuracy figures and shows that the HVZ, EP, RI and 
HVZ/EP model generate similarly accurate predictions for one- to three-year ahead earn-
ings (see also Figure 4.3). Forecasting precision is decreasing over time for all four mod-
els as mean (median) accuracy is increasing from a low of about 3.7 (2.1) percent for 
E(t+1) to a high of 9.1 (5.4) percent for E(t+3) forecasts. Earnings predictions from the 
RW model are as accurate as those from the cross-sectional models. This is consistent 
with findings in Bradshaw et al. (2012) who show that in particular for younger and 
smaller firms naïve earnings forecasts compete reasonable well with analyst forecasts 
over varying forecasting horizons. Taken together, all five models perform equally well 
in regard to the accuracy of their respective forecasts, but the HVZ/EP model generates 
less biased earnings predictions than the HVZ, EP and RI models.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Forecast Accuracy in Percent of Market Value 
Panel A (Panel B) shows median (mean) forecast accuracy in percent of market value for each of the four cross-
sectional earnings forecasting models for one- to three-year ahead earnings forecasts. For comparison, average fore-
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Table 4.6: Forecast Bias of the Forecasting Models for the IPO Sample  
Panel A: Time-Series Averages  
  E(t+1)   E(t+2)   E(t+3) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
HVZ -0.0163 -0.0013   -0.0311 -0.0047   -0.0440 -0.0159 
  (-9.98) (5.91)   (-11.20) (-7.55)   (-12.01) (-10.16) 
EP -0.0127 -0.0033   -0.0282 -0.0102   -0.0439 -0.0182 
  (-9.17) (7.13)   (-11.22) (-9.21)   (-12.83) (-11.58) 
RI -0.0132 -0.0041   -0.0287 -0.0104   -0.0435 -0.0199 
  (9.21) (7.44)   (-11.30) (-9.37)   (-12.76) (-11.62) 
HVZ/EP -0.0045 0.0020   -0.0153 -0.0013   -0.0285 -0.0105 
 (-3.54) (-0.14)   (-6.56) (-3.75)   (-8.93) (-7.21) 
RW 0.0134 0.0134   0.0198 0.0220   0.0216 0.0227 
  (12.95) (17.01)   (10.52) (13.94)   (8.32) (11.64) 
Panel B: Pairwise Comparison 
  E(t+1)   E(t+2)   E(t+3) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
HVZ-EP -0.0036 0.0021   -0.0028 0.0055   -0.0001 0.0024 
  (-2.97) (4.06)   (-1.55) (6.12)   (-0.07) (7.53) 
HVZ-RI -0.0031 0.0029   -0.0023 0.0057   -0.0005 0.0041 
  (-2.46) (4.16)   (-1.25) (6.16)   (-0.23) (7.34) 
HVZ-HVZ/EP -0.0118 -0.0033   -0.0158 -0.0035   -0.0155 -0.0054 
  (-10.58) (-5.05)   (-9.36) (-3.82)   (-8.55) (-1.85) 
HVZ-RW -0.0297 -0.0147   -0.0509 -0.0267   -0.0656 -0.0386 
  (-24.79) (-33.18)   (-26.73) (-34.45)   (-28.15) (-34.92) 
EP-RI 0.0005 0.0008   0.0005 0.0002   -0.0004 0.0017 
  (4.13) (2.69)   (2.78) (3.42)   (-0.58) (2.42) 
EP-HVZ/EP -0.0082 -0.0054   -0.0130 -0.0089   -0.0154 -0.0077 
  (-13.96) (-21.18)   (-14.19) (-22.53)   (-15) (-22.48) 
EP-RW -0.0261 -0.0168   -0.0480 -0.0322   -0.0655 -0.0409 
  (-27.16) (-31.85)   (-29.12) (-33.18)   (-29.24) (-33.66) 
RI-HVZ/EP -0.0087 -0.0062   -0.0134 -0.0092   -0.0150 -0.0094 
  (-13.98) (-21.58)   (-14.37) (-22.9)   (-12.69) (-22.45) 
RI-RW -0.0267 -0.0176   -0.0485 -0.0324   -0.0651 -0.0427 
  (-26.06) (-31.46)   (-28.71) (-32.97)   (-28.23) (-33.43) 
HVZ/EP-RW -0.0179 -0.0114   -0.0351 -0.0232   -0.0501 -0.0332 
  (-21.21) (-28.31)   (-23.50) (-30.66)   (-25.51) (-32.16) 
Panel A reports time-series averages of the mean and median forecast biases for the cross-sectional earnings forecast-
ing models and the random walk model (RW). In parentheses time-series t-statistics for mean and median (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test) are reported. Panel B reports pairwise comparisons (differences) between the models with t-statistics 
for mean (paired t-test) and median (Wilcoxon signed rank sum test) differences reported in parentheses. Results are 
based on 1,657 IPOs.   
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Table 4.7: Forecast Accuracy of the Forecasting Models for the IPO Sample 
Panel A: Time-Series Averages  
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
HVZ 0.0408 0.0227   0.0725 0.0418   0.0966 0.0542 
  (30.14) (35.26)   (32.09) (35.26)   (32.22) (35.26) 
EP 0.0364 0.0204   0.0681 0.0412   0.0924 0.0547 
  (32.95) (35.26)   (33.97) (35.26)   (33.27) (35.26) 
RI 0.0372 0.0212   0.0687 0.0408   0.0927 0.0552 
  (32.12) (35.26)   (33.89) (35.26)   (33.60) (35.26) 
HVZ/EP 0.0341 0.0208   0.0633 0.0398   0.0860 0.0514 
  (35.49) (35.26)   (35.69) (35.26)   (34.46) (35.26) 
RW 0.0306 0.0205   0.0555 0.0379   0.0740 0.0490 
  (39.02) (35.26)   (40.01) (35.26)   (38.40) (35.26) 
Panel B: Pairwise Comparison 
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
HVZ-EP 0.0044 0.0024   0.0044 0.0006   0.0042 -0.0004 
  (4.79) (5.48)   (3.19) (2.25)   (2.51) (1.74) 
HVZ-RI 0.0036 0.0016   0.0038 0.0010   0.0039 -0.0010 
  (3.84) (4.75)   (2.64) (2.05)   (2.25) (1.84) 
HVZ-HVZ/EP 0.0067 0.0019   0.0091 0.0021   0.0106 0.0028 
  (8.11) (9.69)   (7.54) (8.01)   (7.36) (7.04) 
HVZ-RW 0.0102 0.0022   0.0169 0.0039   0.0226 0.0052 
  (8.73) (2.04)   (8.91) (3.21)   (9.56) (5.22) 
EP-RI -0.0008 -0.0008   -0.0006 0.0004   -0.0002 -0.0005 
  (-6.20) (-4.63)   (-3.54) (-2.42)   (-0.74) (-1.37) 
EP-HVZ/EP 0.0023 -0.0005   0.0048 0.0015   0.0065 0.0032 
  (4.35) (0.94)   (5.87) (4.27)   (6.73) (6.07) 
EP-RW 0.0058 -0.0002   0.0126 0.0033   0.0185 0.0057 
  (6.07) (0.50)   (7.37) (2.54)   (8.07) (4.56) 
RI-HVZ/EP 0.0031 0.0003   0.0054 0.0011   0.0067 0.0038 
  (5.50) (1.51)   (6.40) (4.32)   (6.67) (5.80) 
RI-RW 0.0066 0.0006   0.0132 0.0029   0.0187 0.0062 
  (6.52) (1.07)   (7.57) (2.74)   (8.13) (4.55) 
HVZ/EP-RW 0.0035 0.0003   0.0078 0.0018   0.0120 0.0024 
  (4.69) (-1.40)   (5.68) (0.08)   (6.36) (1.95) 
Panel A reports time-series averages of the mean and median forecast accuracy for the cross-sectional earnings fore-
casting models and the random walk model (RW). In parentheses time-series t-statistics for mean and median (Wil-
coxon signed-rank test) are reported. Panel B reports pairwise comparisons (differences) between the models with t-
statistics for mean (paired t-test) and median (Wilcoxon signed rank sum test) differences reported in parentheses. 
Results are based on 1,657 IPOs.  
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4.4.2.3 Comparison with large sample studies  
Table 4.8 compares forecasts biases (Panel A) and accuracies (Panel B) of this study’s 
IPO earnings forecasts with large sample study results of HVZ (2012, Table 3) and LM 
(2014, Table 2 & 3). Given that my forecast biases are winsorised at the 1st and 99th per-
centile, which contrasts with HVZ and LM, I focus the discussion on median figures. 
 
HVZ forecast bias for the IPO sample increases from a low of -0.13 percent for E(t+1) 
to a high of -1.69 percent for E(t+3), and lies between figures reported in HVZ (2012) 
and LM (2014): the former reports bias as low as zero percent and the latter as high as      
-4.3 percent. EP model predictions for the IPO sample are about twice as biased than in 
LM (2014) for E(t+1) and E(t+2), but similar for E(t+3); results for the RI model show a 
similar pattern, but differences in biases are of larger magnitude. On the other hand, IPO 
forecast biases for the HVZ/EP model are highly comparable with figures in HVZ (2012) 
and LM (2014). In respect to forecast accuracy it is shown that IPO earnings forecasts for 
E(t+1) generated from HVZ, EP and RI models are about 30 percent more accurate than 
in large sample studies; EP and RI based forecasts of E(t+2) and E(t+3) remain more 
accurate than in LM (2014), whereas for the same forecasting horizons HVZ predictions 
become less accurate if compared against HVZ (2012). Similar in magnitude to HVZ, EP 
and RI stand-alone, HVZ/EP forecast accuracy compares equally well to large sample 
study results over all forecasting horizons.  
4.4.2.4 Earnings response coefficients   
Table 4.9 provides time-series averages of “annual” ERCs for the IPO earnings forecasts 
(Panel A) and pairwise comparisons across the models are provided in Panel B. Figure 
4.4 summarises this information graphically.  
 
Earnings response coefficients for one-, two- and three-year ahead earnings predic-
tions from the HVZ (0.09, 0.25, 0.37) and HVZ/EP (0.09, 0.27, 0.40) model are somewhat 
higher than those from the EP (0.08, 0.23, 0.36) and RI (0.08, 0.23, 0.35) model; however, 
these differences are insignificant (Panel B). Notably, ERCs are approximately 60 percent 
lower than figures reported in HVZ (2012, Table 3), implying reduced value relevance of 
earnings for IPO firms vis-à-vis more mature and stable firms. This is consistent with 
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prior evidence showing that it is not only financial (e.g., earnings), but also non-financial 
information that explains IPO valuations (e.g., Bartov et al. (2002),  Klein (1996)). An-
nual ERCs from the RW model (0.08, 0.26, 0.49) are similar to those from HVZ, EP, RI 
and HVZ/EP for E(t+1) and E(t+2), but significantly higher for E(t+3), which is similar 
to findings in Bradshaw et al. (2012) who compare analyst-based earnings forecasts with 
naïve RW predictions.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: Earnings Response Coefficients 
The figure shows time-series averages of “annual” earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for each of the four cross-
sectional earnings forecasting models. The average large study ERC (Avg. LS studies) reported in this figure is based 
on HVZ (2012, Table 3).  
 
To summarise, results suggest a slight outperformance of the HVZ/EP model in fore-
casting IPO earnings (mostly because of its lower forecast biases and higher ERC coeffi-
cients), followed by HVZ in second place, and EP & RI in joint third. This ranking differs 
from findings in LM (2014)—where it is shown that EP and RI earnings predictions per-
form better than HVZ forecasts—which indicates that model performance varies with 
firm characteristics: while earnings in large sample studies (and, thus, for more estab-
lished firms) can be reliably predicted by means of parsimonious forecasting models (i.e., 
EP and RI), newly listed firms require more comprehensive forecasting solutions (even 
beyond HVZ) to minimise bias and maximise accuracy of forecasted earnings, with the 
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Table 4.8: Comparison of Forecast Bias & Accuracy with Large Sample Studies 
Panel A: Comparison of forecast biases  
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3)   
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Obs. 
HVZ/EP -0.0045 0.0020   -0.0153 -0.0013   -0.0285 -0.0105   1,657 
                      
HVZ                     
IPOs -0.0163 -0.0013   -0.0311 -0.0047   -0.0440 -0.0159   1,657 
HVZ (2012) -0.0209 0.0031   -0.0167 0.0010   -0.0109 -0.0001   87,825 
LM (2014) -0.0560 -0.0130   -0.0920 -0.0270   -0.1330 -0.0430   119,653 
                      
EP                     
IPOs -0.0127 -0.0033   -0.0282 -0.0102   -0.0439 -0.0182   1,657 
LM (2014) -0.0200 0.0000   -0.0320 -0.0060   -0.0520 -0.0150   119,653 
                      
RI                     
IPOs -0.0132 -0.0041   -0.0287 -0.0104   -0.0435 -0.0199   1,657 
LM (2014) -0.0130 0.0020   -0.0190 -0.0030   -0.0340 -0.0100   119,653 
                      
RW                     
IPOs 0.0134 0.0134   0.0198 0.0220   0.0216 0.0227   1,657 
LM (2014) 0.0070 0.0080   0.0270 0.0150   0.0400 0.0220   119,653 
 
Panel B: Comparison of forecast accuracies  
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3)   
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Obs. 
HVZ/EP 0.0341 0.0208   0.0633 0.0398   0.0860 0.0514   1,657 
                      
HVZ                     
IPOs 0.0408 0.0227   0.0725 0.0418   0.0966 0.0542   1,657 
HVZ (2012) 0.0837 0.0302   0.0938 0.0400   0.1031 0.0458   87,825 
LM (2014) 0.1010 0.0340   0.1510 0.0570   0.2030 0.0790   119,653 
                      
EP                     
IPOs 0.0364 0.0204   0.0681 0.0412   0.0924 0.0547   1,657 
LM (2014) 0.0730 0.0280   0.1010 0.0450   0.1330 0.0610   119,653 
                      
RI                     
IPOs 0.0372 0.0212   0.0687 0.0408   0.0927 0.0552   1,657 
LM (2014) 0.0730 0.0270   0.0990 0.0440   0.1260 0.0590   119,653 
                      
RW                     
IPOs 0.0306 0.0205   0.0555 0.0379   0.0740 0.0490   1,657 
LM (2014) 0.0880 0.0280   0.1020 0.0430   0.1280 0.0560   119,653 
The table compares forecast biases (Panel A) and accuracies (Panel B) for this studies IPO earnings forecasts with 
large sample results from HVZ (2012, Table 3) and LM (2014, Table 2). HVZ (2012, Table 3) is based on observations 
for which both model- and analyst-based forecasts are available; thus, sample size varies by horizon: E(t+1): 99,100; 
E(t+2): 89,454; E(t+3): 74,922 and I report the average between the three figures.  
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Table 4.9: ERC of the Forecasting Models for the IPO Sample 
Panel A: Time-Series Averages  
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3) 
  ERC R-squared   ERC R-squared   ERC R-squared 
HVZ 0.0865 0.0093   0.2485 0.0168   0.3714 0.0199 
  (2.95)     (4.38)     (4.48)   
EP 0.0788 0.0094   0.2341 0.0145   0.3585 0.0195 
  (2.92)     (4.35)     (4.88)   
RI 0.0782 0.0091   0.2288 0.0136   0.3498 0.0182 
  (3.03)     (4.39)     (4.92)   
HVZ/EP 0.0855 0.0119   0.2650 0.0201   0.3972 0.0260 
  (3.06)     (5.09)     (5.16)   
RW 0.0714 0.0090   0.2635 0.0232   0.4905 0.0362 
  (2.11)     (4.06)     (4.87)   
 
Panel B: Pairwise Comparison 
  E(t+1) 
 E(t+2)  E(t+3) 
  ERC R-squared   ERC R-squared   ERC R-squared 
HVZ-EP 0.0077 -0.0001   0.0145 0.0023   0.0129 0.0004 
  (0.19)     (0.37)     (0.33)   
HVZ-RI 0.0083 0.0002   0.0198 0.0032   0.0217 0.0017 
  (0.21)     (0.52)     (0.56)   
HVZ-HVZ/EP 0.0010 -0.0026   -0.0164 -0.0033   -0.0258 -0.0061 
  (0.02)     (-0.43)     (-0.63)   
HVZ-RW 0.0151 0.0003   -0.0150 -0.0064   -0.1190 -0.0163 
  (0.34)     (-0.33)     (-2.44)   
EP-RI 0.0005 0.0003   0.0053 0.0009   0.0088 0.0013 
  (0.01)     (0.14)     (0.25)   
EP-HVZ/EP -0.0068 -0.0025   -0.0309 -0.0056   -0.0387 -0.0065 
  (-0.17)     (-0.83)     (-1.02)   
EP-RW 0.0074 0.0004   -0.0294 -0.0087   -0.1319 -0.0167 
  (0.17)     (-0.68)     (-2.84)   
RI-HVZ/EP -0.0073 -0.0028   -0.0362 -0.0065   -0.0475 -0.0078 
  (-0.19)     (-0.99)     (-1.27)   
RI-RW 0.0069 0.0001   -0.0347 -0.0096   -0.1407 -0.0180 
  (0.16)     (-0.81)     (-3.06)   
HVZ/EP-RW 0.0142 0.0029   0.0015 -0.0031   -0.0932 -0.0102 
  (0.32)     (0.03)     (-1.95)   
Panel A reports time-series averages of annual earnings response coefficients (ERC) for the cross-sectional earnings 
forecasting models and the random walk model (RW). In parentheses Fama-MacBeth t-statistics. Panel B reports pair-
wise comparisons between the models, with t-statistics for ERC differences reported in parentheses (paired t-test). 
Results are based on 1,590; 1,587 and 1,493 observations for E(t+1), E(t+2) and E(t+3), respectively.  
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4.4.3 Model-Based Implied Cost of Capital Estimates  
4.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Table 4.10 reports summary statistics for realised and expected returns. One-year ahead 
buy-and-hold returns (BHR) are strongly positively skewed over all seven points in time. 
Average BHR of 17.3 percent are realised if stocks are bought at MV1, but subsequently 
decline to about 12 percent if purchased at MV3 and MV6. Beginning with MV9 realised 
returns are monotonically increasing from 14.9 percent to a high of 20.0 percent for 
MV24. Median returns display a similar pattern over time and range from negative 2.2 
percent to positive 5.5 percent. These findings are incompatible with large sample stud-
ies—for example, Guay et al. (2011) report realised one-year-ahead returns of about 13 
percent for both mean and median—, but can be explained by the return distribution of 
my IPO sample: some IPOs perform exceptionally well—181 (149) [149] yield annual 
returns of above 100 percent if bought at MV1 (MV6) [MV12]—while the median IPO 
hardly creates any return for investors.  
 
Expected returns for the composite ICC are highly consistent across all four models 
and over time. The average (median) IPO in my sample has an expected rate of return of 
10.9 (8.6) percent, which is identical to average analyst-based ICC estimates in Liu et al. 
(2014) for a sample of approximately 800 IPOs.97 Figures also compare well with both 
model- and analyst-based ICC estimates in large sample studies: HVZ (2012) document 
a mean (median) of 14.9 (9.2) percent for their model-based ICC composite and Botosan 
et al. (2011) report an average (median) of about 10.4 (10.1) percent for their analyst-
based composites.98 The somewhat lower median levels in this study can be explained by 
the fact that many IPOs in my sample (53 percent) pertain to the 1990s, a decade which 
marks the beginning of declining median ICC estimates to about 6 percent per year (HVZ, 
2012, Table 4). 
 
                                                 
97  Appendix 4.1 provides mean and median expected returns for each of the four ICC measures (rPE, 
rPEG, rMPEG, rAEGM) from which rCOMP is calculated.   
98  HVZ (2012) composite is formed of rGLS, rCT, rOJN (similar to rAEGM), rMPEG and rGOR (similar 
to rPE); Botosan et al. (2011) uses two composites: rHL consists of rCT, rGLS, rMPEG, and rOJN 
(similar to rAEGM), and rDKL is the average of rCT, rGLS and rGM (similar to rMPEG).  
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Table 4.10: Pooled Average Future Realised Returns and Implied Cost of Capital 
  MV1  MV3  MV6  MV9  MV12  MV18  MV24 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
rREAL                                         
Actual 0.1725 0.0088   0.1214 -0.0193   0.1219 -0.0222   0.1493 0.0126   0.1706 0.0270   0.1820 0.0256   0.2008 0.0545 
Winsor 1% 0.1546 0.0088   0.1124 -0.0193   0.1056 -0.0222   0.1327 0.0126   0.1426 0.0270   0.1654 0.0256   0.1858 0.0545 
Winsor 2% 0.1491 0.0088   0.1029 -0.0193   0.0929 -0.0222   0.1176 0.0126   0.1275 0.0270   0.1549 0.0256   0.1713 0.0545 
rCOMP                                         
HVZ 0.1113 0.0919   0.1029 0.0827   0.1032 0.0816   0.1045 0.0808   0.1069 0.0830   0.1094 0.0810   0.1092 0.0811 
EP 0.1147 0.1003   0.1059 0.0883   0.1060 0.0859   0.1076 0.0845   0.1104 0.0852   0.1216 0.0955   0.1219 0.0933 
RI 0.1148 0.0998   0.1051 0.0858   0.1051 0.0850   0.1067 0.0832   0.1094 0.0846   0.1214 0.0952   0.1215 0.0939 
HVZ/EP 0.1017 0.0860   0.0987 0.0810   0.0987 0.0797   0.0999 0.0787   0.1023 0.0797   0.1111 0.0848   0.1111 0.0852 
The table reports pooled mean and median future realised returns and expected returns for the composite ICC measure rCOMP. HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which is used 
to estimate rCOMP. MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month of trading. Realised return observations from MV1 to MV24: 
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Table 4.11 shows temporal averages of year-by-year Spearman and Pearson correla-
tions between realised and expected returns, including the number of years (out of 29 for 
MV1-MV18 and 28 for MV24) for which annual coefficients are significantly posi-
tive/negative. Average Spearman correlations for the HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP model 
centre around zero up to MV9 (i.e., half of the sixteen significant correlations are positive 
and half of them are negative), but become consistently positive from MV12 onwards 
(Panel A). Across all models, HVZ-based estimates show the highest association with 
realised returns for MV12 (0.07), MV18 (0.06) and MV24 (0.05), followed by HVZ/EP 
with an average correlation of 0.04 over the same forecasting horizons. The lowest cor-
relations are observed for EP- and RI-based estimates, with a mean association of about 
0.03. Pearson correlations (Panel B) lead to qualitatively similar conclusions; however, 
the linear relationships between realised and expected returns tend to be considerably 
stronger than the monotonic ones above; that is, the average correlation between HVZ-
based ICC estimates and actual returns from MV12 to MV24 is about 0.09, and approxi-
mately 0.08 for EP, RI and HVZ/EP.  
 
While comparable in magnitude to prior evidence—for instance, Botosan et al. (2011) 
document an average Spearman correlation of about 0.06—results differ in respect to 
statistical significance: approximately forty percent of coefficients are significantly posi-
tive in large sample studies (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011)), 
while only about ten (twenty) percent of Spearman (Pearson) coefficients are positive for 
my IPO sample (averaging correlations over all models and forecasting horizons beyond 
MV9). This study’s correlation coefficients are, on average, based on 60 observations per 
year; Botosan and Plumlee (2005) on the other hand rely on approximately 1,100 obser-
vations (12,400 firm-years from 1983-1993) and Botosan et al. (2011) infer results from 
about 700 observations per year (14,521 firm-years from 1984–2004). Thus, low sample 
size possibly diminishes the statistical power of these tests and explains the comparatively 
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Table 4.11: Year-by-Year Correlations 
Panel A: Spearman correlations  
















rCOMP                           
HVZ -0.0172   0.0148   0.0214   -0.0026   0.0686   0.0578   0.0471 
  (2/1)   (1/1)   (3/1)   (2/0)   (3/0)   (3/1)   (3/1) 
EP 0.0082   0.0194   0.0003   -0.0331   0.0361   0.0271   0.0226 
  (4/1)   (3/2)   (4/2)   (2/1)   (2/0)   (3/1)   (3/0) 
RI -0.0001   0.0145   -0.0018   -0.0382   0.0273   0.0283   0.0229 
  (3/1)   (3/2)   (4/2)   (2/1)   (3/0)   (3/2)   (2/0) 
HVZ/EP -0.0078   0.0065   0.0011   -0.0439   0.0203   0.0474   0.0458 
  (3/1)   (2/1)   (3/2)   (3/0)   (4/0)   (2/1)   (4/0) 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations   
















rCOMP                           
HVZ -0.0592   -0.0106   0.0441   0.0052   0.0994   0.0787   0.0832 
  (0/2)   (2/1)   (3/2)   (2/2)   (5/0)   (5/1)   (7/0) 
EP -0.0313   -0.0014   0.0098   -0.0417   0.0799   0.0712   0.0748 
  (1/0)   (3/1)   (3/3)   (2/2)   (4/0)   (6/1)   (4/1) 
RI -0.0321   -0.0045   0.0107   -0.0425   0.0786   0.0768   0.0723 
  (1/0)   (3/2)   (3/2)   (2/1)   (5/0)   (6/1)   (4/1) 
HVZ/EP -0.0479   -0.0185   -0.0065   -0.0571   0.0581   0.0754   0.0957 
  (1/2)   (3/1)   (2/3)   (1/2)   (5/0)   (5/0)   (5/0) 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the average value of year-by-year Spearman (Pearson) correlations between realised and 
expected returns. In parentheses the number of years (out of 29 for MV1-MV18 and 28 for MV24) for which annual 
coefficients are significantly positive/negative at the 0.05 level.  HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which is 
used to predict earnings. MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month 
of trading. Results based on 1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 observations for MV1 to MV24.  
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4.4.3.2 Empirical results  
Table 4.12 provides Fama-MacBeth coefficients from regressing one-year ahead buy-
and-hold returns on the model-based ICC measures. The benchmark for each regression 
is a coefficient of one which indicates that realised and expected returns are on average 
equal. LM (2014) report statistically significant non-zero coefficients of 0.31 (3.42) for 
HVZ-based ICC estimates, 0.57 (2.59) for EP and 0.65 (2.81) for RI (Fama-MacBeth t-
statistic in parentheses).99  
 
FMB coefficients for HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP are all negative and insignificant for 
MV1, somewhat mixed (7 negative; 5 positive) for MV3 to MV9, but significantly posi-
tive for forecasting horizons beyond. HVZ/EP-based ICC estimates display the strongest 
relationship with future realised returns in that coefficients are consistently close to one 
(MV12: 0.94; MV18: 1.04; MV24: 0.96), statistically non-zero (t-statistic MV12-MV24: 
1.81; 2.52; 2;69) and highly insignificantly different from one (t-statistics MV12-MV24: 
0.10). In contrast, HVZ, EP and RI-based estimates tend to be on average too low for 
MV12 (as indicated by coefficients above one: 1.31; 1.22; 1.12), but too high for MV24 
(as illustrated by coefficients below one: 0.87; 0.74; 0.75).100 
 
Inefficient market prices in the short-term may explain why results only become sig-
nificant beyond MV9. Consistent with Miller (1977), investors might diverge on opinions 
about fundamental values of newly listed shares in the immediate aftermarket. In combi-
nation with short-sale constrains—which prohibit pessimistic investors to register their 
negative outlook—this can result in upward biased aftermarket prices towards the value 
perceptions of optimistic investors. Only as short-sale constrains are lowered and investor 
opinions are less divergent, observed market prices converge towards stocks’ fundamen-
tal values (i.e., market prices become efficient).101 The effect of this adjustment process 
is twofold; first, average realised returns are declining until prices reflect fundamental 
                                                 
99  HVZ (2012) do not carry out firm-level analyses. 
100  Given that scale effects can bias coefficients and confound inferences in regression analyses (e.g., Barth 
and Clinch (2009), Easton and Sommers (2003)), I re-run the analyses on share-deflated earnings and 
use closing prices (i.e. P1 to P24) instead of market values (i.e. MV1 to MV24) in the ICC calculations. 
ICC level estimates remain almost unchanged and FMB coefficients are qualitatively equal to results 
using undeflated earnings (see Appendix 4.3) which corroborates results.    
101  See also Cornelli and Yilmaz (2015) who model the impact of short-selling constraints on long run 
equilibrium prices and discuss implications of their model for IPOs.  
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value (leading to insignificant associations with realised returns); second, only as markets 
turn efficient, realised and expected returns become positively related. My findings sup-
port this proposition: median realised returns are initially decreasing (see Figure 4.5)—
which leads to insignificant FMB coefficients up to MV9—but realised returns converge 
towards expected returns from MV12 onwards (implying and increase in market effi-
ciency) which results in positive and significant FMB coefficients thereafter (see Figure 
4.6).  
 
These results are also supported by prior evidence. For instance, Cornelli et al. (2006, 
p. 1190) find for the vast majority of their sample that (1) retail investors’ overoptimism 
results in first-day IPO prices which are on average 41 percent higher than they would 
have been in the “absence of sentiment demand” and (2) that prices decline in the first 12 
months of trading as “overoptimism gives way to realistic expectations.” In a similar vein, 
Ecker (2014) shows that “positive abnormal returns disappear after the first nine post-
IPO months” and “negative abnormal returns persist for 18 months” (p. 907). I interpret 
these findings as evidence that post-IPO market efficiency increases with time and prices 
“turn” efficient somewhere between 9 and 18 months of listing.  
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Figure 4.5: Realised & Expected Returns 
The figure compares median realised buy-and-hold returns (dotted line) with median expected ICC (rCOMP) returns, 
calculated from HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP earnings forecasts (solid lines) over time.   
 
 
Figure 4.6: Fama-MacBeth Coefficients 
The figure shows Fama-MacBeth coefficients from regressing realised returns on expected ICC (rCOMP) returns, 

















MV1 MV3 MV6 MV9 MV12 MV18 MV24
Median Realised (1-year BHR) & Expected Returns (rCOMP)
HVZ EP RI HVZ/EP rREAL
MV1  MV3  MV6  MV9  MV12 MV18 MV24
HVZ -0.7581 -0.1528 0.3150 0.1597 1.3059 1.0623 0.8789
EP -0.5459 0.0505 0.0072 -0.3230 1.2236 0.9960 0.7437
RI -0.5461 0.0248 -0.0064 -0.3012 1.1186 1.0324 0.7539
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Table 4.12: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Future Annual Returns on ICC estimates 






























HVZ -0.7581 0.30  -0.1528 0.02  0.3150 0.60  0.1597 0.05  1.3059 0.61  1.0623 1.86  0.8789 0.92 
























EP -0.5459 0.09  0.0505 0.06  0.0072 0.06  -0.3230 0.00  1.2236 0.94  0.9960 1.42  0.7437 0.64 
























RI -0.5461 0.08  0.0248 0.06  -0.0064 0.03  -0.3012 0.00  1.1186 0.87  1.0324 1.57  0.7539 0.63 
























HVZ/EP -0.6254 0.29  -0.1369 0.02  -0.1094 0.07  -0.4316 0.02  0.9403 0.41  1.0383 1.60  0.9573 0.91 
























The table reports Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients of future realised returns on the composite ICC measure rCOMP. In parentheses t-statistics for whether the mean coefficient is 
equal to zero or one. ***, **, * denotes significance at the one, five, ten percent level or better. HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which is used to predict earnings. MV1 to 
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4.4.3.3 Robustness Tests 
To further substantiate the validity of the suggested ICC methodology, I perform several 
robustness tests. Given above findings, which show that the HVZ/EP model generates 
more valid ICC estimates vis-à-vis the HVZ, EP and RI models stand-alone, I run those 
tests for the HVZ/EP model only.  
 
First, it is examined if results are robust to different econometric implementations (see 
Table 4.13 and Figure 4.7). In the base case—which equals previous results—all ICC 
estimates are set to a range of zero and 50 percent, and at least 15 IPOs per fiscal year are 
required, before FMB regressions are estimated. Test I follows data requirements/manip-
ulations of the base case, but operates pooled OLS regressions (controlling for time-fixed 
effects) instead. Except for MV12, all coefficients are very similar in size and statistical 
significance to previous results. Data requirements of the base case are undone in Test II 
in that actual future returns are regressed on actual ICC estimates, without requiring a 
minimum number of firms per year. Test coefficients are in the median about 20 percent 
smaller than under the base case; however, the pattern between the two setups remains 
highly consistent (Pearson r: 0.93), leaving results qualitatively unchanged. Further, it is 
examined if results are driven by survivorship bias. The total number of firms in each 
regression depends on when stocks are assumed to be bought; observations are close to 
1,590 for MV1 to MV12, but drop to 1,563 and 1,504 for MV18 and MV24, respectively; 
whilst small, this indicates survivorship bias in my sample. Keeping only those firms with 
non-missing data for MV1-MV24 (1,503 observations) and comparing FMB coefficients 
against previous results (i.e., the base case), it is shown that variation in firm numbers has 
no material impact on findings (see Test III). 
 
Second, I test if excluding the largest and smallest IPOs (in terms of market value at 
the end of the first month of trading) from the sample alters results. This is important as 
IPO size is strongly positively skewed (25.9) and highly leptokurtic (828.2), which might 
allow extreme cases to bias results. Table 4.14 and Figure 4.8 show FMB coefficients for 
three different size percentiles: MV[1-99] excludes IPOs with market value below the 1st 
and above the 99th percentile from the analysis, MV[5-95] excludes firms outside the 
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5th/95th percentile and MV[10-90] firms outside the 10th/90th percentile. Test coefficients 
between the base case and the different size percentiles are highly correlated (average 
Pearson r: 0.95), but somewhat lower in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. 
This indicates slightly upward biased results due to an “abnormally” high representation 
of very small and large IPOs in my sample. 
 
Third, I analyse if results are robust to different sampling periods. As shown in Table 
4.15 and Figure 4.9, FMB coefficients for IPOs pertaining to the 1980s show a very sim-
ilar pattern to the base case; the 1990s coefficients are slightly higher, and the 2000s are 
somewhat lower. Only few IPOs in my sample relate to the 1980s (average observations 
MV1-MV24: 440) and 2000s (234), which partially explains lower statistical significance 
of the coefficients; in contrast, t-statistics for the 1990s (900) compare well with full sam-
ple results. Finally, it is examined if the dot-com bubble (2000/02) and financial crisis 
(2007/08) distort our findings. To provide coarse indication of these crises’ impact on 
results, I exclude IPOs occurring immediately before and during the collapse of each bub-
ble: fiscal years 1997-2001 (dot-com) and 2004-2007 (financial crisis) are removed from 
the analysis which—as noted in Section 4.3.2 Earnings Forecasts—include firms going 
public from 1998-2002 and 2005-2008. FMB coefficients become more conservative un-
der this setting (reduced size and significance) which reveals some upward bias in full 
sample results due to market inefficiencies surrounding the dot-com and financial crisis.    
 
 Taken together, several additional tests support the validity of this study’s ICC meth-
odology for newly listed firms. Base case results are somewhat too optimistic due to the 
impact of very large/small IPOs in my sample as well as distorting effects emanating from 
the two major financial crises in the early 2000s; however, even after controlling for these 
confounding factors, the overall construct validity of HVZ/EP-based ICC estimates re-
main widely intact. 
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Figure 4.7: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different Econometric Settings    
The figure shows regression coefficients for different econometric settings. Base: FMB regressions of future realised 
returns on the composite ICC measure HVZ/EP-rCOMP, where ICC measure set to range between zero and 50 percent, 
actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to be included; Test I: Base case, but pooled 
OLS regressions (controlling for time-fixed effects) are run; Test II: FMB regressions on raw data (i.e., data manipu-
lation and requirements of base case undone); Test III: Base case, but only those firms are kept which have non-
missing data for all points in time (MV1-MV24: 1,503 observations).  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different IPO Size Percentiles 
The figure shows FMB regression coefficients for different IPO size percentiles. Base: FMB regressions of future 
realised returns on the composite ICC measure HVZ/EP-rCOMP, where ICC measure set to range between zero and 
50 percent, actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to be included; MV[1-99]: Base 
case, but IPOs with market value below 1st and above 99th percentile are excluded from the analysis; MV[5-95] and 
MV[10-90] follows accordingly. Percentiles based on market value at the end of the first month of trading.  
 
MV1 MV3 MV6 MV9 MV12 MV18 MV24
Base -0.6254 -0.1369 -0.1094 -0.4316 0.9403 1.0383 0.9573
Test I -0.6935 -0.2311 0.0118 -0.4146 0.6728 1.1558 0.9462
Test II -0.8877 -0.1087 -0.6407 -0.5172 1.1769 0.6951 0.5467







Regression Coefficients (HVZ/EP-rCOMP) for Different Econometric Setups
MV1 MV3 MV6 MV9 MV12 MV18 MV24
Base -0.6254 -0.1369 -0.1094 -0.4316 0.9403 1.0383 0.9573
MV [1-99] -0.4706 -0.0943 -0.3412 -0.6484 0.4307 0.7270 0.9076
MV [5-95] -0.3644 -0.1566 -0.2558 -0.4195 0.6608 0.8635 0.8722







FMB Coefficients (HVZ/EP-rCOMP) for Different IPO Size Percentiles
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Figure 4.9: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different Sample Periods 
The figure shows FMB regression coefficients of the HVZ/EP model for different sample periods. Base: FMB regres-
sions of future realised returns on the composite ICC measure HVZ/EP-rCOMP from 1980 - 2013, where ICC measure 
set to range between zero and 50 percent, actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to 
be included; 1980/89: Base case, but IPOs pertaining to fiscal years 1980 to 1989 only; 1990/99 and 2000/13 follows 




MV1 MV3 MV6 MV9 MV12 MV18 MV24
Base -0.6254 -0.1369 -0.1094 -0.4316 0.9403 1.0383 0.9573
1980/89 -0.7203 -0.4616 -0.2964 -0.7275 1.0208 1.0981 0.9789
1990/99 -0.3501 0.5373 0.1517 -0.2948 0.8996 1.7389 1.1396
2000/13 -0.8260 -0.5253 -0.1919 -0.2549 0.8961 0.1933 0.7026








FMB Coefficients (HVZ/EP-rCOMP) for Different Sample Periods
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Table 4.13: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different Econometric Settings  












































Base -0.6254 0.29   -0.1369 0.02   -0.1094 0.07   -0.4316 0.02   0.9403 0.41   1.0383 1.60   0.9573 0.91 
= 0 (-1.51)     (-0.35)     (-0.29)     (-1.01)     (1.81)*     (2.52)**     (2.69)***   
= 1 (3.93)***     (2.88)***     (2.92)***     (3.34)***     (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.10)   
Test I -0.6935 6.06   -0.2311 6.50   0.0118 5.39   -0.4146 5.14   0.6728 4.38   1.1558 6.46   0.9462 4.06 
= 0 (-2.54)***     (-0.92)     (0.04)     (-1.53)     (2.19)**     (4.71)***     (3.74)***   
= 1 (6.18)***     (4.90)***     (3.73)***     (5.22)***     (1.06)     (0.63)     (0.22)   
Test II -0.8877 0.00   -0.1087 0.00   -0.6407 0.00   -0.5172 0.02   1.1769 0.10   0.6951 1.09   0.5467 0.28 
= 0 (-1.52)     (-0.15)     (-1.46)     (-0.97)     (2.32)**     (1.52)     (1.39)   
= 1 (3.24)***     (1.50)     (3.75)***     (2.85)***     (0.35)     (0.67)     (1.15)   
Test III -0.7041 0.42   -0.1033 0.01   -0.0461 0.07   -0.2768 0.01   0.9697 0.48   1.1289 1.89   0.9590 0.92 
= 0 (-1.61)     (-0.24)     (-0.11)     (-0.56)     (1.76)*     (2.68)***     (2.69)***   
= 1 (3.89)***     (2.60)**     (2.59)**     (2.59)**     (0.00)     (0.30)     (0.10)   
The table reports regression coefficients of the HVZ/EP model for a number of different econometric settings. Base: FMB regressions of future realised returns on the composite ICC 
measure HVZ/EP-rCOMP, where ICC measure set to range between zero and 50 percent, actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to be included; Test I: 
Base case, but pooled OLS regressions (controlling for time-fixed effects) are run; Test II: FMB regressions on raw data (i.e., data manipulation and requirements of base case undone); 
Test III: Base case, but only those firms are kept which have non-missing data for all points in time (MV1-MV24: 1,503 observations). In parentheses t-statistics for whether the mean 
coefficient is equal to zero or one. ***, **, * denotes significance at the one, five, ten percent level or better. MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to 
twenty-fourth month of trading. Results based on 1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 observations for MV1 to MV24, except for Test III (MV1-MV24: 1,503 observations).  
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Table 4.14: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different Sample Percentiles 












































Base -0.6254 0.29   -0.1369 0.02   -0.1094 0.07   -0.4316 0.02   0.9403 0.41   1.0383 1.60   0.9573 0.91 
= 0 (-1.51)     (-0.35)     (-0.29)     (-1.01)     (1.81)*     (2.52)**     (2.69)***   
= 1 (3.93)***     (2.88)***     (2.92)***     (3.34)***     (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.10)   
MV[1-99] -0.4706 0.32   -0.0943 0.02   -0.3412 0.00   -0.6484 0.03   0.4307 0.27   0.7270 1.10   0.9076 0.91 
= 0 (-1.02)     (-0.25)     (-0.92)     (-1.56)     (1.03)     (1.84)*     (2.50)**   
= 1 (3.19)***     (2.85)***     (3.61)***     (3.97)***     (1.36)     (0.69)     (0.26)   
MV[5-95] -0.3644 0.29   -0.1566 0.00   -0.2558 0.00   -0.4195 0.06   0.6608 0.24   0.8635 1.31   0.8722 0.93 
= 0 (-0.95)     (-0.39)     (-0.64)     (-0.90)     (1.47)     (2.03)**     (2.43)**   
= 1 (3.55)***     (2.91)***     (3.15)***     (3.06)***     (0.75)     (0.32)     (0.36)   
MV[10-90] -0.5284 0.37   -0.1761 0.00   -0.4115 0.00   -0.8832 0.04   0.0901 0.23   0.7298 1.59   0.8927 0.94 
= 0 (-0.98)     (-0.35)     (-0.79)     (-1.53)     (0.19)     (1.57)     (2.16)**   
= 1 (2.83)***     (2.31)**     (2.70)***     (3.26)***     (1.90)*     (0.58)     (0.26)   
The table reports FMB regression coefficients of the HVZ/EP model for different sample percentiles. Base: FMB regressions of future realised returns on the composite ICC measure 
HVZ/EP-rCOMP, where ICC measure set to range between zero and 50 percent, actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to be included; MV[1-99]: Base 
case, but IPOs with market value below 1st and above 99th percentile are excluded from the analysis; settings for MV[5-95] and MV[10-90] follow accordingly. Percentiles are based on 
market value at the end of the first month of trading. In parentheses t-statistics for whether the mean coefficient is equal to zero or one. ***, **, * denotes significance at the one, five, ten 
percent level or better. MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month of trading. Results of base case are based on 
1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 observations for MV1 to MV24; MV[1-99] observations:1558/1559/1560/1560/1559/1532/1474;MV[5-95]:1432/1433/1434/1434/1434/1409/1359; 
MV[10-90]: 1272/1273/1274/1274/1274/1253/1210.  
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Table 4.15: Robustness Tests of HVZ/EP Model for Different Sample Periods 












































Base -0.6254 0.29   -0.1369 0.02   -0.1094 0.07   -0.4316 0.02   0.9403 0.41   1.0383 1.60   0.9573 0.91 
= 0 (-1.51)     (-0.35)     (-0.29)     (-1.01)     (1.81)*     (2.52)**     (2.69)***   
= 1 (3.93)***     (2.88)***     (2.92)***     (3.34)***     (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.10)   
1980/89 -0.7203 0.55   -0.4616 0.04   -0.2964 0.21   -0.7275 0.14   1.0208 0.60   1.0981 1.75   0.9789 0.96 
= 0 (-1.29)     (-0.79)     (-0.36)     (-0.90)     (0.84)     (1.42)     (1.84)*   
= 1 (3.08)***     (2.51)**     (1.58)     (2.15)**     (0.00)     (0.14)     (0.00)   
1990/99 -0.3501 0.07   0.5373 0.06   0.1517 0.02   -0.2948 0.04   0.8996 0.26   1.7389 2.17   1.1396 0.85 
= 0 (-0.35)     (0.57)     -0.24     (-0.32)     (1.65)     (2.84)***     (1.92)*   
= 1 (1.36)     (0.49)     (1.32)     (1.40)     (0.17)     (1.21)     (0.25)   
2000/13 -0.8260 0.57   -0.5253 0.02   -0.1919 0.28   -0.2549 0.11   0.8961 0.12   0.1933 0.15   0.7026 1.94 
= 0 (-1.53)     (-1.51)     (-0.37)     (-0.63)     (0.99)     (0.27)     (0.85)   
= 1 (3.38)***     (4.40)***     (2.32)**     (3.11)***     (0.10)     (1.11)     (0.36)   
Ex.Crises -0.4850 0.35   -0.2410 0.00   -0.0910 0.02   -0.5608 0.14   0.6945 0.09   0.8298 0.81   0.6909 0.20 
Coeff. = 0 (-1.73)*     (-0.78)     (-0.24)     (-1.40)     (1.09)     (1.83)*     (1.84)*   
Coeff. = 1 (5.29)***     (4.04)***     (2.87)***     (3.89)***     (0.48)     (0.37)     (0.82)   
The table reports FMB regression coefficients of the HVZ/EP model for different sample periods. Base: FMB regressions of future realised returns on the composite ICC measure HVZ/EP-
rCOMP from 1980 - 2013, where ICC measure set to range between zero and 50 percent, actual future return are used, and at least 15 IPOs per year are required to be included; 1980/89: 
Base case, but IPOs pertaining to fiscal years 1980 to 1989 only; 1990/99 and 2000/13 follows accordingly. Ex.Crises: Base case, but IPOs pertaining to fiscal years 1997/2001 and 
2004/07 excluded from sample. In parentheses t-statistics for whether the mean coefficient is equal to zero or one. ***, **, * denotes significance at the one, five, ten percent level or better. 
MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month of trading. Results of base case are based on 1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 obser-
vations for MV1 to MV24; 1980/89 observations: 442/443/444/444/443/439/431; 1990/99: 907/907/907/907/ 907/899/ 863; 2000/13:241/241/241/241/241/225/210; Ex.Crises: 1310/1311/ 
1312/1312/1311/1285/1235.  
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions   
This study elaborates on recent advancements in ICC research and evaluates the perfor-
mance of mechanical earnings predictions for newly listed firms. IPO markets constitute 
one of the most demanding empirical settings in finance, and as such are an ideal envi-
ronment to scrutinise extant “large sample study” results. Using three cross-sectional 
earnings forecasting models suggested in seminal work by HVZ (2012) and LM (2014), 
this paper provides comparative evidence for a sample of 1,657 IPOs on the quality of 
model-based earnings forecasts and the validity of ICC estimates derived therefrom.  
 
My primary two conclusions are as follows. First, combining the HVZ and EP model 
into one forecasting solution (HVZ/EP) generates higher quality earnings forecasts (as 
indicated by lower forecast biases and higher ERC coefficients) and more valid ICC es-
timates (as shown by more consistent FMB coefficients) vis-à-vis the HVZ, EP and RI 
models stand-alone. These results contrast with large sample evidence of LM (2014)—
who recommend that “future research use the RI model or the EP model to generate earn-
ings forecasts” (LM, 2014, p. 1152)—and indicates that model performance is likely to 
be conditional on firm characteristics: while parsimonious forecasting models (such as 
EP and RI) appear to work well for established firms, more complex forecasting solutions 
(such as HVZ/EP) perform better for younger and smaller firms as corroborated by my 
findings.   
 
Second—and putting findings into greater context—results demonstrate that cross-
sectional earnings forecasting models can be reliably used in a market setting where idi-
osyncratic information is limited and risk factor-based (RFB) estimates are inapplicable 
due to a lack of sufficiently long enough return histories (i.e., under this study’s method-
ology an IPOs ICC estimate is essentially available from the first day of trading, while 
RFB proxies calculated from asset pricing models generally require previous five year of 
return data). On the one hand, this adds evidence to the discussion on the usefulness of 
IPO prospectus information for investors: pre-IPO financial information is no longer only 
a valuable source for pricing purposes (Klein, 1996), but can also be effectively used for 
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cost of equity calculations. On the other hand, findings endorse this study’s ICC method-
ology as a unique method of expected return estimation in the context of newly listed 
firms which, more generally, promotes model-based ICC estimates as a valid alternative 
to other CoE measures.  
 
While this study contributes novel evidence on the applicability of model-based ICC 
for newly listed firms, it is silent on the more general impact of firm characteristics and 
market-settings on the reliability of earnings models and corresponding ICC estimates. 
Future research might fill this gap and provide clearer guidance on the conditions under 
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4.6 Appendices 
Appendix 4.1: Pooled Average Implied Cost of Capital 
  MV1   MV3   MV6   MV9   MV12   MV18   MV24 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
rPE                                         
HVZ 0.0509 0.0337   0.0673 0.0424   0.0677 0.0414   0.0694 0.0411   0.0715 0.0401   0.0881 0.0494   0.0896 0.0464 
EP 0.0500 0.0346   0.0668 0.0444   0.0668 0.0430   0.0686 0.0429   0.0715 0.0414   0.0899 0.0496   0.0902 0.0465 
RI 0.0509 0.0354   0.0678 0.0447   0.0677 0.0428   0.0695 0.0427   0.0723 0.0411   0.0901 0.0472   0.0902 0.0446 
HVZ/EP 0.0444 0.0292   0.0567 0.0360   0.0570 0.0344   0.0584 0.0347   0.0607 0.0329   0.0755 0.0384   0.0762 0.0365 
rPEG                                         
HVZ 0.1255 0.1085   0.1072 0.0918   0.1070 0.0914   0.1081 0.0908   0.1101 0.0921   0.1083 0.0881   0.1080 0.0878 
EP 0.1334 0.1185   0.1146 0.0968   0.1142 0.0945   0.1155 0.0951   0.1177 0.0944   0.1246 0.1032   0.1248 0.1017 
RI 0.1339 0.1185   0.1145 0.0970   0.1139 0.0945   0.1153 0.0941   0.1175 0.0942   0.1247 0.1047   0.1248 0.1032 
HVZ/EP 0.1184 0.1045   0.1079 0.0929   0.1074 0.0924   0.1085 0.0908   0.1105 0.0915   0.1157 0.0960   0.1159 0.0945 
rMPEG                                         
HVZ 0.1334 0.1112   0.1179 0.0951   0.1179 0.0948   0.1189 0.0934   0.1212 0.0956   0.1204 0.0925   0.1200 0.0924 
EP 0.1395 0.1208   0.1227 0.1004   0.1225 0.0988   0.1236 0.0977   0.1263 0.0975   0.1345 0.1068   0.1348 0.1065 
RI 0.1400 0.1207   0.1223 0.1010   0.1220 0.0984   0.1232 0.0976   0.1259 0.0985   0.1344 0.1081   0.1345 0.1070 
HVZ/EP 0.1262 0.1066   0.1179 0.0962   0.1175 0.0955   0.1184 0.0930   0.1209 0.0941   0.1270 0.0992   0.1269 0.0977 
rAEGM                                         
HVZ 0.1430 0.1231   0.1250 0.1027   0.1251 0.1024   0.1260 0.1019   0.1280 0.1034   0.1254 0.0980   0.1247 0.0974 
EP 0.1478 0.1301   0.1298 0.1084   0.1297 0.1078   0.1307 0.1066   0.1331 0.1077   0.1395 0.1142   0.1397 0.1124 
RI 0.1481 0.1297   0.1300 0.1080   0.1297 0.1081   0.1308 0.1062   0.1333 0.1077   0.1398 0.1148   0.1398 0.1135 
HVZ/EP 0.1357 0.1164   0.1253 0.1037   0.1249 0.1029   0.1256 0.1015   0.1280 0.1022   0.1327 0.1066   0.1325 0.1043 
The table reports pooled mean and median expected returns the four different implied cost of capital measures suggest by Easton (2004). HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which 
is used to predict earnings. MV1-MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to the twenty-fourth month of trading which is used to calculate the respective ICC. 
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Appendix 4.2: Regressions of Future Annual Returns on ICC measures 
  MV1   MV3   MV6   MV9   MV12   MV18   MV24 
  
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.)   
Coeff. 
(t-stat.) 
rPE                           
HVZ -1.0303   -0.1509   0.7744   0.5511   1.5735   0.3774   0.3458 
  (-1.61)   (-0.45)   (1.54)   (1.25)   (2.98)   (1.21)   (1.39) 
EP -0.4288   0.2876   0.0218   -0.0866   0.9146   0.7482   0.4908 
  (-0.75)   (0.72)   (0.07)   (-0.19)   (1.67)   (2.26)   (1.61) 
RI -0.4030   0.2651   0.0313   -0.0652   0.8721   0.6675   0.3859 
  (-0.70)   (0.68)   (0.10)   (-0.14)   (1.58)   (2.29)   (1.42) 
HVZ/EP -0.7889   0.0509   0.0078   -0.2127   0.7712   0.4097   0.3865 
  (-1.30)   (0.13)   (0.02)   (-0.44)   (1.38)   (1.31)   (1.45) 
rPEG                           
HVZ -0.9230   -0.0334   0.4082   0.2490   1.3266   1.2535   1.0107 
  (-2.70)   (-0.09)   (1.00)   (0.61)   (2.82)   (2.51)   (2.23) 
EP -0.6373   0.3734   0.2025   0.1454   1.2124   0.9169   0.7993 
  ( -1.99)   (0.90)   (0.54)   (0.36)   (2.59)   (1.80)   (1.79) 
RI -0.6558   0.4797   0.1516   0.0087   0.9659   0.9787   0.7878 
  (-2.01)   (1.08)   (0.40)   (0.02)   (2.18)   (1.94)   (1.70) 
HVZ/EP -0.9079   0.2010   0.2786   0.0881   1.4829   1.1438   0.9038 
  (-2.44)   (0.51)   (0.71)   (0.20)   (2.42)   (2.34)   (2.06) 
rMPEG                           
HVZ -0.6596   -0.1476   0.0923   -0.0945   0.7866   1.0910   0.6990 
  (-1.93)   (-0.49)   (0.26)   (-0.27)   (2.00)   (2.57)   (1.90) 
EP -0.5755   0.1359   0.0456   -0.0086   1.0096   0.8516   0.6042 
  (-1.62)   (0.35)   (0.13)   (-0.02)   (2.43)   (2.00)   (1.57) 
RI -0.6035   0.1713   0.0370   -0.0833   0.9107   0.8740   0.5915 
  (-1.68)   (0.43)   (0.10)   (-0.24)   (2.31)   (2.10)   (1.50) 
HVZ/EP -0.6569   -0.0683   -0.0412   -0.1024   0.8957   0.9832   0.6912 
  (-1.89)   (-0.21)   (-0.12)   (-0.29)   (2.25)   (2.37)   (1.92) 
rAEGM                           
HVZ -0.4862   -0.0182   0.1892   -0.1008   0.8500   1.1178   0.7935 
  (-1.42)   (-0.06)   (0.52)   (-0.27)   (2.02)   (2.49)   (2.17) 
EP -0.4931   0.0776   0.1572   0.1391   1.3644   1.2002   0.8154 
  (-1.43)   (0.21)   (0.40)   (0.35)   (2.43)   (2.41)   (2.16) 
RI -0.5510   0.0816   0.0773   -0.0137   1.1350   1.1770   0.7925 
  (-1.59)   (0.21)   (0.19)   (-0.04)   (2.33)   (2.37)   (2.01) 
HVZ/EP -0.4138   -0.0064   -0.0426   -0.1371   0.9226   1.0353   0.7765 
  (-1.14)   (-0.02)   (-0.12)   (-0.36)   (2.09)   (2.37)   (2.20) 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients of future realised returns on the four different implied cost of 
capital measures suggest by Easton (2004). HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which is used to predict earn-
ings. MV1 to MV24 denote the market value of equity at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month of trading which is 
used to calculate the ICC measures. Results based on 1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 observations for MV1 to 
MV24. 
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Appendix 4.3: Future Annual Returns and ICC measures (Deflated Earnings) 
Panel A: Pooled average future realised returns and implied cost of capital 
  P1  P3  P6  P9  P12  P18  P24 
rCOMP Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
HVZ 0.1113 0.0919   0.1047 0.0834   0.1066 0.0840   0.1091 0.0842   0.1127 0.0865   0.1176 0.0893   0.1202 0.0927 
EP 0.1147 0.1003   0.1079 0.0890   0.1098 0.0880   0.1123 0.0885   0.1164 0.0899   0.1308 0.1040   0.1339 0.1048 
RI 0.1148 0.0998   0.1071 0.0871   0.1088 0.0869   0.1113 0.0867   0.1154 0.0880   0.1305 0.1040   0.1335 0.1051 
HVZ/EP 0.1017 0.0860   0.1006 0.0821   0.1023 0.0814   0.1044 0.0813   0.1079 0.0832   0.1194 0.0933   0.1221 0.0951 
 
Panel B: Regressions of future annual returns on ICC measures 






















HVZ -0.7581   -0.1518   0.3309   0.2035   1.2835   1.0543   0.7791 
= 0 (-1.83)*   (-0.44)   (0.82)   (0.54)   (2.86)***   (2.69)**   (2.25)** 
= 1 (4.24)***   (3.32)***   (1.66)   (2.10)**   (0.63)   (0.14)   (0.64) 
EP -0.5459   0.0111   -0.0234   -0.2740   1.2017   0.9615   0.6726 
= 0 (-1.21)   (0.03)   (-0.06)   (-0.56)   (1.87)*   (2.30)**   (1.87)* 
= 1 (3.44)***   (2.57)**   (2.65)**   (2.62)**   (0.32)   (0.10)   (0.91) 
RI -0.5461   0.0143   -0.0096   -0.2531   1.0990   0.9966   0.6819 
= 0 (-1.19)   (0.04)   (-0.02)   (-0.55)   (1.79)*   (2.40)**   (1.87)* 
= 1 (3.38)***   (2.52)**   (2.59)**   (2.73)**   (0.17)   (0.00)   (0.87) 
HVZ/EP -0.6254   -0.1558   -0.1011   -0.3782   0.9178   0.9968   0.8520 
= 0 (-1.51)   (-0.40)   (-0.27)   (-0.88)   (1.78)*   (2.50)**   (2.49)** 
= 1 (3.93)***   (2.95)***   (2.90)***   (3.21)***   (0.17)   (0.00)   (0.44) 
Panel A reports pooled mean and median future realised returns and expected returns for the composite ICC measure rCOMP. HVZ, EP, RI and HVZ/EP denote the model which is used 
to predict earnings. P1 to P24 denote closing stock price at the end of the first to twenty-fourth month of trading which is used to calculate the ICC measures. Expected return observations 
for all models from P1 to P24:1600/1594/1594/1592/1592/1592/1591. Panel B reports Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients of future realised returns on the composite ICC measure 
rCOMP. In parentheses t-statistics for whether the mean coefficient is equal to zero or one. ***, **, * denotes significance at the one, five, ten percent level or better. Results based on 
1590/1591/1592/1592/1591/1563/1504 observations for MV1 to MV24. 
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5 Summary, Conclusion and Future Work  
This thesis is motivated by the information-based return models of Easley and O'Hara 
(2004) and Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2012) who show that firms with higher (lower) 
quality information environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) cost of equity than oth-
erwise identical firms. More specifically, it is demonstrated that firms can lower their cost 
of equity if they (1) disclose more value-relevant information to investors (Quantity); (2) 
provide information of higher accuracy (Precision); and (3) disseminate information 
more widely between investor groups (Asymmetry). Building on these propositions, I con-
tribute three interrelated papers to this strand of research.  
 
The first paper “Idiosyncratic Information and Expected Rate of Returns: A Meta-An-
alytic Review of the Literature” provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature 
examining the association between firm-specific information and expected rate of returns. 
In total, the results of 113 unique papers—which analyse the cost of equity effects of 
information Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity—are reconsidered. Overall, findings 
suggest that the association between firm-specific information and expected returns is 
moderated by the empirical measurement of both CoE and information attributes: firstly, 
CoE effects of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity are 3 to 6 times stronger in studies 
using risk factor-based (RFB)/valuation model-based (VMB) proxies than in studies con-
ducing asset pricing tests or using realised returns as proxies for CoE; secondly, the con-
troversy over the impact of Precision (Asymmetry) on firms’ CoE stems—by and large—
from the debate on the market pricing of accrual quality (PIN scores) insofar as, when 
other proxies are used, results confirm the conjectured associations with CoE; similarly, 
Quantity results show that country-level factors and type of information (financial vs. 
partial-/non-financial) mitigate disclosure effects on firms’ CoE.  
 
However, the variety of different CoE and information proxies used in extant work 
hinders analysis of the relative importance of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity as driv-
ers of expected returns; that is, which of the three attributes has comparatively greater 
CoE relevance cannot be conclusively answered by my literature review. Therefore, in 
my second paper “The Impact of Idiosyncratic Information on Expected Rate of Returns: 
A Structural Equation Modelling Approach” I apply a structural equation modelling 
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(SEM) approach to allow for simultaneous analysis of the different information attributes 
and CoE measures within one empirical model. 
  
Using three different proxies for each information attribute and nine different CoE 
measures, SEM results confirm for a sample of 7,091 firms that companies with high 
(low) quality information environments enjoy relatively lower (higher) CoE than other-
wise identical firms, with Precision and Asymmetry being of equal CoE relevance, while 
Quantity effects being economically negligible; however, findings also show that the sig-
nificance of this impact decreases with firm size, maturity and profitability as well as 
market competition. Furthermore, informational differences between companies explain 
substantial variation in analyst-based implied cost of capital (ICC) estimates, but none in 
traditional risk factor-based return proxies (RFB), indicating that the former impound 
much more firm-specific information than the latter. Given the generally higher construct 
validity of ICC over RFB proxies, this suggests that the incorporation of idiosyncratic 
information in the measurement of risk factor-based proxies might help improve the em-
pirical soundness of those estimates.  
 
It should be noted, that findings of my literature review as well as SEM paper hinge 
upon the empirical soundness of VMB measures. While convincing evidence exists that 
VMB proxies are indeed better measures of CoE than realised return-based ones—which 
corroborates previous results—, concerns about upward-biased ICC estimates due to op-
timism in analyst earnings forecasts as well as coverage bias due to a lack of analyst 
following of young, small and financial distressed firms should not be neglected. My third 
paper “Implied Cost of Capital and Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasting Models: Evi-
dence from Newly Listed Firms” addresses these limitations in that it elaborates on recent 
advancements in model-based ICC research and examines the applicability of this new 
methodology for the smallest, youngest and least followed firms in capital markets: initial 
public offerings (IPOs).  
 
Using three cross-sectional earnings forecasting models proposed by Hou et al. (2012, 
HVZ) and  Li and Mohanram (2014, LM), I provide for a sample of 1,657 IPOs compar-
ative evidence on the quality of model-based earnings forecasts and the validity of ICC 
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estimates derived therefrom. Results demonstrate that combining the earnings model of 
HVZ (2012) with the earnings persistence (EP) model of LM (2014) into one forecasting 
solution (HVZ/EP) generates less forecast bias, higher earnings response coefficients 
(ERCs) and more valid ICC estimates vis-à-vis the HVZ, EP and RI (residual income) 
models stand-alone. This implies that for smaller and younger firms more complex fore-
casting solutions are required to ensure reliability of model-based earnings predictions 
and ICC estimates.  
 
Findings also indicate some interesting avenues for future research. First, quantifying 
the effect of idiosyncratic information on firms’ CoE via an information risk factor, which 
contemporaneously captures firms’ asymmetry and precision characteristics, appears to 
be promising in that it might help improve the empirical soundness of asset pricing mod-
els and, as such, expands recent work by Ecker et al. (2006), who recommend to modify 
traditional RFB models by an earnings quality factor. Second, investigating the impact of 
firm characteristics and market settings on both the reliability of mechanical earnings 
forecasts and the validity of model-based ICC estimates might be beneficial to obtain 
clearer guidance on the conditions under which the respective models perform best; that 
is, while parsimonious forecasting models appear to work well for established firms and 
more complex forecasting solutions tend to perform better for younger and smaller firms; 
the drivers of model performance are unidentified in extant work.   
 
The practical implications of this thesis may be summarised as follows: (1) more cor-
porate disclosure is no guarantee for lower cost of equity per se; that is, disclosure effects 
are greatest if financial information is disclosed, but starkly diminished for partial/non-
financial disclosure; furthermore, firms’ operating in countries with weak disclosure reg-
ulation and transparency enjoy substantially greater CoE benefits than firms operating in 
highly regulated markets; therefore, firms should consider these points before committing 
to more expansive disclosure policies given the economic trade-off between the proprie-
tary costs of more disclosure and the benefits from lower costs of equity; (2) if firms must 
decide to either provide more accurate information to investors or distribute information 
more equally between them, they should dedicate scarce resources to those activities that 
show the most room for improvement given similarly strong CoE effects emanating from 
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Asymmetry and Precision activities (such activities may include promoting investor rela-
tions, increasing reporting quality/frequency, committing to more expansive disclosure); 
however, if less established firms face a trade-off between providing better quality infor-
mation to investors and aiming to reduce informational disadvantages between investor 
groups, they should choose the former over the latter given the greater persistence of 
Precision effects (i.e., CoE benefits) for younger and smaller firms; (3) firms may oper-
ationalise model-based ICC estimates as a valid alternative to commonly used return 
proxies; while particularly relevant for firms for which traditional CoE measures are un-
available (due to a lack of a trading history or no listing at all), this approach also offers 
public companies a simple method of cross-validating their existing cost of equity esti-
mates.   
 
Overall, this thesis makes three major contributions to the literature. First, providing a 
quantitative review of the literature on the association between idiosyncratic information 
and expected returns complements narrative reviews on this topic. Second, reassessing 
this association by means of a novel structural equation modelling approach contributes 
new and empirically robust evidence to the debate on the market pricing of information 
risk. Third, examining the applicability of cross-sectional earnings forecasting models in 
an imperfect market setting is unique and elaborates on recent advancements in model-
based ICC research.  
 
Taken all findings together, this thesis presents convincing evidence that firms can 
lower their cost of equity if they disclose more value-relevant information to investors, 
provide information of higher accuracy, and disseminate information more widely be-
tween investor groups. While there is debate about the economic and statistical signifi-
cance of these associations, results suggest that it is limited to the controversy over the 
market pricing of a few information proxies. Reconsidering a large sample of previous 
results and using a wide range of different measures for both CoE and information attrib-
utes, findings corroborate the proposition that firms with high (low) quality information 
environments enjoy relatively low (high) costs of equity.  
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